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The nature of governorship just before, during, and just after the American Revolution is a 
subject that has been noticeably neglected in the historiography of the Revolution. While 
biographies of individual governors have been written, there remains a need for a clear 
ideological and constitutional debate about the actual executive functions, the nature of the 
appointment system in place, and the constitutional role of governors across the colonial and 
state periods. 
This dissertation examines the evolution of governorship in Virginia from 1758 to 1781. 
It attempts to identify, define and compare two different systems of governorship in Virginia. 
It examines the nature of executive authority and constitutional role of the different governors 
in this period. It seeks, first, to identify and define a gubernatorial system in colonial Virginia. 
By analysing a governor’s methods of appointment, the governor’s constitutional status, his 
relationship with the legislature and the people at large, this dissertation will identify a ‘British’ 
system of governorship. Second, the dissertation will attempt to identify a separate republican 
system of governorship in Virginia that was established in 1776. It will analyse the Virginia 
Constitution and explain the gubernatorial position in this political framework. It will also 
examine the first five years of Virginia’s independence from Britain and focus on the nature of 
gubernatorial authority in practice. By identifying two distinct models of governorship, this 
dissertation will be able to compare them in order to ascertain to what extent Virginians relied 
upon or abandoned British constitutional thinking and practice. 
The dissertation maintains that Virginians relied heavily upon British constitutional 
thinking when establishing their system of governorship in 1776. While Virginians rejected 
wholeheartedly a system based on monarchical influence and patronage, they were inspired by 
radical Country Whig thinkers who had dictated that an uncontrolled executive branch posed 
the greatest threat to the political system. Virginians in 1776 established a system of 
governorship that was inherently weak and that was controlled and dominated by the legislative 
branch. This dissertation, however, maintains that the system of state governorship established 
by the Virginian Convention in 1776 was not wholly dissimilar to the practical powers and 
influence at the disposal of royal governors. Both systems were inherently weak: the royal and 
state governors could not exert any meaningful control over the legislative branch, were not 
able to exert much influence over the people at large and were not granted many significant 
practical powers. This dissertation will also demonstrate that executive power, and the 
iii 
 
perceptions of the dangers that executive power posed, had developed markedly from 1776 to 
1781. Not only will it prove that Thomas Jefferson and Patrick Henry enjoyed more powers 
than was prescribed to the governorship in 1776, but it will also show that, by 1781, a strong 
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Early histories of the American Revolution habitually demonised royal governors and their 
apparently corrupt system of government; while at the same time, they lauded the achievements 
of the Founding Fathers and the creation of republican government. Royal governors such as 
Thomas Hutchinson, Francis Bernard, and Lord Dunmore were all painted with the same 
tyrannical brushstrokes: their egregious actions and policies during the period of revolutionary 
crisis were highlighted as one of the main reasons that provoked the colonists into fighting for 
liberty and eventual independence. Individual governors were depicted as instruments of 
British corruption: one early nationalist historian described a notorious royal governor as ‘dark, 
intriguing, insinuating, haughty and ambitious, while the extreme of avarice marked each 
feature of his character’.1 This interpretation was juxtaposed with one that deified the Founding 
Fathers who, of course, included the first governors of the various newly-independent states. 
This eulogy-denigration dichotomy was an essential part of the cultural identity for the newly 
independent Americans and was a staple item in the nationalist histories spawned thereafter.2 
Contained within these interpretations is an implied suggestion that there was a separate ‘old’ 
British form of governorship as opposed to a new ‘American’ form of governorship.3 The ‘old’ 
British model produced corruption, greed and tyranny. In stark contrast, the ‘new’ American 
model typified the republican virtues which helped create the American Revolution. 
                                                          
1 Mercy Otis Warren, History of the Rise, Progress and Termination of the American Revolution, Interspersed 
with Biographical, Political and Moral Observations, 3 vols. (Boston, 1805), I, 79. 
2 See Arthur H. Shaffer, The Politics of History: Writing the History of the American Revolution, 1783-1815 
(Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1975), 13; Joseph J. Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation, 
2nd edn. (New York: Vintage Books, 2002), 13-14. 
3 For example, see Guy Carleton Lee, The History of North America, ed. C.W. Verditz and B.B James, 6 vols. 
(Philadelphia: George Barrie & Sons, 1904), IV: 120-121, George Bancroft, History of the United States of 
America from the Discovery of the Continent, 6 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1876).  
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These early histories pose a significant question: did the Revolution signify a 
continuation or a change in American political ideology and practice before and after the 
revolution?  Mercy Otis Warren’s History of the Rise, Progress, and Termination of the 
American Revolution maintained a Jeffersonian interpretation of the Revolution, which 
stipulated that the Revolution was a radical secession not just from British domination, but 
from its corrupting system of monarchy and aristocracy. The natural assumption of the 
Revolution was that it represented a complete watershed from British political thought and 
practice. The Americans achieved radical change in their constitutions by promoting individual 
liberty. Revolution, therefore, represented a transformation of the political and social order 
according to this school of thought.4 J. Franklin Jameson’s The American Revolution 
Considered as a Social Movement (1950) claimed that the revolution was a transformative 
process whereby all aspects of American life were significantly altered: 
The stream of revolution, once started, could not be confined within narrow banks, but spread 
abroad upon the land. Many economic desires, many social aspirations were set free by the political 
struggle, many aspects of colonial society profoundly altered by the forces thus let loose. The 
relations of social classes to each other, the institutions of slavery, the system of land-holding, the 
course of business, the forms and spirit of the intellectual and religious life, all felt the transforming 
hand of revolution, all emerged from under it in shapes advanced many degrees nearer to those we 
know.5 
The American Revolution, therefore, transformed American society and its economy as well as 
its political structure. Gordon Wood has maintained that the American Revolution ‘was as 
radical and social as any revolution in history’ because ‘in destroying monarchy and 
establishing republics they were changing their society as well as their governments, and they 
                                                          
4 Mercy Otis Warren, Rise, Progress and Termination of the American Revolution, Vol. 2. Alternative 
interpretations were articulated in the early national period. Certain historians maintained that the Revolution was 
a deeply nationalist movement that had its origins in the colonial era. Americans belonged to a collective 
movement striving for independence together.  John Marshall’s The Life of George Washington maintained that 
the Revolution was a national movement with its origins in the colonial era. See John Marshall, The Life of George 
Washington, 5 vols. (Philadelphia, 1804-7). 




knew it’.6 The American Revolution was, according to this school of thought, a deeply radical 
and transformational revolution. 
 Alternative, more conservative, interpretations of the American Revolution have 
downplayed the claim that the revolution marked a sudden transformation into a republican 
society. Jack P. Greene has claimed that ‘so intent have some scholars been upon assimilating 
the American Revolution to the great European revolutions that followed it, upon emphasizing 
its revolutionary character and radical discontinuity with the American past’ that they have 
neglected ‘to explore the bearing of earlier American political and social experience on the 
events and developments of the American Revolution’.7 Greene suggests that the Revolution 
was simply a result of what was already apparent in colonial society. During the period of 
salutary neglect, the colonial assemblies had grown in prominence and had largely become 
independent of executive control. They had accrued important powers of appointment and 
controlled the public purse of the colonies. Greene suggests that historians have been too 
preoccupied with analysing the radical nature of the Revolution, that they have overlooked the 
fact that the Americans of the time created a ‘profoundly conservative revolution’.8 In other 
words, the American Revolution was not a radical transformation, but was a continuation of 
what was already apparent before the revolution. Thus the question is: was the revolution part 
of an evolutionary process through which Americans, becoming increasingly independent, 
gradually achieved their political independence in 1776? Or did the American Revolution 
resemble a juncture whereby the Americans ended an ‘old’, tyrannical, and dysfunctional 
system of royal authority and created a ‘new’, republican  and radical system of government. It 
                                                          
6 Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 5. 
7 Jack P. Greene, Creating the British Atlantic: Essays on Transplantation, Adaptation, and Continuity 




is exactly this question of whether the American Revolution was a ‘revolutionary’ 
transformation or the result of a gradual evolution that this dissertation seeks to investigate.   
It seeks to do so by focusing on the evolution of governorship in Virginia from 1758 to 
1781. It attempts to identify, define and compare the system of governorship in Virginia before 
and after the Revolution to see whether there was a revolutionary or evolutionary change in 
this important institution. It examines the nature of executive authority and the constitutional 
role of the successive governors of Virginia before and after 1776. While considerable attention 
will be given to the lives and actions of individual governors, the focus of this dissertation is 
primarily on the system of governorship in Virginia. It is an analysis of systems rather than of 
individuals; it is not a biographical study. Rather than focusing on individual governors and 
how they coped, struggled or even flourished during their time as governor, this dissertation 
will strive to define a system of governorship by analysing the powers and role of these 
individual governors. The dissertation is a comparative study in the sense that it identifies and 
compares two different systems of governorship in Virginia. It seeks, first, to identify and 
define a system of royal governorship in colonial Virginia. By analysing the methods of 
appointment, the constitutional status, the relationship with the legislature and the people at 
large, this dissertation will first identify a ‘British’ system of governorship. The analysis of 
royal governorship focuses on the relationship between governors and the British system of 
imperial administration and colonial political institutions, such as the colonial assembly. This 
network of interconnected political bodies was fundamental to the running of the British 
Atlantic world. This dissertation will reassess how these political bodies interacted and how 
effective governors were in this tripartite system of colonial administration. This dissertation 
will then examine the republican system of governorship in Virginia that was established in 
1776 in order to identify what had or had not changed as the result of independence. It will 
analyse the Virginia Constitution and explain the governorship position in this political 
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framework. It will also examine the first five years of Virginia’s independence from Britain 
and focus on the nature of gubernatorial authority in practice. By examining two models of 
governorship pre and post-1776, this dissertation will compare them in order to ascertain to 
what extent Virginians after 1776 relied upon or abandoned British constitutional thinking and 
practice.   
Virginia’s importance to the development of colonial America and the establishment of 
an independent confederation of states cannot be overestimated. Jamestown was the first 
English colony on the mainland of North America and Virginia was the first royal colony to be 
established. It was the first colony to have a representative assembly and the first colony to 
establish slavery. Virginia was the largest and most populous of the thirteen mainland British 
colonies by the time of the American Revolution. By 1758, it had become one of the most 
politically important colonies and certainly one of the most influential.  It was controlled by a 
local planter elite who had dominated the legislative assembly for a number of decades. Some 
of the most important actors on the Revolution were Virginian: including Patrick Henry, 
Thomas Jefferson, George Washington and James Madison. Virginians were instrumental in 
helping devise the Federal Constitution and, in terms of executive power, four of the first five 
presidents were born and raised in Virginia. The revolutionary experience and character of 
Virginia, therefore, make it a natural choice for an in-depth study of how executive power 
changed over the revolutionary period. 
This dissertation seeks to understand the ideological debate over executive power that 
took place in the American colonies and, subsequently, in the American states. Trans-Atlantic 
History is based on the concept of shared experiences and ideas that are not restricted by 
national boundaries.9 Crucial to this analysis of the evolution of governorship is the notion that 
                                                          
9 David Armitage, ‘Three Concepts of Atlantic History’, in The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800, ed. David 
Armitage and Michael J. Braddick (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 18-22. 
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Americans were heavily reliant upon British constitutional thinking concerning executive 
power. Americans did not have any personal experience writing constitutions and, thus, had to 
rely on their reading of historical precedent and theoretical texts. This dissertation argues that 
Virginian understanding of the dangers of executive power was preconditioned by radical 
Country Whig thinking that dictated that a powerful executive branch posed the greatest danger 
to the political stability and the liberty of the individual. It will maintain that it is impossible to 
understand the Virginian constitution of 1776 without giving prior consideration to the 
ideological principles that motivated these colonists. 
The nature of executive power in America just before, during, and just after the 
American Revolution is a subject that is more often ignored than examined by historians. There 
is a glaring gap in the already crowded historiography of the Revolution in terms of the 
continuity/change in the governor structures in the colonies/states.  Not only have the 
individual governors in the various colonies/states received minimal attention, but scholarship 
on the theoretical and practical constitutional questions concerning the changes in executive 
authority during this period are almost non-existent.  
While there has not been a study of executive power in America that has straddled the 
Revolutionary and Independence periods, there have been several constitutional studies that 
have taken into account the nature of executive power either in the colonial or in the state eras. 
For example, several scholars have attempted to explain why the various states uniformly 
weakened the executive branch in their respective first constitutions. Pennsylvania essentially 
abolished the governorship in the new political system established in 1776, by creating an 
executive committee of 12 members with a rotational presidency. Virginia, in 1776, deprived 
the governor of all of the prerogatives and patronage he had enjoyed in the colonial era. Several 
analyses of the first state constitutions have discussed the reasons for the various states 
decisions to weaken the governor’s position in their respective constitutions, in varying 
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degrees, in order to make the executive power in the political system but a shadow of what it 
had been in the colonial era. Historians have uniformly placed the reason for the deliberate 
weakening of the executive authority in the first state constitutions on the colonial experience 
of royal governors. They have argued that Americans acted from a widespread fear that an 
executive similar to that of the royal model would corrupt the newly created republics. The 
experiences of the colonial era, when the Americans believed that they had to endure 
overbearing royal governors possessing considerable prerogative powers, ensured that the 
newly created state constitutions would make the executive little more than a prestigious 
ceremonial office.10   
Most historians of the first state constitutions have argued that the constitutions which 
were devised by the various states during the period from 1776 up to the adoption of the Federal 
constitution in 1789 can be divided into two ‘waves’. The first wave, including Pennsylvania 
and Virginia in 1776, devised constitutions which completely stripped the executive of all the 
prerogatives and influence theoretically enjoyed by their royal predecessors. The second wave, 
including New York’s 1777 constitution and Massachusetts’s 1780 constitution, restored the 
position of the executive to some degree of influence and power within the framework of 
government.11 The states in the first-wave largely retained much of their colonial charters with 
the exception of changes made to the executive branch. Their constitutions were drafted and 
ratified by a provincial congress, not by the people. In the second stage, however, the 
                                                          
10 See, for example, Marc W. Kruman, Between Authority and Liberty: State Constitution Making in Revolutionary 
America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 36; Gordon Wood, The Creation of the 
American Republic 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), 136; Lee Ward, The 
Politics of Liberty in England and Revolutionary America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); 
Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 1985), 242-7; Donald Lutz,  Popular Consent and Popular Control: Whig Political Theory in 
the Early State Constitutions (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980), 44-45; Willi Paul Adams, 
The First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the 
Revolutionary Era, trans. Rita and Robert Kimber (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980).  




constitution-making bodies were distinct from the legislatures, with Massachusetts being the 
prime example, and the ‘constituent power’ was placed in the hands of special conventions 
which drafted the constitutions which then had to be ratified by the people. 
 For the executive branch within these constitutions, the two-wave interpretation is an 
insufficient description of the way the theory and practice of executive power developed within 
the different states. In the first place, the chronology does not make sense: Massachusetts 
devised a constitution (which was rejected by the people) in 1778 that mirrored the weak 
executives in the constitutions of the 1776 ‘first wave’, but this constitution came after the 1777 
New York Constitution, with its strengthening of the executive power, which purportedly 
signals the start of the second ‘wave’. Moreover, the ‘two-wave’ interpretation places too much 
emphasis on the content of the constitutions themselves and ignores the practical increase in 
power that various governors enjoyed in certain states over this period. Instead, this dissertation 
maintains that the varying degrees of power granted to the executive branch in the first state 
constitutions must be seen as being the result of an evolutionary process and not as the result 
of two distinct waves. 
The fate of the royal governors in the historiography of the American revolutionary 
crisis is indicative of their position in the colonies during this period. In view of the fact that 
the royal governors were the king’s representatives in the colonies, and they held the critical 
political posts as mediators between British colonial policy and the colonial assemblies, one 
would have expected the royal governors to be elevated to what, in theory, should have been a 
prominent place within the narrative of the political origins of the American Revolution. Such 
prominence has never been accorded to the royal governors by historians seeking to explain 
the American Revolution. Apart from Leonard Woods Labaree’s seminal Royal Government 
in America, published as far back as 1930, which provides a thorough survey of the nature of 
executive power in the royal colonies including its executive functions, its relationship with 
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legislative assemblies and its constitutional role, there has not been a similar, exhaustive 
examination of the royal governors in more recent historiography. The interpretations, put 
forward by such institutional historians as Labaree, Evart Boutell Greene and Louise Dunbar, 
have never been seriously questioned. Undoubtedly, historians have considerably downplayed 
the importance and relevance of the royal governors prior to the outbreak of the American 
Revolution. Historians have distinguished between the theoretical powers which the royal 
governors appeared to enjoy and the practical powers which they actually possessed. These 
historians have argued that, although all governors were furnished with an apparently 
impressive array of powers, their research has suggested that such powers proved to be hollow 
and inconsequential. Their ability to wield the royal prerogative, to control the colonial 
legislature and judiciary, and to distribute patronage was restricted by an over-restrictive home 
government and by increasingly powerful colonial legislatures.12 
The role of royal governors has never been subjected to modern revision of the kind 
that other colonial institutions, such as the colonial assemblies, have received. Instead, they 
have played only supporting roles in the great historiographical dramas that have been played 
out over the last fifty years. For example, Jack P. Greene’s work on the rising influence and 
burgeoning powers of the colonial assemblies in the decades before the American Revolution 
has ensured that royal governors are often interpreted as unfortunate bystanders in the 
revolutionary crisis. It is within this context that the royal governors have received the most 
                                                          
12 See Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 71. Labaree has 
insisted that ‘the duties of the governor were extensive and his powers almost dangerously great’, Leonard Woods 
Labaree, Royal Government in America: A Study of the British Colonial System Before 1783 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1930), 123. This excellent study has been the definitive study of royal government in America. 
The scope of Labaree’s research focuses equally on colonies in the Caribbean and Canada however. Leonard 
Woods Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors, 1670-1776, 2 vols (New York: D. 
Appleton-Century Company Inc., 1935). Evart Boutell Greene, ‘The Provincial Governor in the English Colonies 
of North America (New York: Longmans, 1898). For other important discussions of royal governors see John W. 
Raimo, Biographical Directory of American Colonial and Revolutionary Governors, 1607-1789 (West Port: 
Mekler Books, 1980); and Louise Dunbar, ‘The Royal Governors in the Middle and Southern Colonies on the Eve 
of the American Revolution’, in The Era of the American Revolution: Studies to Evarts Boutell Greene, ed. 
Richard B. Morris (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939). 214-268.  
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recent attention from historians.  This framework, however, lessens the importance of royal 
governors to the extent that they are used as a body to be compared with the legislatures and 
not assessed and analysed in their own right.13 
A few historians have explored the disparate nature of executive authority in the 
American colonies. Bernard Bailyn has analysed the constitution of colonial America and 
compared it to the constitution of Stuart England. Within this analysis, Bailyn makes several 
important points about the nature of executive authority in the colonies. First, he explores the 
fact that although all royal governors were invested with legal powers which exceeded those 
possessed by the monarch at home, they had far less influence than leading politicians in 
Britain. Bailyn maintains that even though governors had the power to have an absolute veto 
on legislation, to prorogue or dissolve colonial legislatures and to dismiss judges (which were 
powers no longer exercised by the monarch at home), governors lacked the powers of patronage 
to exercise effective influence, lacked a ruling class to assist them in their duties, and lacked 
autonomy as they were hindered by strict instructions from Britain.14 Second, Bailyn maintains 
that in the absence of real power being exercised by the royal governors, factions thrived and 
colonial politics became more dynamic than the politics in Britain. Within this factionalism, 
the opposition ideology within Britain, the radical country Whig ideology, became dominant 
in the colonies.15 In other words, because governors had very little real power within the 
colonial system, opposition politics was allowed to spread and eventually dictate colonial 
policy. The governors’ lack of authority allowed colonists to challenge Britain’s authority to 
impose taxation within the colonies. 
                                                          
13 Jack P Greene, The Quest for Power: The Lower Houses of Assembly in the Southern Royal Colonies, 1689-
1176 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1983). See also Jack P Greene, Negotiated Authorities: 
Essays in Colonial Political and Constitutional History (Charlottesville: The University of Virginia Press, 1994, 
and John F. Burns, Controversies Between Royal Governors and Their Assemblies in the North American 
Colonies, 2nd edn.  (New York: Russell & Russell, 1969). 
14 Bernard Bailyn, The Origin of Politics, 67-74. 
15 Ibid., 41-58. 
11 
 
While historians have demonstrated that nearly all royal governors lacked genuine 
authority in the colonies, some historians have shown that colonists did respect the authority 
of the monarch who headed the executive branch in Britain. Brendan McConville, in his study 
of the evolution of royalist culture within colonial America, has maintained that, in the 
eighteenth century, colonists had a resurgent reverence for monarchy. He provides extensive 
evidence, from the printed word to popular iconography, to suggest that the vast majority of 
colonists showed growing enthusiasm for the institution of monarchy and for what it 
represented. In this regard, McConville echoes interpretations, put forward by Gordon Wood 
and Richard Bushman before him, that monarchy was central to the eighteenth-century 
American character.16 One of ‘the King’s Three Faces’ that McConville depicts is a face that 
represented an ‘extralegal, extrainstitutional monarch at one with his meanest subjects’. In 
other words, the king, not parliament, was the crucial tie between mother country and colony. 
The monarchy represented a form of benevolent kingship whereby the king ‘alone bound the 
empire together and acted as an imperial arbitrator’ between competing legislative bodies in 
the imperial conflict.17 For the colonists, therefore, the imperial executive was the one imperial 
institution that was above partisanship and above contested authority. It was only in 1774 and 
1775, when it became evident that the monarch did not heed the repeated colonial requests for 
assistance, that the monarch became embroiled in the fraught ideological warfare that was 
being waged throughout the colonies.  
This is an interpretation easily identifiable in Rhys Isaac’s analysis of the famous 
Virginian planter and diarist, Landon Carter, in his monograph, Landon Carter’s Uneasy 
Kingdom. Isaac reveals that Carter’s greatest anguish in 1775 was ‘the cruel and unnatural 
                                                          
16 Brendan McConville, The King’s Three Faces: The Rise and Fall of Royal America, 1688-1776 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 203-219; Richard L. Bushman, King and People in Provincial 
Massachusetts (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 135-169; and Gordon Wood, The 
Radicalism of the American Revolution, 16-19. 
17 McConville, The King’s Three Faces, 143, 204. 
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fatherhood of the king’.18 Isaac maintains that Carter believed that ‘this king would prohibit 
these loving American “children” from approaching him with petitions’ and thus destroy the 
relationship of child and parent forever.19 Isaac more broadly explores the challenge to political 
authority in his cultural history of the religious and political transformation of Virginia between 
1740 and 1790. By using an ethnographic approach, Isaac maps out the inherent hierarchical 
nature of Virginian society prior to the American Revolution. He reveals that various colonial 
institutions, such as the Church, the General Court and the militia, were all built around 
reminders of social class and accepted authority. He maintains, however, that many Virginians 
began to challenge the traditional authority of the Established Church as early as the 1740s and 
this allowed them to accept the revolutionary doctrine that stipulated that separation between 
mother country and state was necessary in the 1770s.20 Michael McDonnell, moreover, in his 
monograph, The Politics of War, builds upon Isaac’s analysis. He maintains that, by the eve of 
the Revolution, Virginia was a divided society between the planter elite and the colony’s lower 
classes. He suggests that Dunmore’s actions, in confiscating the gunpowder stocks and issuing 
the proclamation to emancipate slaves, served to radicalise the disparate ‘lower sort’ – slaves, 
middle-class whites and poor whites – who not only challenged the British government, but 
also the authority of the leadership in Virginia.21 In other words, both McDonnell’s and 
McConville’s interpretations infer that executive authority was crucial to the form that the 
revolution took in Virginia. 
Royal governors in Massachusetts have understandably received far more attention 
from historians than in any other colony. Both Francis Bernard and Thomas Hutchinson were 
                                                          
18 Rhys Isaac, Landon Carter’s Uneasy Kingdom: Revolution and Rebellion on a Virginia Plantation (Oxford: 
University of Oxford Press, 2004), 291.  
19 Ibid., 292. 
20 Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia, 1740-1790 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1982), 131-133, 144-157, 194-198. 
21 Michael A. McDonnell, The Politics of War: Race, Class and Conflict in Revolutionary Virginia (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 7-15. 
13 
 
excoriated by the Massachusetts’ colonial assembly and colonists alike for their apparent 
attempts to subvert the rights and liberties of the colonists. Colin Nicolson, in his study of 
Francis Bernard’s governorship of Massachusetts, persuasively maintains that the actions and 
reports of Bernard directly informed both the British government’s policies of the time and the 
colonists’ response to these measures, which often had disastrous consequences. He deftly 
shows how Bernard’s actions alienated a body of potential loyalist support – the ‘friends of 
government’ – because of Bernard’s stubborn insistence on the colonists’ theoretical 
subordination to parliament. Nicolson also demonstrates that Bernard’s exaggerated reports of 
the lack of support for government measures and the decline of law and order in Massachusetts 
shaped British colonial policy in Massachusetts. Far from being a bystander between 
competing legislatures, Nicolson proves that Francis Bernard played a key role in provoking 
the colonists towards revolution.22 Bernard Bailyn’s The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson 
analyses the fate of a conservative and a loyalist in an age of apparent liberty and revolution. 
In this way, Bailyn’s work is not a study of a governor grappling to control his colony, but is 
an account of a Burkean conservative, who accepted wholeheartedly the indivisibility of the 
sovereignty of king in Parliament, while struggling to understand the increasingly country 
Whig aspirations of his fellow colonists.23 William Pencak, in a similar vein, examines Thomas 
Hutchinson’s ideological motivations through an analysis of his political and historical 
writings. In naming Hutchinson, as ‘America’s Burke’, Pencak maintains that Hutchinson was 
a major exponent of American conservatism. By drawing out a coherent conservative 
philosophy from his writings, Pencak claims that Hutchinson wanted Americans to accept an 
imperfect liberty and happiness. Although the careers of a few royal governors, such as Thomas 
Hutchinson and Francis Bernard, have been extensively researched, other royal governors have 
                                                          
22 Colin Nicolson, The ‘Infamas Govener’: Francis Bernard and the Origins of the American Revolution 
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2001), 10-13, 124-32. 
23 Bernard Bailyn, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson (Cambridge, Mass., Belknapp Press, 1974), 196-273. 
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remained surprisingly understudied.24 Historians have been very concerned with the 
breakdown of the imperial-colonial relationship, and have ignored examples of where the 
relationship seems to have worked harmoniously.25 
The insufficient historiographical treatment of royal governors is perfectly exemplified 
in the historical treatment of Virginian royal governors. Between 1758 and 1776, three men 
acted as governors of Virginia successively: Francis Fauquier, Lord Botetourt and Lord 
Dunmore. Of these three governors, only Lord Dunmore has received substantial scholarly 
attention. This scholarship, however, has largely concentrated on Dunmore’s Proclamation of 
7 November 1775. Understandably a royal governor, calling for a slave insurrection against 
their rebellious slave masters and offering manumission in return, has been of great interest for 
historians of slavery before the American Revolution and to British colonial policy towards 
slavery.26 The stress on Dunmore’s proclamation, however, has ensured that his wider role as 
                                                          
24 William Pencak, America’s Burke: The Mind of Thomas Hutchinson (London: University Press of America, 
1982), 210-227. See also Andrew Walmsley, Thomas Hutchinson and the Origins of the American Revolution 
(New York: New York University Press, 1999). For other major biographies of leading royal governors, see John 
Richard Alden, Robert Dinwiddie: Servant of the Crown (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press,1973), 
Michael C. Batinski, Jonathan Belcher: Colonial Governor (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1996), 
Alfred R. Hoermann, Cadwallader Colden: A figure in the American Enlightenment (West Port, Greenwood Press, 
2002), Paul D. Nelson, William Tryon and the Course of Empire: A Life in Imperial Service (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1990), Charles A.W. Pownall, Thomas Pownall, M.P., F.R.S.: Governor of 
Massachusetts Bay, Author of the Letters of Junius. With a Supplement comparing the colonies of King George 
III and Edward VII, 1722-1805 (London: H. Steven, Sons & Stiles, 1908). For a brief biography of every serving 
royal governor in the colonies, see John W. Raimo, Biographical Directory of American Colonial and 
Revolutionary Governors, 1607-1789 (West Port: Mekler Books, 1980). 
25 The insufficient nature of the scholarship is not caused by a lack of available source material. There is a 
considerable imbalance between the relatively insubstantial scholarly attention given to governors in the American 
colonies and the vast collection of source material available both in printed and manuscript form. There is indeed 
a plethora of source material that is available to the historian for this research topic: ranging from correspondences 
and speeches by individual governors to pamphlets from prominent members of colonial and state society who 
discussed the nature of executive authority and leadership. There is a considerable number of ‘official’ sources, 
which reveal the theoretical powers of both royal and state governors: royal instructions written from the Board 
of Trade and Plantations in London to each royal governor dictating colonial policy and directing governors’ 
actions; colonial charters which set up the colonies’ political frameworks; and the first state constitutions. All 
royal governors were compelled to report back regularly to the Board of Trade and Plantations in London on 
events in the colonies and any difficulties that they had in carrying out British colonial policy. This voluminous 
correspondence provides historians with extensive knowledge of the multiple problems experienced by all royal 
governors, and it reveals the complicated nature of the relationship between governors and prominent members 
of colonial society and with the political institutions in the colonies.   
26 See Mark Lawrence McPhail, ‘Dunmore’s Proclamation (November 7 1775)’, in The American Revolution, 
1775-1783: An Encyclopaedia, ed. Richard L. Bianco, 2 vols. (New York: Garland Reference library of the 
humanities, 1993), I: 490; Benjamin Quarles, ‘Lord Dunmore as Liberator’, The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd 
Series, 15 (1958), 494-507; Philip D. Morgan and Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy, ‘Arming Slaves in the 
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governor has not received sufficient attention. Early historical works were influenced by the 
American ‘demonisation’ of him after the revolution. Percy Burdelle Caley’s lengthy PhD 
dissertation in 1939 was the first attempt to provide a balanced assessment of Dunmore, but it 
has never been published.27. James Corbett David’s recent biography, however, has made an 
excellent attempt at re-assessing Dunmore’s governorship in Virginia. He neatly captures 
Dunmore’s strong personality and his thirst for land. He also manages to explain the 
motivations behind Dunmore’s ‘tyrannical’ actions.28 
The scholarship on Fauquier and Botetourt is relatively thin in comparison, which is 
surprising. Both governors appeared to have excellent relations with the House of Burgesses, 
the Virginian assembly, and the people. Undoubtedly the lack of primary sources has been a 
contributing factor to the lack of detailed scholarship on Fauquier. We know very little about 
his private live in Virginia, his early career and the exact nature of his appointment to the 
position of lieutenant-governor in the first place. George Reese’s outstanding research, 
however, in his three volume publication of Francis Fauquier’s ‘Official Papers’ in 1980 has 
proved an invaluable resource for understanding Fauquier’s governorship and the thinking 
which influenced many of his actions. Thus, although we can only speculate about Fauquier’s 
private life and early career, Reese’s work has given us evidence for a re-examination of 
Fauquier’s tenure as governor. Indeed, it seems strange that, since Reese’s work, there has been 
                                                          
American Revolution’, in Arming Slaves from Classical Times to the Modern Age, ed. Christopher Leslie and 
Philip D. Morgan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Woody Holton, Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, 
Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1999), 156-16; Michael A. McDonnell, The Politics of War, 139-44. 
27 See Caley, ‘Dunmore: Colonial Governor of New York and Virginia, 1770-1782’ (Unpublished PhD 
Dissertation: University of Pittsburgh, 1939). John Selby wrote a short bicentennial pamphlet on Dunmore in 
Virginia, which essentially recaps Caley’s dissertation, see John Selby, Dunmore (Williamsburg, VA.: Virginia 
Independence Bicentennial Commission, 1977). 
28 James Corbett David, Dunmore’s New World: the extraordinary life of a royal Governor in Revolutionary 
America with Jacobites, Counterfeiters, land schemes, shipwrecks, scalping, Indian politics, runaway slaves, and 
two illegal royal weddings (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2013). His biography was built upon his 
PhD dissertation, David, ‘Dunmore’s New World: Political Culture in the British Empire, 1745-1796’ 
(Unpublished PhD Dissertation, The College of William and Mary, 2004). See also Glenn F. Williams’s popular 




little attempt to re-evaluate the significance of Fauquier’s term as governor, especially in the 
context of royal authority in the royal colonies.29  
Because of the poor state of scholarship on Fauquier, Nellie Norkus’s thesis remains 
the most substantial contribution to Fauquier historiography. Norkus’s unpublished 1954 PhD 
dissertation on Fauquier provides us with an exhaustive, and in painstaking detail, an almost 
day-to-day account of Fauquier’s governorship. While Norkus deserves much credit for the 
amount of research that went into her study, her analysis of Fauquier’s governorship is 
completely submerged by her detailed narrative of events. There is no attempt to place 
Fauquier’s governorship in context or to discuss the significance of Fauquier’s apparently 
successful governorship.30 There have been other attempts to revisit Fauquier, but there 
remains a gap in the historiography of Virginia and of governors in general which needs to be 
filled.31 Since Percy Scott Flippin’s analysis of Royal Government in Virginia, in 1919, there 
has been little constructive analysis of Botetourt’s governorship. Indeed, Lord Botetourt 
appears to be a forgotten governor in this period. Only Graham Hood’s excellent re-
construction of the Governor’s Palace in Williamsburg has demonstrated Botetourt’s 
undoubted cultural importance to colonial Virginia on the eve of the American Revolution. 
Using inventories of Botetourt’s belongings drawn up after his death, Hood has shown how the 
governor symbolised the cultural connection between the old world and the new.32  
                                                          
29 See The Official Papers of Francis Fauquier: Lieutenant-Governor of Virginia, 1758-1768, ed. George Reese, 
3 vols. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1980). 
30 See Nellie Norkus, ‘Francis Fauquier, lieutenant-governor of Virginia, 1758-1768: A study in Colonial 
Problems’, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1954. 
31 See George H. Reese, ‘Portraits of Governor Francis Fauquier’, The Virginia Magazine of History and 
Biography,  76 (1968), 3-13; Robert Douthat Meade, ‘Gov. Fauquier --- Friend of Jefferson: His Influence on 
Sage of Monticello Said to Have Moulded Latter’s Religious Views, Created Desire for Travel and Broadened 
Outlook on Nationalistic Philosophy’, Richmond Times-Despatch, 7 July 1935; Charles R. Hildeburn¸ ‘Notes on 
the Stamp Act in New York and Virginia’, The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 2 (1876), 296-
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32 See Percy S. Flippin, Royal Government in Virginia, 1624-1775 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1918); 
Graham Hood, The Governor's Palace in Williamsburg: A Cultural Study (Williamsburg, Va.:  Colonial 
Williamsburg Foundation, 1992), Charles Washington Coleman, ‘Norborne, Baron de Botetourt, Governor-
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The first Virginian state governors have fared little better than their royal predecessors 
in terms of the attention which they have received by historians. They have tended to ignore 
the position of the governor in the initial years of the State in favour of an analysis of the 
revision of laws undertaken by Thomas Jefferson among others.33 The best way to exemplify 
the dearth of scholarship is to point to the fact that Emory G. Evans’s chapter on the first three 
governors of Virginia – Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Nelson – still remains 
the most systematic analysis of governorship in this period to date.34 Individual biographers of 
Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson understandably have also focused on their terms of office 
as governor. Excellent biographies of Patrick Henry are particularly rare: older works lack 
objectivity and more modern biographies tend to offer somewhat superficial analyses.35 Patrick 
Henry’s exploits pre-1776 dwarf his post-1776 career in the majority of these biographies. In 
addition, Henry’s opposition to the Federal Constitution in the late 1780s receives more 
attention than his difficult first stint as governor.36 In the voluminous literature on Jefferson 
and his ‘excellent’ career, surprisingly little has been written on his ill-fated tenure as governor 
of the colony. Jefferson, for posterity, blamed his perceived failure as governor on the status 
                                                          
General of Virginia, 1768-1770’, WMQ, 1st Series, 5 (1897), 165-171, and Bryan Little, ‘Norbonne Berkeley: 
Gloucestershire Magnate’, The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, 63 (1955), 379-409. 
33 See, for example, John E. Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 1775-1783 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia 
Press, 1988). 
34 This is clear in Evans’s defence of Thomas Jefferson’s governorship: ‘Jefferson, despite a gloomy prospect, 
seems to have entered office confidently, and, other estimates to the contrary, he proved to be an extremely good 
governor. Any careful study of his two years in office will reveal him to have been informed, practical, 
hardworking, tough, decisive, and infinitely patient. He was the master of detail but at the same time saw the 
state’s and the country’s problems in broad perspective’. Evans, in his assessment of Jefferson, even mounts a 
defence of Jefferson’s last five months in office and his ‘flight from Monticello’, Evans Emory G. ‘Executive 
Leadership in Virginia, 1776-1781: Henry, Jefferson and Nelson’, in Sovereign States in an Age of Uncertainty, 
ed. Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1981), 202, 216-7. 
35 The most detailed biography of Patrick Henry is by William Wirt Henry. While it lacks objectivity, it contains 
many extremely useful sources, see William Wirt Henry, Patrick Henry: Life, Correspondence and Speeches. For 
other biographers who discuss Patrick Henry’s time as governor between 1776 and 1779, see Richard R. Beeman, 
Patrick Henry: A Biography (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974); Henry Mayer, A Son of Thunder: Patrick Henry 
and the American Republic (New York: F. Watts, 1986); Robert D. Meade, Patrick Henry, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: 
Lippincott, 1957-1969); Moses C. Tyler, Patrick Henry, 2nd edn. (New York: AMS Press, 1972); David J. Vaughn, 
Give Me Liberty: The Uncompromising Statesmanship of Patrick Henry (Nashville: Cumberland House, 1997). 
36 For example, Richard Beeman’s biography only contains two pages on Henry’s 1776-1779 governorship in a 
biography of 192 pages. Richard Beeman, Patrick Henry, 111-2. 
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and provisions of his office rather than on his own actions.37 This is a theme which the most 
fervent Jefferson apologists have latched onto: Jefferson’s failings as a governor has more to 
do with the system rather than the man, with the system of government in place rather than 
with the governor himself.38 Other biographers have been less forgiving: they have argued that 
Jefferson was a poor administrator and an ineffective executive.39 Most historians who have 
analysed Jefferson’s presidency usually preface their analysis with a consideration of 
Jefferson’s first experience as the head of an executive.40 Although this strategy is 
understandable, it does tend to relegate the importance of Jefferson’s governorship: in other 
words, Jefferson’s gubernatorial career is regarded as a prelude, not a story in itself.41 The only 
logical explanation for the change in the constitutional status of the governor in Jefferson’s 
                                                          
37 ‘For this portion therefore of my own life, I refer altogether to [Louis H. Girardin’s] history. From a belief that 
under the pressure of the invasion under which we were then laboring the public would have more confidence in 
a Military chief, and that the Military commander, being invested with the Civil power also, both might be wielded 
with more energy promptitude and effect for deference of the state, I resigned the administration at the end of the 
2d. year, and General Nelson was appointed to succeed’. ‘The Autobiography of Thomas Jefferson’, in The Life 
and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Adrienne Koch and William Peden (New York: Random House, 
Inc., 2004), 50-51. 
38 Dumas Malone has argued that ‘At the conclusion of the account of this highly controversial period, however, 
it may be said without much doubt that the most conspicuous failure was that of the government rather than the 
Governor. The agencies which had been created in 1776 were ill-suited to the conduct of war, or to the meeting 
of serious crises of any sort’. See Malone, Jefferson and his Time: Volume 1 – Jefferson the Virginian (London: 
Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1948), 368. Marie Kimball is in no doubt that it was events that caused the difficult nature 
of his governorship, see Marie Kimball, Thomas Jefferson: War and Peace, 1776 to 1784 (New York: Coward-
McCann, 1947). See also Nathan Schachner, Thomas Jefferson: A Biography (New York: Thomas Yosseloff, 
1951); Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation: A Biography (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1970); and R.B. Bernstein, Thomas Jefferson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
39 Fawn Brodie: ‘It was the great misfortune of his life that Jefferson was elected as governor of Virginia in June 
1779’, Brodie, Thomas Jefferson: An Intimate History (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1974), 136. 
40 Jeremy Bailey’s analysis of Jefferson and executive power, for example, foreshadows Jefferson’s presidency 
with a discussion of Jefferson’s governorship, see Jeremy D. Bailey, Jefferson and Executive Power (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 28-64. 
41 Clearly the most significant recent monograph on Jefferson’s governorship is Michael Kranish’s excellent 
analysis of Jefferson’s ‘Flight from Monticello’. While Kranish does analyse Jefferson’s governorship in its 
entirety, he focuses more on the last six months of Jefferson’s governorship. See Michael A. Kranish, Flight from 
Monticello: Thomas Jefferson at War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). Francis D. Cogliano has provided 
us with an excellent analysis of Jefferson’s governorship in the first chapter of his recent monograph. However, 
this acts as a foundation for his analysis of Jefferson’s foreign policy as President. See Francis D. Cogliano, 
Emperor of Liberty: Thomas Jefferson’s Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), ch.1.The lack 
of proper focus on Jefferson’s governorship is probably best exemplified by the fact that the two most recently 
published companions to Thomas Jefferson do not have a separate chapter on Jefferson’s governorship. Clearly 
in the historiography of Thomas Jefferson, his governorship does not figure as large as his other positions or 
exploits. See The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Jefferson, ed. Frank Shuffelton (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) and A Companion to Thomas Jefferson, ed. Francis D. Cogliano (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd., 2012). 
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draft of a revised constitution of Virginia in 1782 as opposed to his ‘administrator’ in his 1776 
draft, must rest on his experiences as governor of Virginia. Jefferson’s attitude to executive 
power changed when he had to endure being a weak executive himself during two terms as 
governor. 
The historiography on Virginian governors is clearly lacking the depth of analysis that 
the subject deserves and dated historical interpretations are in need of revision in the light of 
modern scholarship. A clear ideological and constitutional debate about the actual executive 
functions, the nature of the appointment system in place, and the constitutional role which both 
the royal and state governors were granted and which were actually put into practice is clearly 
needed. This dissertation will provide an analysis of the Virginian governorship within a 
chronological framework: examining, in turn, the system of governorship just before, during 
and just after the American Revolution. In so doing, it will be divided into six chapters. 
Chapter One will reassess the nature of royal government in the colonies. It will provide 
a succinct overview of the powers granted to the royal governor, the powers that they actually 
had at their disposal, their relationship with the British imperial government, and their 
relationship with the colonial assemblies. It will also provide a summary of the franchise in 
Virginia. In so doing, it will seek to challenge the widely accepted view, which has been 
maintained by the institutional school and has been widely accepted by later historians, that 
royal governors were, in theory, kings in America, but in practice could never exercise their 
kingly powers. Instead, this chapter will argue that royal governors could never be mistaken 
for being kings, even in theory, in terms of the powers which they had at their disposal and 
their relationship with the colonists. Royal governors were not kings, but administrators who 
acted as a conduit between an over-zealous British government and potent colonial assemblies. 
 From this foundation, Chapter Two will analyse how Virginian governors functioned 
in an age of difficult imperial politics. It will focus on three governors in particular: Francis 
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Fauquier, Lord Botetourt and Lord Dunmore. Through an analysis of these three governors’ 
actions, their relations with the British government, the colonial council, the legislative 
assembly and the Virginian people, this chapter will seek to examine the distinctive Virginian 
model of royal governorship. The system of royal governorship in Virginia, from outward 
appearances at least, was by far the most successful example of British administration in the 
colonies. Francis Fauquier and Lord Botetourt were widely admired by the colonial gentry 
during their respective terms and their deaths were mourned in Virginia. Even Lord Dunmore 
had a far more successful governorship, up to 1775, than some of his less unfortunate 
colleagues. This chapter will demonstrate that this widespread respect and affection for the 
governorship in Virginia was not based on the powers possessed by these governors: the 
Virginian governorship was in fact a very weak office. The apparent good relations between 
royal governor and people, moreover, masked a conditional system of deference whereby the 
royal governor would gain respect of the colonists only so long as he complied with their wishes 
and served their interests.  
 Creating a ‘perfect’ system of governorship in a new republican political system was 
an extremely difficult task. Traditionally historians have maintained that the vast majority of 
the first state constitutions created a weakened gubernatorial position because of their shared 
experiences of the apparent ‘tyranny’ perpetrated by royal governors. This dissertation will 
maintain that newly independent Americans were not influenced solely by their perception of 
previous royal governors, but were heavily guided by their reading of classical and republican 
texts on executive power. Chapter Three will explore the way in which Virginians put their 
ideological beliefs into practice in their Constitution of 1776. This chapter will explore the 
events that surrounded the writing of the Constitution of 1776 and, in particular, it will 
investigate the executive provisions in the political framework which was created. This chapter 
will seek to prove that Virginians established an executive within the political system which 
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was inspired by the Country Whig theories on executive power. It will demonstrate, however. 
that Virginians modified the English Country Whig model in order to suit their own distinctly 
Virginian (and republican) needs. They massaged the separation of powers theory in order to 
create legislative supremacy and to emasculate the governorship.  
Chapter Four will investigate how well Virginia’s first Constitution worked in practice 
during the difficult and tortuous years of war. In particular, it will focus attention on the fate of 
its first two governors, Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson. It will examine the difficulties 
experienced by both governors as they attempted to navigate the ship of state through war and 
economic crises while possessing a relatively ineffective political remit.  It will demonstrate 
that the powers of the governor, as devised by the Constitutional Convention in 1776, were 
woefully inadequate to manage the Virginian war effort, but it will also show that the 
governor’s position evolved to some extent over this period. It will maintain that the 
governorship was a far more fluid system than has been previously claimed: both Thomas 
Jefferson and Patrick Henry accrued more powers in order to pursue the war effort than has 
often been realised. The system of governorship evolved in this period and the perception of 
the dangers of executive power also changed. 
Chapter Five will examine one particular instance which exemplifies this change of 
perception: the often overlooked debate over whether Virginia should install a dictator as head 
of state in 1781. It will question whether this debate meant that Virginians had abandoned their 
Country Whig ideology and whether they meant to install an absolute despot instead of a weak 
plural governor as the term ‘dictator’ connotes. It will show that some Virginians did not regard 
dictatorship as a direct contradiction to Country Whiggism and that they believed that they 
were following Roman republican precedents. More important, it will also maintain that 
Virginians began to realise that a strong executive branch was required in order to save the 
state from ruin. 
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Chapter Six will describe the constitutional development of executive authority in the 
American states up to the ratification of the Federal Constitution in 1787-88. It will analyse the 
creation of the Federal Executive branch and will discuss the Virginian reaction to the proposed 
Presidential system. It will also provide a conclusion concerning the Virginian development of 
executive power. This dissertation will reach three main conclusions. First, the system of 
governorship that was established in 1776 was very similar to the system of royal governorship 
in terms of the practical authority which governors had at their disposal. While royal governors 
were appointed by the king, granted kingly prerogatives, and involved in all aspects of colonial 
government, they were not as a powerful as they appeared. Because of the nature of their 
appointment, the fact that they acted under instruction and that colonial assemblies had become 
increasingly powerful, the authority of royal governors was, in reality, very weak. When 
Virginians established an ineffective governorship in their new constitution in 1776, they were 
only instituting what had become obvious in reality. Second, Virginians relied heavily upon 
British thinking when they established their republican governorship in 1776. While the 
perceived tyranny of royal governors, such as Lord Dunmore, helped shape American fear of 
a strong executive power, they were also influenced by a radical Country Whig ideology which 
dictated that a powerful executive posed the greatest threat to the political stability and personal 
liberty. Third, in the years following 1776, the system of governorship in Virginia evolved in 
its perceived importance and the powers it actually had at its disposal. Governors changed from 







‘Kings in America’: The System of Royal Government in America.  
During the several readings of the Massachusetts Government bill in the Houses of Parliament 
in the spring of 1774, MPs and Lords debated the nature and effectiveness of royal authority 
within the American colonies. After the egregious destruction of tea and the public repudiation 
of parliamentary supremacy in Boston in December 1773, Parliament questioned the extent to 
which royal governors in their current form had the required powers and authority to implement 
imperial policy and had the ability to clamp down on the revolutionary upheaval which was 
causing so much difficulty for the mother country. It was the first time in Parliament that MPs 
had properly considered the functionality and suitability of gubernatorial power in the colonies. 
Lord North, the Prime Minister, believed that in the colony of Massachusetts, ‘an executive 
power was wanting’.1 He argued that ‘something is radically wrong in their [Massachusetts] 
constitution. The Governor in the last riot issued a proclamation without the advice of his 
council. It was treated with contempt’. In a typically Court Whig attitude, he declared, 
erroneously, that the fault lay in the hands of the democratic nature of the election of the 
Council which worked to undermine the governor’s orders. North proposed to ‘take the 
executive power out of the democratical part of the constitution and put into the hands of the 
civill [sic] Governor appointed by the Crown’.2 The implicit contention in North’s argument is 
that the royal governor still had an important and essential role to play in imperial government. 
The realisation that the powers of the royal governor were not as effective as first supposed 
caused considerable debate among MPs as new proposals to strengthen the Massachusetts 
governor were being discussed. During these debates, MPs disagreed over the exact nature of 
                                                          
1 Lord North, ‘First reading of the Massachusetts Government Bill’, 28 March 1774, in Proceedings and Debates 
of the British Parliaments Respecting North America, 1754-1783, ed. R.C. Simmons and P.D.G Thomas, 8 vols 
(New York: Kraus International Publications, 1985), IV: 149. 
2 Ibid., IV: 148.   
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royal governorship in the colonies: what did royal governorship represent and what should be 
the role of royal governors in the colonies? William Dowesdell, an MP who vehemently 
opposed strengthening the powers of a governor, asked ‘what is a governor? The king’s servant, 
I do not like that Power. I do not consider that Governor otherwise than as a creature of the 
Crown put in a powerful office from which he may be removed’.3 The royal governor, 
therefore, was merely a creature of the crown, whose power, though strong, was purely 
transitory. Thomas Pownall, a former governor of the Massachusetts colony, however, in a 
vehement defence of the specifics and provisions of royal government in the American colonies 
defined the royal governor’s position in far more laudable terms: ‘Governors are kings in 
America’.4 Pownall was one of the most knowledgeable authorities on American affairs in 
Britain at the time because he had the experience of being a royal governor. 
The historiography of royal governors in the American colonies has largely portrayed 
royal governors, in their theoretical form, in the terms that Pownall used. These ‘institutional’ 
historians have defined the theoretical model of royal governorship that existed in the colonies 
as an executive in the mould of a Stuart king in the seventeenth century.5 They have insisted 
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Governor in the English Colonies of North America (New York: Longmans, 1898). Ian Steele has claimed that 
‘the governors represented a monarchical power that was supposedly stronger in the colonies than in England’, 
but were denied these in practice. See Steele, ‘The Anointed, the Appointed, and the Elected: Governance of the  
British Empire, 1689-1784’, in Oxford History of the British Empire, ed. Wm. Roger Louis, et al., 5 vols. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), II: 110-11. For other important discussions of royal governors, see John W. 
Raimo, Biographical Directory of American Colonial and Revolutionary Governors, 1607-1789 (West Port: 
Mekler Books, 1980); and Louise Dunbar, ‘The Royal Governors in the Middle and Southern Colonies on the Eve 
of the American Revolution’, in The Era of the American Revolution: Studies to Evarts Boutell Greene, ed. 
Richard B. Morris (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939). 214-268.  
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that royal governors were granted immense theoretical powers, were the bearer of the royal 
prerogative, albeit by proxy, had extensive patronage powers and had substantial theoretical 
control over the political system in the colonies. These historians have shown, moreover, that 
this theoretical royal gubernatorial system was never realised because, in practice, royal 
governors were deprived of any substantial powers with which to influence or control colonial 
governments. They have furnished a picture that suggests, in reality, royal governors suffered 
in their position because their powers, responsibilities and patronage were parcelled out 
between a controlling home government and an increasingly potent colonial legislative 
system.6 Colin Nicolson, in a recent published work on royal governorship, has adopted a 
similar position when he maintains that ‘royal governors in theory had considerable powers, 
but in practice they were counterbalanced or outweighed by the General Court’.7 
The purpose of this chapter is, in part, to revise this ‘institutional’ interpretation. It will 
seek to prove that using a theory versus practice paradigm does not fully explain the system of 
royal governorship that existed in the American colonies. It will maintain that there can be no 
doubt that all royal governors theoretically enjoyed some of the same powers and privileges 
which were at the bestowal of a Stuart monarch, but it will also stress that it is entirely 
misleading to maintain that royal governors theoretically had an awesome armoury of powers, 
that they resembled Stuart kings in every colony and were able to control every aspect of the 
political system in the colonies. Undoubtedly all royal governors enjoyed a broad portfolio of 
                                                          
6 Bernard Bailyn has argued that ‘a paradox lay at the heart of provincial politics in eighteenth-century America: 
on the one hand an enlargement, beyond what was commonly thought incompatible with liberty, of the legal 
authority possessed by the first branch of government, the executive; and on the other hand, a radical reduction of 
the actual power in politics exercised by the executive, a reduction accounted for by the weakness of the so-called 
“influence” by which the crown and its ministers in England actually managed politics in that country’. Bernard 
Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 106.  
7 Colin Nicolson, The ‘Infamas Govener’: Francis Bernard and the Origins of the American Revolution (Boston: 
Northeastern University Press, 2001), 11. Nicolson has also provided the most succinct description of royal 
governors’ powers to date: ‘A royal governor was the king’s representative, his captain general and vice admiral, 
and exercised by proxy the king’s prerogatives in colonial government and imperial administration. With respect, 
the royal governor was the colony’s chief executive, in which capacity he issued warrants, addressed the House, 
presided over the Governor’s Council, and administered the provincial executive.’ In ibid., 10.  
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powers which was denied their royal master in London, but it is certainly not true to maintain 
that, even theoretically, royal governors were all-powerful executives. Indeed, within this 
theoretical system of governorship, which devolved certain provisions and powers to all royal 
governors, there were certain restraints placed upon the royal governors that ensured that they 
could never be 'kings in America' as has been supposed. It is not possible to describe the 
governors’ powers in a theoretical-practical dichotomy, but it is possible to show what the 
system of royal government was in reality.  
This chapter will set out the system of royal government in the American colonies prior 
to the American Revolution. It will seek to define the specific powers of the royal governor, 
his authority within a royal colony and the exact nature of his power in theory and in practice. 
It will compare the powers, constitutional status and political role of a royal governor to the 
powers, constitutional status and the political role of George III during his early years as king 
in the 1760s and 1770s. It will focus its attention on the system of governorship in Virginia and 
compare this system to other systems of governorship in the colonies. In so doing, it will first 
attempt to prove that royal governors, even in their theoretical manifestation, were inherently 
weak executives and could never resemble George III in their colonies. This will be achieved 
through an analysis of the prescribed powers at the disposal of the royal governor. Second, this 
chapter explores the nature of the royal governor’s practical relationship with the home 







The Appointment System for Royal Governors 
By 1763, there were thirteen British colonies on the North American mainland which were 
destined to become the first thirteen states of the United States of America. Of these thirteen, 
eight were royal colonies, three were proprietary colonies and two were charter colonies. While 
a proprietary colony was ruled by proprietors or owners in the king’s stead, a royal colony was 
ruled by the king. The eight royal colonies in this era were Georgia, Massachusetts-Bay, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia. Delaware, 
Maryland, and Pennsylvania were proprietary colonies and Connecticut and Rhode Island were 
charter colonies. Of the thirteen colonies, only New Hampshire started off as a royal colony. 
Virginia was a charter colony until 1624, when James I revoked its charter and the colony was 
thereafter to be controlled by the king through his appointed representative, the governor.8 In 
the eight royal colonies, therefore, the governor was the king’s representative in the colony. 
The system of appointing a royal governor, however, meant that he could not govern like a 
king. 
Essentially, the appointment system for royal governors weakened their ability to 
govern their colony. The connections and networks which allowed many governors to secure 
this office made their position as governor unstable and impermanent because the connections 
that helped them to be promoted to this office lacked permanence and, because of the uncertain 
nature of their tenure of office, any change in personnel in the British machinery of government 
made many governors nervous. The mode of appointing governors varied in the different types 
of colonies, but their appointments always depended upon the British government. The 
appointment of a royal governor involved a complex series of solicitations, network-building 
                                                          
8 Charter colonies were given charters from the king, which acted as their constitutions. While they acknowledged 
the king’s ultimate sovereignty over the colony, they were essentially self-governing polities. The Virginia 
Company was created by James I in 1606.   
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and familial connections. The power of appointment always rested with the king who had the 
final say over any of the appointments.  The crown would consider recommendations from 
various secretaries of state and the more secure their position, the more chance their suggestions 
would be accepted. Recommendations would largely come from the Secretary of State for the 
South, the President of the Board of Trade and eventually the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, a new post created in 1768. This power of patronage largely remained the same even 
if the hands that held it changed. In order to be appointed, a prospective governor had to lobby 
the respective minister, usually through an important patron. For example, Francis Bernard 
owed his appointment to the New Jersey governorship in 1758 and his successful transfer to 
the more lucrative Massachusetts governorship in 1760 to the patronage of Lord Barrington, 
who was the Secretary at War at the time and also his wife’s cousin. Lord Barrington was a 
prominent member of the Pitt-Newcastle government and Newcastle’s patronage appointments 
were usually rubber-stamped by the Board of Trade which was under the presidency of the Earl 
of Halifax.9 Sources of patronage of this kind are seldom permanent, however. When Bernard’s 
situation in Boston deteriorated rapidly after the Stamp Act crisis, he called upon the patronage 
of his friend and relative to remove him to a better and more peaceable colony. When Francis 
Fauquier died in 1768 in Virginia, Bernard pleaded with his patron that he should be given this 
more agreeable position, but he was unsuccessful and the position was given to Lord 
Botetourt.10 By 1768, however, the Duke of Newcastle was no longer in government and the 
                                                          
9 Colin Nicolson, The “Infamas Govener”, 41. For a fuller discussion of the patronage at the disposal of the Duke 
of Newcastle when he was First Lord of the Treasury, see Richard Middleton, ‘The Duke of Newcastle and the 
Conduct of Patronage during the Seven Years’ War, 1757-1762’, British Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies, 
12 (1989), 175-86.  
10 Bernard quickly realised that the Virginian governorship could be his escape from his difficult predicament in 
Massachusetts. While he had reservations at first concerning the nature of the position, once he was assured of its 
benefits, he became hopeful of moving south to this ‘safe’ colony. Bernard’s original reservation was about the 
Virginia position being of the rank of Lieutenant Governor which he saw as ‘no advancement’ for him. His patron, 
Lord Barrington, however, assured him that Virginia ‘in ease and comfort it is infinitely preferable’. See Bernard 
to Lord Barrington, 7 February 1768, and Lord Barrington to Francis Bernard, 9 May 1768, The Barrington-
Bernard Correspondence and Illustrative Matter, 1760-1770, ed. Edward Channing and Archibald Cary Coolidge 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1912), 142, 154. Bernard’s patron, Lord Barrington, however, had 
to send him the disappointing news that Lord Botetourt was chosen to be governor of Virginia. Lord Barrington 
to Francis Bernard, 8 November 1768, ibid., 175. Lord Hillsborough, the new American Secretary at the time, 
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path by which Bernard gained his position in the first place had closed. Barrington could no 
longer help his friend in the same manner as before. This highlights the inherent weakness of 
a royal governor’s position in the colonies: because he owed his appointment to a complex 
system of patronage, he was in continuous danger of losing that appointment and not being 
able to gain a new one because of the very same system. As he was at least 3000 miles away 
from the decision-makers, he was obviously unable to advance his interests in person. It is 
ironic that as soon as a royal governor sailed to his colony, he was reducing his ability to retain 
his position. In addition, the governors were not appointed for a fixed term, but were appointed 
as governors during the king’s pleasure. This was particularly important in the 1760s when 
there were many short-lived and unstable ministries, all of which had difficult relations with 
the king or with the House of Commons or with opinion ‘out of doors’. Not only was the 
patronage through which governors secured their gubernatorial position impermanent, but their 
very tenure of it was uncertain as well.  
In Virginia, moreover, in what was a peculiar custom in a royal colony, ever since the 
Earl of Orkney’s governorship which began in 1714 until the death of Francis Fauquier in 1768, 
the governor of the colony never resided in the colony itself since the position was purely a 
sinecure. He did, however, receive half the salary of the governorship with the other half going 
to his deputy, the lieutenant-governor. Although Fauquier served the colony merely as its 
lieutenant-governor, which in other colonies was a position of very little power, he was in 
effect, the de facto governor as the ‘official’ governors of the colony during this period, Lord 
Loudoun and Sir Jeffrey Amherst, never visited Virginia. Thus, Fauquier fulfilled all the duties 
of governor, but had to share the salary with the official governor.  
                                                          
was more circumspect in his response to Bernard, intimating that it was simply a matter of expediency that denied 
Bernard the position in Virginia. Lord Hillsborough to Francis Bernard, 19 November 1768, TNA, CO 5/757.  
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Who were those men who were promoted by this system of appointment? Labaree has 
maintained that the governors, who were appointed, were generally similar to ‘typical British 
officials neither better nor worse than those who were carrying on the administration in 
England’.11 This interpretation is disputable: while the Westminster Parliament could never 
claim to be a meritocracy, MPs and peers were able to ascend the political ladder based partly 
on their merits as able administrators, gifted speakers and skilled parliamentarians, and their 
ability to build a network of relationships within a system that was heavily reliant upon 
patronage. Although it is an appealing image to suggest that there was a similarity between the 
officials appointed as governors and the ministers making imperial policy, it is a flawed 
interpretation. The Westminster Parliament was hardly the stagnant pool of talent that some 
American historians have implied. Many ministers in Britain were men of very considerable 
ability. This could not be said of most colonial governors. The governors appointed in this 
period to the royal colonies rarely had a track record of significant achievements before they 
were appointed governors. Lord Dunmore, for example, was an unremarkable Member of 
Parliament and Lord Botetourt was almost forced to take the governorship of Virginia because 
he had multiple financial troubles as a result of an unsuccessful business venture.12 It is highly 
unlikely that if any of these men had been successful in his career in Britain that he would have 
even ended up being a colonial governor at all. In other words, able men with the prospect of 
                                                          
11 Leonard Woods Labaree, ‘The Early Careers of the Royal Governors’ in Essays in Colonial History Presented 
to Charles McLean Andrews by His Students, ed. Leonard Woods Labaree (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1931), 168.  
12 William C. Lowe has provided us with an excellent overview of Dunmore’s early parliamentary career and his 
financial troubles and predicament prior to his appointment to the position in New York, see Lowe, ‘The 
Parliamentary Career of Lord Dunmore, 1761-1774’, The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, 96 (1988), 
3-30. Botetourt, who became an MP for Gloucestershire in 1741, was a colonel of the North Gloucestershire 
militia, and in 1762 he became the Lord Lieutenant of Gloucestershire. In 1760 he became one of the lords of the 
king’s bedchamber and this suggests he was one of the ‘king’s friends’. Important for his future governorship, he 
successfully petitioned for a peerage and sat in the House of Lords as Baron de Botetourt. His move to Virginia, 
however, largely originated with the financial troubles that he encountered with his investment into the Warmley 
Copper Works. Botetourt’s difficulties with the Warmley Company are detailed in the Badminton Muniments, 
Warmley, Gloucestershire Archives, Gloucester, D2700 QP 13/2-3. For Botetourt’s early life, see Bryan Little, 
‘Norbonne Berkeley: Gloucestershire Magnate’, The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, 63 (1955), 
379-409. For source material on Botetourt’s elevation to the peerage, see ‘The Case of Norbonne Berkeley, Esq, 
In relation to The Barony of Botetourt. [written by C.Yorke]’, Gloucestershire Archives, Gloucester, D421 Z7.  
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a successful political or administrative career in Britain would not use their patronage 
connections in order to seek a colonial governorship. 
Colonial patronage appointments were typically not based on an individual’s talent or 
ability as a politician or as an administrator, but were based on the influence they could curry 
with men in the highest echelons of government. While it has been argued that the Duke of 
Newcastle’s appointments in Britain and in the colonies in the 1750s and the early 1760s were 
often made as a result of his desire to see the talented rise to the upper echelons of government, 
this was not entirely true of the general system of appointment to official positions in the 
colonies.13 There can be no doubt that there were men who were appointed as colonial governor 
who had considerable ability and merited the appointment: governors such as William Shirley, 
Alexander Spotswood and Francis Fauquier all had precocious skill in people-management and 
were highly esteemed in the colony themselves.14 In the same vein, however, it is indisputable 
that there were other governors appointed about the same time who lacked the administrative 
abilities and diplomatic skill required of effective royal governors.15 Because of the non-
                                                          
13 Richard Middleton has maintained that the Duke of Newcastle did believe that, contrary to the traditional 
interpretation, merit was an important factor in making appointments. See Middleton ‘The Duke of Newcastle 
and the Conduct of Patronage’, 179. Of course, Middleton’s argument makes sense, but it is certainly more 
accurate in terms of patronage in government departments within Britain. For Newcastle, gaining supporters 
within parliament and government departments was foremost in his consideration. See Richard Middleton, The 
Bells of Victory: The Pitt-Newcastle Ministry and the Conduct of the Seven Years’ War, 1757-1762 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 213; and Reed Browning, The Duke of Newcastle (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1975), 263-4.  
14 For William Shirley, see John A. Schutz, William Shirley: King's Governor of Massachusetts (Williamburg, 
Va.: University of North Carolina Press, 1961); and Correspondence of William Shirley: Governor of 
Massachusetts and Military Commander in America, 1731-1760, ed. Charles Henry Lincoln (London: Macmillan, 
1912). For Francis Fauquier, see Nellie Norkus, ‘Francis Fauquier, lieutenant-governor of Virginia, 1758-1768: 
A stud study in Colonial Problems’, unpublished PhD Diss, University of Pittsburgh, 1954; Robert Douthat 
Meade, ‘Gov. Fauquier --- Friend of Jefferson: His Influence on Sage of Monticello Said to Have Molded Latter’s 
Religious Views, Created Desire for Travel and Broadened Outlook on Nationalistic Philosophy’, Richmond 
Times-Despatch, 7 July 1935; and Charles R. Hildeburn¸ ‘Notes on the Stamp Act in New York and Virginia’, 
The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 2 (1876), 296-302.  
15 Benjamin Franklin insisted that that the governors were ‘sometimes men of vicious characters and broken 
fortunes, sent by a minister to get them out of the way’, see Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the 
American Revolution (Cambridge, MA.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1967), 102.  
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meritocratic nature of the appointment system, therefore, it was, in effect, a lottery whether 
capable candidates were chosen. 
From the Earl of Halifax to Lord Dartmouth (from 1748 to 1775) the reasons adopted 
for making certain appointments varied from expediency at home to attempts at pacifying 
troubling situations in certain colonies. There were many types of appointment made to the 
office of governor.16 Indeed, the variation in the men appointed to a governorship in itself 
reflects the haphazard and disorderly way that the system of appointment worked. Most of the 
governors appointed to the royal colonies were neither American born nor had ever previously 
set foot in the colony before becoming governor. When they arrived in the colony, therefore, 
there was much pomp and ceremony to accompany their arrival, which, without doubt, added 
prestige to their appearance and future governance. It was easier to govern as the substitute for 
the king, when a governor appeared to be actually coming directly from the monarch in Britain. 
A British-born governor had the added advantage of being an ‘unknown’ quantity to the 
colonists, with little baggage to weigh down his administrations.  
In the light of this gubernatorial appointment system, the claim that a governor was a 
king in America is deeply flawed and quite untenable. In the eighteenth century, a king owes 
his position to hereditary right, which is a claim that some held to be divinely ordained and all 
believed it was a revolutionary act to challenge. In contrast, a governor owed his position to 
patronage – he was appointed by the monarch and could be dismissed by him. In other words, 
while a king owed his position to divine providence, a governor was appointed on the personal 
whim of the king or because of the influence on the king of powerful backers of that person. 
He could be easily removed for the same reasons. No governor was chosen solely because of 
                                                          
16 Leonard Woods Labaree has argued that those who were appointed to royal governorships can be neatly divided 
into three groups of appointments: ‘provincials’, ‘military or naval officers’, and, lastly, ‘by far the largest group 
of governors was composed of Englishmen who owed their appointments to political connections at home', 
Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Government in America, 37-41. 
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his own influence or personal merits. All governors were no more than second-rank political 
figures within the British political world, who owed their position to the superior influence of 
their patrons within the British political system. They were ‘clients’ of superior patrons, such 
as the monarch or powerful politicians, and were appointed and removed as such patrons saw 
fit. This profoundly affected the prestige which they possessed with the colonists. A king was 
revered in Britain because he could expect the loyalty of almost all men and he possessed an 
aura of majesty. One young American noted in 1774: ‘There is something that Strikes an awe 
when you enter the Royal presence’.17 A governor could not possibly resemble a king because 
he was lacked such an aura and had not inherited the right to govern; he could never command 
the same aura that the king possessed as of right. In the same way, he could never exercise the 
powers exercised by a king. 
II 
The Royal Governor as ‘King’: The Powers devolved to the Royal Governor 
The prevailing historiography has maintained that, in theory, royal governors were endowed 
with substantial and wide-ranging powers which should have enabled them to exercise tight 
control over the political system in the colonies and to retain the right to be the ultimate 
authority in all legislative, judicial and executive matters. The system of royal government in 
the American colonies was theoretically one in which all authority and power was devolved 
upon the head of the executive in each colony: the royal governor. Unlike the first state 
constitutions, this system of government was not designed or created upon a specific 
ideological foundation, but evolved over time with one overriding aim: the maintenance of the 
royal prerogative in the colony. This system of royal government in the American royal 
                                                          
17 Margaret Hutchinson to Elizabeth Hutchinson, 19 October 1774, cited in Jerrilyn Greene Marston, King and 
Congress: The Transfer of Political Legitimacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 15.  
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colonies can be understood through the analysis of the documents which were devised by the 
Board of Trade and Plantations in London and accompanied every newly appointed royal 
governor when he travelled to his colony. All royal governors, soon after they were appointed 
to the governorship were supplied with a series of documents that set out the exact nature and 
format of royal government in the colony in which they were going to govern. The governors’ 
commissions, which bestowed on them all powers necessary for establishing and maintaining 
royal government, were issued in the form of letters patent under the Great Seal: ‘with these 
instructions you will receive our commission under our great seal of Great Britain constituting 
you our Captain General and Governor in Chief’.18 This commission, because it was issued 
under the ‘great seal’, gave the governors the solemn duty of maintaining the royal prerogative 
in the royal province. Together with the commission, the royal governor was issued with a set 
of instructions that set out how he should execute the powers granted to him in the royal 
commission. While the terms of his commission were read aloud in the colony once the 
governor had arrived, the gubernatorial instructions were almost always kept private because 
they were written only for the governor’s consumption.19 The commission and set of 
instructions established the highest legal authority in the royal colonies.20 Historians, while 
                                                          
18 The full Massachusetts commission read: ‘With these our instructions you will receive our commission under 
our great seal of Great Britain constituting you our Captain General and Governor in Chief of our Province of the 
Massachusetts Bay, AND our Lieutenant and Commander in Chief of the militia within our dominions and 
Territory of New England in America’. ‘Governor’s Commission and Title: Massachusetts, 1702-1771’, in Royal 
Instructions to British Colonial Governors, 2 vols (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company Inc., 1935), I: 8. 
The Virginian governor’s Commission from 1683 to 1768 read ‘with these instructions you will receive our 
commission under our great seal of Great Britain constituting you our lieutenant and Governor General of our 
colony and Dominion of Virginia in America’. From 1768, the commission inserted ‘lieutenant and governor 
general of our said colony’. See ibid., I: 13, 31.  
19 The governor’s commission was given a public reading at the governor’s inauguration, but the instructions did 
not get a public airing: ‘And forthwith to cause our said commission under our great seal of Great Britain 
constituting you our lieutenant and governor general of our said colony and dominion to be published in the usual 
manner and with all due and usual solemnity’, ibid., I: 31. The instructions were written only for the governor’s 
private use, but some sections were read to the executive council, see ibid., I:45-6.  
20 Thomas Pownall boldly claimed that the commission ‘is hardly a commission during pleasure, to the person 
therein named as governor, yet it provides for a succession without vacancy, or interregnum, and it is not revoked 
but by a like commission, with like powers: It became the known, established constitution of that province which 
hath been established on it, and these laws, courts, and whole frame of legislature and judicature, are founded on 
it: It is the charter of that province: It is the indefeasible and unalterable right of those people ... and therefore not 
to be altered; but by such means as any reform or new establishment may take place in Great Britain: It cannot, 
in its essential parts, be altered or destroyed by any royal instructions or proclamation; or by letters from secretaries 
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analysing these commissions and instructions, have tended to depict governors as examples of 
an executive in the mould of a Stuart king. A close examination of this system, however, 
demonstrates that the authority and power of royal governors should not be compared to those 
of kings. The system of royal governorship set up a weak executive who can only be regarded 
as a symbolic representative of a king rather than one who could exercise his royal master’s 
full powers in his stead.  
From the outset, royal governorship was an inherently weak position because it was 
governance by instruction. The instructions which bestowed an array of powers on all royal 
governors were, ironically, one of the main reasons why royal governors could not function as 
their powers dictated. Constrained by precise and standardised instructions which had to be 
rigidly maintained,21 the governor was unable to respond to a crisis with any degree of 
flexibility.  When placed in a difficult situation, the governor lacked the autonomy required to 
respond as he best saw fit. The instructions were not general guides as to how a governor should 
act, but were specific orders that had to be obeyed. Because of the standardised nature of these 
instructions, the Board of Trade ignored the inherent differences between the royal colonies on 
the American mainland. The most remarkable aspect of royal government in the American 
colonies is the unchanging nature of the gubernatorial commissions and instructions: for over 
a century, the commissions which were sent to every royal governor across all royal colonies 
were surprisingly similar. For example, the commission sent to Alexander Spotswood, 
lieutenant-governor of Virginia from 1710 until 1722, was almost identical to the commission 
sent to Francis Fauquier almost fifty years later.22 While the situation in the colonies, in terms 
                                                          
of state: It cannot be superceded, or in part annulled, by the issuing out of any other commissions not known to 
this constitution.’ Thomas Pownall, The Administration of the Colonies, 2nd edn. (London, 1765), 54.  
21 See Leonard Woods Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors, 1670-1776, 2 vols (New 
York: D. Appleton-Century Company Inc., 1935). 
22 Ibid., I: 11. A further example of the standardisation of commissions can be seen in the collection of 
commissions for the Massachusetts Bay colony: Massachusetts Royal Commissions, 1681-1774, 2 vols. (Boston: 
Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 1913). 8. 
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of the powers of the assemblies and attitudes towards imperial control of the colonies, had 
evolved significantly over these decades, gubernatorial powers had not evolved in a 
comparable manner. Whenever a governor attempted to ignore his instructions for expedient 
reasons in times of crisis, the Board of Trade vehemently censured him and normally vetoed 
any laws agreed to by him. The very fact that royal governors were bound by instructions, 
which had to be strictly followed, demonstrates that royal governors had no real sovereign 
authority to act as they saw fit. Bernard Bailyn has claimed that, even with this system of 
governorship by instructions, royal governors had the ability to be powerful executives ‘if they 
had had the equipment that they needed’.23 Of course, governing by instruction does not 
necessarily mean that royal governors were always in a weak position because, if they actually 
had full use of the powers that were theoretically devolved upon them, they should have been 
able to maintain power and influence despite the apparent inflexibility of their instructions.  
A closer inspection of the governor’s powers, however, which have led so many 
historians to depict governors as possessing kingly authority, proves that governors could never 
be powerful executives in the colonies. As the governors’ commissions make clear, the ultimate 
responsibility of the royal governor was to maintain the royal prerogative. They were the 
bearers and maintainers of the royal prerogative in the colonies. Prerogative power is an 
abstract concept and this makes it difficult to define. Institutional historians, such as Leonard 
Woods Labaree, Evart Boutell Greene and Percy Scott Flippin, have often defined the royal 
governors’ role in the colonies as the maintenance of the royal prerogative, but they have not 
suggested the larger significance of this devolved task.24 What is the ‘royal prerogative’ and 
                                                          
23 Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 72. 
24 Leonard Woods Labaree, Royal Government in America, 5; Evart Boutell Greene, The Provincial Governor in 
the English Colonies of North America, 92-93; and Percy Scott Flippin, The Royal Government in Virginia, 1624-
1775, 101. Most recently, in a forum report published in The William and Mary Quarterly, several historians have 
debated the role of the concept of prerogative power in the ideological controversy waged in the colonies during 
the revolutionary period. The forum is centred on an essay by Eric Nelson and three responses by Gordon Wood, 
Daniel Hulsebosch, and Pauline Maier. See Eric Nelson, ‘Patriot Royalism: The Stuart Monarchy in American 
Political Thought, 1769–75’, The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, 68 (2011), 533-572; Daniel J. 
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what does it mean when the royal governors exercised and upheld such a prerogative in the 
colonies? The royal prerogative is the rights and powers at the disposal of a monarch which are 
inherent in his authority to rule. The royal prerogative, as fully exercised by a king, is clearly 
illustrated in the examples of the Stuart dynasty in seventeenth-century Britain. By the middle 
of the eighteenth century, however, the powers of the royal prerogative were becoming 
increasingly subsumed with the portfolio of powers at the disposal of the king’s ministers. 
George III, for example, increasingly exercised his prerogative powers through the advice and 
consent of his ministers who were appointed by the king but were also directly accountable to 
Parliament. The sovereignty of king-in-parliament, which increasingly developed following 
the settlement of the Glorious Revolution in 1688-89, was widely accepted in order to curtail 
and limit the powers of the crown.25 Historians have argued that royal governors did not have 
the same restrictions on their right to exercise and maintain the royal prerogative in their 
theoretical manifestation. Indeed, it has been argued that royal governors were, in theory, relics 
of a system of kingly power that had existed in Britain prior to the Glorious Revolution. While 
the royal prerogative was gradually diminished in Britain in the decades after 1688-89, the 
prerogative powers of the governors arguably remained undiminished in the royal colonies. It 
is clear, however, that royal governors were never able to wield their prerogative powers 
autonomously, but were, in fact, only custodians of this prerogative power so long as the 
monarch and his ministers allowed them to exercise it. A closer inspection of the nature and 
execution of these theoretical powers demonstrate that royal governors were simply pawns in 
the imperial machinery of colonial government rather than kings of their respective colonies. 
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Historians have highlighted some of the powers apparently granted to the governor and 
have claimed that this made the governor appear as powerful as a king. In terms of military and 
maritime affairs, a royal governor could exercise vice-regal powers: the commission named 
him captain general, vice-admiral and commander-in-chief of his colony, making him second 
only to the overall commander-in-chief of His Majesty’s forces in the colonies, and the 
instructions given to him devolved all the requisite powers due to his rank, and these, in theory, 
were extensive. He was able to impose martial law in an emergency, had control over all 
provincial forces in his colony, all officers in the colony were under his authority and he was 
able to direct any forces under his command to any part of the colonies if need be.26 These 
powers have led Labaree to argue that a royal governor’s control over purely local and 
provincial military organisation was, in theory, practically absolute.27 
Royal governors also appeared to have substantial powers over the judiciary in the 
colonies. In 1701, the judiciary in England had been protected from monarchical intrusion by 
the Act of Settlement. In England, judges were appointed by the crown, but could be removed 
for bad behaviour only at the request of both houses of Parliament. This made them independent 
of the crown after their appointment, but did not separate the judiciary from the legislature. The 
judicial system was very different in the colonies. Indeed, such was gubernatorial interference 
within the judicial branch in the colonies that the judiciary was almost an extension of the 
executive branch of government. Before 1700, all the commissions for the governors in the 
royal colonies, except Massachusetts, stipulated that they had the power to appoint all judges 
and other judicial officers on their own authority.28 From 1752, however, the Board of Trade 
prohibited all royal governors from appointing judges on their own initiative and required them 
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to seek the approval of at least three members of their council.29 Colonial judges lacked security 
of tenure and could be removed at will by a royal governor. Because of the perceived amateur 
status of judges in the colonies, the imperial government denied them the same rights and 
privileges bestowed on their English counterparts.30 Governors were also given the right, 
through the advice and consent of the council, to erect courts of justice, but only on the 
authority of an ‘especial order’ from the Board of Trade.31 The governor also had other judicial 
functions to perform: he heard appeals in civil cases, had the probate of wills and the issue of 
marriage licenses.  
Apart from the military and the judiciary, however, governors did not have the required 
powers needed to control other parts of the political system. Historians have pointed to the 
apparently immense patronage powers at the disposal of royal governors, which allowed them 
to fill most colonial offices in their colonies. The governor’s powers of appointment were 
essential to his ability to maintain his influence and uphold the royal prerogative in the colonies: 
by placing key personnel in official positions in his colony he should have been able to curry 
favour with important sections of colonial society and ensure that he could garner support for 
his measures when he pleased. All royal governors had certain powers of appointment and it 
was not purely restricted to the judiciary: in military affairs, they had the right to name all their 
subordinate officers; in civil affairs, the commission empowered them to appoint justices of 
the peace, sheriffs, customs officials ‘and other necessary Officers and Ministers ... for the 
better Administration of Justice and putting the Laws in Execution’.32 Governors, could not 
remove these officials ‘without good and sufficient cause to be signified’ to the metropolitan 
authorities and were instructed to report all names of those officers that were appointed.33 
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Patronage in colonial America should not solely be understood as the ability to appoint to 
offices because a large amount of the patronage at the disposal of a royal governor involved 
the ability to approve all land grants in their colony. Because the governor was the custodian 
of the ‘great seal’, and because of the fact that in all royal colonies, any unclaimed land was 
deemed to belong to the king, the commission gave him the power, with the consent of the 
council, to grant lands.34 This was a privileged power which greatly benefited all governors, 
both in terms of personal monetary gain and the prestige and influence it gave their office. 
It is misleading to maintain that royal governors enjoyed substantial and influential 
powers of patronage, however. While the royal governors undoubtedly enjoyed some patronage 
powers, it is essential to focus on what positions they were entitled to fill. Often these were 
low-level positions that did not significantly enhance the governor’s position in the colonies. 
The most important patronage power denied the royal governor, however, was the ability to 
influence the colonial assembly by means of having ‘friends’ within the assembly. Even in 
times of apparent absolute rule in England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the king 
had to rely on peers and MPs within Parliament who would uphold and support the king’s 
interests. In the eighteenth century, the king always exercised patronage powers over the 
composition and actions of Parliament. He would create and promote peers and bishops in the 
House of Lords. George III was able to count on a reliable Court party in the House of Lords 
because a majority of the king’s ministers sat in the upper house.35 This was not available to 
any governor. The system of influence in a parliamentary system that enabled the king and his 
ministers to influence a majority in the House of Lords and a significant majority in the House 
of Commons, was entirely lacking in the colonies. There were no peers or bishops in the council 
in the colonies and the electoral system in the colonies was very different from that of Britain 
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because there were no rotten boroughs.36 The king’s patronage over the Commons did not 
depend on his direct influence over rotten boroughs, but over his ability to influence the many 
peers who did control so many small boroughs. The king in Britain could himself influence 
some rotten boroughs and was able to offer a range of honours and sinecures that were 
conferred on MPs. Although he was never able to control the House of Commons, George III 
was still able to exert substantial influence over the lower house.37 The governor could not 
control the colonial assembly in the same manner. The system of governorship in place required 
an extensive web of electoral corruption to ensure that the governor had effective control of 
the colonial assembly and this was not possessed by any royal governor. There were no officials 
appointed by the governor sitting in the colonial assemblies. He had no influence at all over 
the members of the colonial assembly or on their behaviour. Rather than having the patronage 
powers to control the colonial assembly, royal governors had to use their personality to court 
the friendship of important members in the assembly in order to influence and maintain control 
of the colony’s legislature. The personality and management skills of a governor, therefore, 
were more important than the patronage at his disposal if he was to maintain effective control 
within his colony.38  
Although royal governors apparently possessed certain powers, their position within 
the framework of government in the colony was, in reality, inherently weak. The position of 
the royal governor within the colonial political framework might appear to be the same as the 
head of the executive in Britain in the eighteenth century. The governor’s relationship with the 
colonial council and colonial assembly also resembled the position of the king in relation to 
the House of Lords and House of Commons. But no governor could exercise as much patronage 
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in order to influence the composition and behaviour of his local assembly as the king could 
exercise over the British Parliament. Although the royal governor was a representative of a 
constitutional monarch, it has been suggested that his powers and responsibilities in his colony 
were more substantial than those of constitutional monarch in Britain. While the royal governor 
worked within a comparable system of limited government in the colonies to the monarch in 
Britain, it has been suggested that he possessed certain powers that ensured his powers within 
this structure were not so limited as those of his royal master in Britain. In other words, it has 
been suggested that the instructions appeared to grant the governor a stronger powerbase than 
the king in London. This was not the case. 
The royal governor of a colony did not govern alone: he was assisted by a council and 
a lieutenant-governor acting as the governor’s advisory board. The colonial council helped the 
governor perform his executive duties. In Britain, the monarch was assisted by the privy 
council, but it only met at the king’s discretion and could only offer advice. Increasingly it was 
replaced as an effective body by a cabinet of ministers, but this was not as active as the 
governor’s council. The governor’s council was involved in every decision that the governor 
had to make and the governor was not able to perform his duties without the consent and advice 
of his council. The colonial council was very influential in all three branches of the colonial 
political system: it was the highest court of appeal in the colony, served as the upper House of 
the legislature, and was involved, with the governor, in all the decision-making of the executive 
branch.  
The council in Virginia was composed of between ten and twelve councillors at any 
one time and they enjoyed an equal voice in all colonial legislation and served as the highest 
court in the colony. Because of their important duties, the selection of the council’s members 
was fundamentally vital to the governor’s effectiveness. This important patronage right, which 
would have allowed a governor to build up a support base, was often denied the royal governor 
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in Virginia. In a letter to the Board of Trade in 1762, for example, Fauquier protested against 
the appointment of Robert Burwell to the Virginia council. Although Fauquier’s instructions 
directed him to recommend appropriate men to be appointed to the council, often these 
recommendations were ignored in Britain and instead the Board of Trade appointed men who 
had not been nominated by the governor.39 Fauquier’s exasperated language in his complaint 
to the Board on this occasion contains a logical and powerful argument. While he did not deny 
that Burwell was a ‘gentleman of very fair character, of a very good family, and of a convenient 
situation’, he believed that Burwell lacked the appropriate ‘mental Qualifications’ and had ‘an 
unwarrantable Impetuosity of Temper’.40 Fauquier maintained that he was not waging a 
personal vendetta by insisting on his recommendations, but was concerned about his position 
and authority within the colony:  
For the sake of his Majesty’s Government here, much more than for my own, I cannot help 
observing to your Lordships (and irksome it is to me to do it, as it personaly [sic] concerns me) that 
if a Governors Recommendation is totaly [sic] disregarded, He will very soon become of little 
Weight, and have very small Influence in the Colony over which He is appointed to preside, by 
which his Majesty’s Service may occasionally suffer .... Such and such only can be answerable to 
your majesty, if they should recommend improper Persons. They are in his Majesty’s Power; but if 
a private Man can obtain his Wishes to serve his Friend, will he not afterwards laugh in his Sleeve 
and despise Consequences?41  
Fauquier’s logic is compelling: he was new to the colony and his influence would diminish 
considerably if the colonists became aware that his recommendations for important 
appointments were being ignored by the Board. The Board denied that, in proposing Burwell’s 
appointment, it was doing anything to weaken the governor’s effectiveness: ‘in general, great 
respect is due and indeed paid to the recommendations of His Majesty’s Governors, but it 
would be carrying that respect too far, if the recommendations were construed to preclude a 
                                                          
39 ‘You are FROM time to time, when any vacancies shall happen in our SAID COUNCIL, FORTHWITH to 
transmit unto our Commissioners for Trade and Plantations in order to be laid before us, the names AND 
characters of THREE persons INHABITANTS of OUR said PROVINCE, whom you shall esteem the best 
qualified for that trust’, in Leonard Woods Labaree ed., Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors, I:51. 
See Leonard Woods Labaree’s excellent discussion of how the Board of Trade often undermined the powers of 
the royal governors with their interference with council appointments in Labaree, Royal Government in America, 
134-171. 
40 Francis Fauquier to the Board of Trade, 31 July 1762, Fauquier Papers, II: 782. 
41 Ibid., II: 782-3. 
44 
 
Nomination to His Majesty of any other person even in preference to the Governor’s 
recommendation’.42 
Unlike the governor’s councils in other colonies, the council in Virginia proved to be a 
disappointing and generally ineffectual body within the Virginian political system. Whereas 
the royal governor was invariably British, the colonial council consisted solely of native-born 
colonists. This fact caused significant logistical problems because of the topography and sheer 
size of colonial Virginia. All three governors of Virginia constantly had problems putting a 
quorum together because the members of the council were scattered across the colony. 
Councillors were often men of influence and ability, but they also normally possessed rich 
plantations which were spread out across the colony and travelling conditions in Virginia in 
this period were notoriously difficult. It would often take a matter of weeks from a governor 
announcing a meeting of council to the meeting actually taking place, even if the business was 
urgent. In 1767, Francis Fauquier reported that five out of the eleven councillors resided in the 
Northern Neck region of the colony, which was 145 miles away from Williamsburg.43 The 
dispersed nature of colonial Virginia’s population ensured that the council was often 
dysfunctional and unmanageable in this period, which severely hampered the governor’s ability 
to govern effectively. 
The importance of the council within the political system had in fact steadily declined 
during the eighteenth century. In the commissions of the Virginian royal governors in the first 
half of the seventeenth century, the royal governor was nothing more than the first among the 
councillors.44 By the middle of the eighteenth century, the importance and role of the governor 
far outweighed the functions of the council in the political system. While the council certainly 
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advised all the royal governors in this period on various matters including the enforcement of 
royal policy or the approval or rejection of colonial legislation, the final decision always rested 
with the governor. Proof of the ineffective nature of the Virginian council can be shown by 
examining Francis Fauquier’s work with the council. In 1759, the House of Burgesses passed 
a bill which laid a duty on slaves imported for the personal use of the importer from Maryland, 
the Carolinas and the West Indies. Fauquier was well aware that his instructions from Britain 
had strictly forbidden him to assent to any such bill, but he also knew that the bill was very 
popular in the colony. He sought the advice of his council and requested its members to give 
him their opinion in writing on whether he should approve the bill in spite of his instructions 
from Britain. Seven out of the eight councillors who attended the meeting approved of the bill 
and Fauquier, therefore, signed it and forwarded this piece of legislation and the councillors’ 
opinions of it to the Board of Trade.45 The Board of Trade, however, sought in no uncertain 
terms to correct Fauquier’s understanding of the functions of the council in no uncertain 
terms.46 The council was simply an advisory body and the home government explicitly refused 
to allow the council to develop into a responsible body which could have a significant influence 
on imperial policy.  
By the time Fauquier was appointed to the lieutenant-governorship of Virginia in 1758, 
the governorship was actually not the most important branch of government in the political 
system within Virginia. The Virginia House of Burgesses, which was the first established 
representative assembly in the English colonies in North America, became the preeminent 
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political institution in the colony by the middle of the eighteenth century. This House was 
dominated by wealthy landowners, who were often members of or closely related to the great 
Virginian families. Its members were well educated, Anglican, and very experienced in local 
politics.47 The apparent and actual relations between royal governor and colonial assembly 
have been misinterpreted in much of the existing historiography. The existence and authority 
of the colonial assemblies in each colony were supposedly dependent on the royal prerogative 
at the disposal of the royal governor. While it was a matter of contention in the colonies prior 
to the American Revolution, the system in place in the royal framework of government in the 
colony, in British-eyes, meant that the assemblies were constitutionally subservient to the 
governor.48 They met at the whim of the royal governor who could convene, prorogue or 
dissolve the assembly whenever he pleased. This prerogative power had not been exercised to 
this extent in Britain since the Glorious Revolution.  
While the colonial assemblies were apparently dependent even for their existence on 
the prerogative at the disposal of the royal governor, the royal governor’s actual authority over 
the assemblies was not strong. During the period of ‘salutary neglect’ in the first fifty years of 
the eighteenth century, when metropolitan control of the colonies was less intrusive and more 
relaxed than during the subsequent twenty-five years, the House of Burgesses took advantage 
of this situation and accrued more powers and responsibilities until in effect they dominated 
colonial government. Although the assembly would meet only in either the spring or autumn 
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every year for around four to six weeks and its membership was composed mainly of part-time 
politicians, the House assumed control of some of the most important functions of the colonial 
political system.  
The House of Burgesses had control of the colony’s public finances, which ensured that 
all governors were dependent on their assemblies to implement royal policy. The assembly’s 
control over finance was the most important weapon that it had in order to restrict, neutralise 
or combat the powers of the executive in the colony. In the first place, its control over finance 
meant that that it had the sole right to initiate taxes in order to raise the revenue required by the 
executive. Francis Fauquier, Lord Botetourt and Lord Dunmore could not fully exercise their 
prerogative rights over the House if the assembly controlled the means of raising revenue and 
the amount to be raised in the colony. Not only was the House in control of raising revenue, 
but it also assumed increasing control over how this revenue was to be spent. All three 
governors during this period in Virginia had to rely on the House of Burgesses for the money 
needed to raise troops and to provide for the colony’s defence. In other words, all three 
governors were accountable to the House of Burgesses for all expenditures out of the funds 
collected by the assembly. This reliance upon the legislative assembly to provide military 
support caused considerable difficulties between governors and legislature in this period. 
The superiority of the House of Burgesses as a political branch in the Virginian political 
system became apparent in the 1750s. Richard Dinwiddie, Francis Fauquier’s predecessor as 
governor, failed to prevent the House of Burgesses from challenging British parliamentary 
authority, and his ability to implement imperial legislation, in the colony. In 1752, Dinwiddie 
successfully sought the permission from the Board of Trade to impose a Pistole fee for 
attaching the royal seal on all land patents.49 In all other American royal colonies in the 1750s, 
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except Virginia, the governor was allowed to impose a fee for sealing land patents. In Virginia, 
however, the House of Burgesses had regulated all fees from land grants since the 1680s. The 
members of the House of Burgesses vehemently protested the implementation of the fee and 
claimed that no fee was legal without the prior consent of the colonial legislative assembly. It 
declared that the ‘demand of a pistole … being not warranted by any known or established law, 
is … an infringement of the rights of the people’.50 The House sent Peyton Randolph to the 
Privy Council in London in order to protest the pistole fee and the Council heard arguments 
from Dinwiddie by letter and from Randolph in person. The Privy Council decided on a 
compromise: Dinwiddie was allowed to levy the pistole fee but not for lands of less than one 
hundred acres, for lands east of the Allegheny mountains, or for lands where applications for 
patents had been initiated before April 1752, when the fee was proposed. It was a partial victory 
for the governor, but, more important, it demonstrated that the House of Burgesses could stand 
up to the royal representative and assert its rights. Although the Privy Council confirmed the 
governor’s right to levy the fee, it placed certain restrictions in order to conciliate the legislative 
assembly. By agreeing to listen to the protests of the House of Burgesses and by agreeing a 
compromise, as a result, the Privy Council essentially acknowledged the political strength of 
the House and legitimised the House acting outwith the governor’s authority and control.  
There was one possible source of friction between governor and legislative assembly 
that did not exist in the colony. Unlike other colonies, the House of Burgesses had no control 
over the governor’s salary. Every governor in Virginia, from 1683 until 1775, was instructed 
to take a salary of £2000 a year from the local revenue of two shillings per hogshead.51 The 
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governor’s salary in Virginia was the largest of all the salaries paid to governors in the eight 
royal colonies. Because this salary was not controlled by the House of Burgesses, this 
legislative assembly could not use its control this issue as a potential bargaining tool in its 
relations with the governor.  
The royal governor’s role in the entire legislative process was minimal. In the first 
place, the governor’s instructions and commission did not allow him to initiate legislation or 
propose policies to be enacted. The most important fact about the nature of gubernatorial power 
in the royal colonies is that the governor, as the head of the executive, did not introduce 
measures in the colonial assemblies, but simply reviewed legislation proposed by the colonial 
legislature.52 Rather than enjoying the full prerogative powers of a king, a royal governor was 
merely an administrator who acted as a conduit between the colonial assembly and the Board 
of Trade. He was instructed: ‘You are to transmit authentic Copies of all Laws Statutes and 
Ordinances which at any time hereafter shall be made or enacted within our said province, each 
of them separately under the public Seal, unto our first commissioners for Trade and Plantations 
within three Months or by the first Opportunity after their being enacted’.53 Royal governors 
were not the initiators of legislation, but were simply the conduit by which colonial legislation 
proposed and passed by the colonial assemblies was transmitted to the Board of Trade and 
Plantations. This is very different from Britain where the most important legislation and taxes 
were initiated by the executive through the king’s ministers. A great deal of legislative action 
in the Westminster Parliament was in the form of private or local legislation brought in by 
ordinary backbench MPs, but the most important legislative acts (especially about taxes and 
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law and order) were initiated by the king’s ministers. The king’s ministers at Westminster were 
far more active in national policy making than were the colonial governors.54 
The governors’ role in the legislative process has been exaggerated primarily because 
they had the ability to veto legislation. While it may seem the case that royal governors had an 
absolute authority over all legislation that passed in the colonial assemblies because they had 
the ability to veto all laws passed in the colonies, the royal governors never enjoyed such an 
absolute negative on colonial legislation. His veto was simply a negative by instruction: the 
governor reviewed all legislation passed by the assembly in strict accordance with his 
instructions. In these instructions, the governor was ordered to veto all legislation that 
contravened his instructions, endangered the prerogatives of the crown, or affected the policies 
set out by the imperial government. The types of laws that were absolutely prohibited were 
meticulously spelled out in the governor’s instructions.55 The power of veto over most colonial 
legislation at the disposal of a royal governor was typically a ‘suspending’ veto. The most 
important legislation passed by the colonial assembly had a suspension clause inserted so that 
it could not be executed until it had received the royal consent by an order in council usually 
on the advice of the Board of Trade and Plantations. Suspending clauses were required for all 
legislation that affected the royal prerogative, colonial trade and colonial currency.56 While the 
governor could indicate his personal approval of a certain piece of colonial legislation in 
practice, the law could not be executed until the imperial administration had approved of it. 
This is markedly different from the situation in Britain. While the Board of Trade and 
Plantations could veto legislation passed in the colonies, no veto was ever applied to legislation 
passed by the Westminster Parliament after 1708. George III never vetoed any legislation 
passed by the British Parliament (though he very occasionally contemplated doing so). Most 
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of the time, his ministers were strong enough to defeat legislation they or the king disliked.57 
From the passage of a bill in the colonial assembly to the approval of the home government 
was a time-consuming exercise and the royal governor merely acted as a conduit in this 
example of metropolitan authority.  
With the ability to wield the royal prerogative, summon, dissolve or prorogue the lower 
houses of the colonial assemblies, the ability to veto colonial legislation, create courts, and 
appoint at all levels of colonial government and the judiciary, historians have maintained that 
royal governors were not merely ‘kings in America’ as Thomas Pownall stipulated, but 
theoretically Stuart kings with all the prerogative powers at their disposal. As we have seen, 
this interpretation is misleading and unhelpful. Royal governors were never the theoretical all-
powerful executives that the prevailing historiography has portrayed, but were essentially 
administrators acting for and under the authority of the imperial government. Without doubt, 
all royal governors were granted some powers that gave them the appearance of being strong 
executives, in the military and judiciary spheres for example, but, crucially, the most important 
powers that the governors required in order to be dominant executives were weakened, became 
conditional and were even non-existent in practice. Royal governors were no more than agents 
or servants of powerful patrons, instructed how to act and liable to have any decision of theirs 
vetoed or overturned back in Britain.  The commission to all royal governors, which contained 
bold titles to executive power, could never be fully realised and this was compounded by the 
system of imperial administration which weakened the governor’s authority even further. What 
is obvious, however, is that the system of governorship in the royal colonies as perceived from 
Britain was diametrically opposed to this political system based on a more participative 
political culture. Royal governors needed to be operating in the system which existed in 
eighteenth-century Britain rather than the one with which they had to contend in the colonies, 
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if they were to be as effective an executive authority as the king and his ministers were in 
Britain. The rise of the colonial assemblies gathered momentum in the first half of the 
eighteenth century and, with their control of the public finance in the royal colonies, the royal 
governors’ authority and effectiveness were seriously weakened. 
III 
The Royal Governor as ‘Pawn’: Metropolitan control of the Colonies 
While this chapter has thus far maintained that royal governors always struggled to be powerful 
executives, this section focuses on the exact nature of imperial administration over the political 
system within the colonies prior to the American Revolution. The system of imperial 
administration that existed in the colonies and in Britain, before the American Revolution, 
made it extremely difficult for the governors to govern effectively. While the prescribed powers 
devolved on the royal governor ensured that the governor could be little more than the chief 
administrator of a royal colony, his limited powers in practice were further restricted by the 
system of imperial government that existed up to the revolutionary crisis that engulfed the 
colonies in the mid-1770s.  
The system of imperial administration for the American colonies within Britain was 
one which repeatedly malfunctioned because the system of communication between colony 
and mother country constantly struggled under a heavy bureaucratic burden and frequently 
suffered because there were too many decision-makers for efficient and effective imperial 
control. Until the creation of the American Colonial Office in 1768, the maintenance of colonial 
affairs was devolved upon several different departments. While the system of governance in 
the colonies appears to have been extremely centralised, in that it was governance by 
instruction and all legislation passed in the colonies was reviewed by the home government, in 
fact the imperial administration within Britain was largely de-centralised. This system was not 
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streamlined, efficient or co-ordinated. It was heavily bureaucratic and lacked the devolved 
system of decision-making that is considered essential by any successful modern government 
department. Policymaking in London involved many individuals and straddled many 
departments, including the Board of Trade and Plantations, the Privy Council, the Secretary of 
State for the South, the Admiralty, the Bishop of London, and the Treasury.58 
The most important office was that of the Lords Commissioners for Trade and 
Plantations, more widely known as the Board of Trade, which oversaw the bulk of colonial 
affairs. The Board frequently wrote to the various royal governors, requesting further 
clarification of their actions, rebuking them for ignoring their instructions, or sending new 
instructions when and if the situation demanded it. While the Board was the centre of all 
information regarding the colonies, it lacked the autonomy to initiate policies in the colonies 
and act upon information received from the colonies because it was largely an advisory body 
and was subordinate to more important ministers and departments of state. It could not take the 
initiative by making changes to the government’s imperial policy or suggest a new course of 
action directly to the governor. Instead, it had to take the ponderous path of making 
recommendations to the king and, if the king acting through the Privy Council agreed to such 
requests, an order-in-council would be sent to the governor directly, or the Secretary of the 
State for the South would be advised to send a letter to the governor. Only in a minority of 
cases was the Board of Trade given the task of writing the recommendation itself. Because 
even then it acted at the request of the Privy Council, and hence these instructions were often 
written in a guarded and vague manner. The circuitous and bureaucratic nature of the 
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administrative system of royal governance over the colonies therefore ensured that the 
governor was handicapped from the outset.  
One of the main functions of a royal governor was to send detailed reports back to the 
Board of Trade and to the Secretary of State for the Southern Department (and the later to the 
Secretary of State for the American Department) in order to keep the imperial authorities up-
to-date with all business in the colony, including any issues concerning trade, recent legislation 
and general colonial affairs. This system of correspondence, however, had an unintended 
consequence: because of the great distance between any colony and Britain and the slow means 
of communication, the governor’s reports were sometimes given greater significance than they 
deserved or their reports were accepted at face-value when the situation might have changed 
in the meantime. The British government lacked accurate, up-to-date and current coverage of 
events in the colonies and, hence, the royal governors’ reports were often accepted as important 
and reliable accounts of events. The reports sent, for example, by Francis Bernard to the Board 
of Trade during the Stamp Crisis were undoubtedly exaggerated and exposed his inability to 
comprehend the true nature of the hostilities against imperial policy and his position. These 
reports, however, were presented to the House of Commons and played a considerable role in 
informing and influencing government opinion and consequently had an impact on the 
government’s role in formulating new policy.59 Of course, the weight given to Bernard’s 
reports during the Stamp Act Crisis was not a frequent occurrence, but the episode does 
demonstrate the importance given to governors’ reports by the British government. 
The patronage originally under the control of the governor was gradually absorbed by 
the home government and by the colonial legislatures during the eighteenth century. In 1752, 
the Earl of Halifax, President of the Board of Trade, brought all colonial appointments under 
                                                          
59 See Colin Nicolson, The ‘Infamas Govener’, 140. 
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the Board’s jurisdiction. Although this simplified the administrative burdens for the Board, it 
reduced the powers of the governor and his effectiveness.60 Moreover, this control of 
appointments was not just restricted to the appointments of councillors. The most important 
facet of the nature of gubernatorial authority within the royal colonies was the fact that they 
essentially lost their powers to appoint officials at a local level. Again, this was not restricted 
to political offices: the royal governors’ ability to grant lands in their colonies was also affected. 
The Privy Council between 1764 and 1777 approved grants of land that incredibly totalled over 
five million acres.61 The egregious intrusion by the imperial centre into powers that had 
previously been at the disposal of all royal governors weakened the gubernatorial position to 
such an extent that any hopes the governors might have had of maintaining some control of 
their colony were much reduced.  
The nature of the appointment system, the disorganised situation in the metropolitan 
administration and the removal of some of the patronage previously at the disposal of the 
governors, ensured that all royal governors struggled to exercise power effectively. They could 
not function as the present king’s vice regent let alone act like a previous Stuart monarch.  
IV 
Conclusion  
Lord Dunmore bemoaned his ineffective political authority in 1774. He was certain that ‘if it 
had been thought fit to vest all power of this nature which this government affords in the hands 
of the governor, I should have had the means of keeping down the attempts of party and faction 
which have put the public affairs of this colony in the alarming situation in which they actually 
stand’.62 The governor believed that he had substantial powers in theory which were denied to 
                                                          
60 See Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 74.  
61 Labaree, Royal Government in America, 106, 114-23. 
62 Lord Dunmore to the Earl of Dartmouth, 24 December 1774, TNA, CO 5/ 1353. 
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him in practice. This was not the case. While he did have certain powers, such as control over 
the military and judiciary, the most important powers and privileges, which would have enabled 
him to control his colony more effectively, were in practice denied to all royal governors. He 
did not have full veto powers, he could not control appointments to his council and he did not 
have a controlling influence within the legislative assembly. His supposed or desired powers 
were in practice parcelled out to the metropolitan government and to an increasingly potent 
legislative system. Royal governors were weak executives in relation to both the Westminster 
government and the colonial legislative assemblies. 
 Royal governors were never ‘Kings in America’ as has often been claimed. The king in 
Britain not only had substantial powers over the political system, but he also had the 
appearance of power. Because he had a natural and undisputed right to be head of a powerful 
executive, his authority was seen as almost divinely ordained, he enjoyed enormous personal 
prestige and the aura of majesty, and, hence, he was elevated above any politician of his day. 
Governors could not remotely expect to possess the same prestige or power. The popular 
British belief, that royal governors should be kings in the colonies, is an important one which 
led British politicians to perceive wrongly what governors could achieve in the colonies. They 
believed that, as representatives of the king, all governors could expect to enjoy the respect and 
deference of the colonists. Thomas Pownall, who was a governor himself, maintained that 
governors were ‘kings’ and should act as such in the colonies. This fundamentally misleading 
picture of eighteenth-century colonial governorship was widely accepted in Britain and this 




Virginian Governors and Imperial Politics, 1758-1776 
John Murray, Lord Dunmore, was relatively content with his appointment as royal governor of 
New York in 1770. After spending ten years in the House of Lords, during which time he 
experienced multiple financial troubles, Dunmore secured this profitable appointment through 
the help of his patrons, the Bedford connection.1 The New York governorship was certainly a 
lucrative appointment in the British Empire, especially for a peer who did not have the financial 
resources to support his elevated status. The governor was granted an annual salary of £2000, 
which was guaranteed out of the revenue collected by the Tea duty which was retained in 1770, 
and was provided with a profitable system of fees which was collected by the governor in return 
for granting land patents. This revenue was particularly welcome to a governor such as 
Dunmore who was unabashedly determined to make his fortune while he lived in New York. 
He certainly benefited from his governance of the northern colony: within nine months, he had 
acquired fifty thousand acres in the colony and obtained substantial sums from granting land 
patents to prospectors. Such was Dunmore’s greed for funds that he became entangled in a 
bitter dispute with the long-serving, and long-suffering, lieutenant-governor of the colony, 
Cadwallader Colden. The lieutenant-governor refused to give up half of the proceeds that 
belonged to the office of the governor during the period of the governor’s absence from 
Dunmore’s appointment to when he finally took up his office.2 Dunmore was in New York for 
                                                          
1 William C. Lowe has provided us with an excellent overview of Dunmore’s early parliamentary career and his 
financial troubles and predicament prior to his appointment to the position in New York, see Lowe, ‘The 
Parliamentary Career of Lord Dunmore, 1761-1774’, The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, 96 (1988), 
3-30. The Bedfords were a crucial segment of the Grafton Ministry in 1769. Although, as William C. Lowe makes 
clear, there is little concrete evidence to tie Dunmore to the Bedford group, there is much circumstantial material.  
2 Mary Lou Lustig, Privilege and Prerogative: New York’s Provincial Elite, 1710-1776 (London: Associated 
University Presses, 1995), 162-3; and James Corbett David, Dunmore’s New World, 32-36. For Cadwallader 
Colden’s lieutenant-governorship of New York, see Seymour I. Schwartz, Cadwallader Colden: A Biography 
(New York: Humanity Books, 2013); Alice Mapelsden Key, Cadwallader Colden: A Representative Eighteenth 
Century Official (New York: 1906); and Alfred R. Hoermann, Cadwallader Colden: A Figure of the American 
Enlightenment (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 2002).  
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his own self-aggrandisement and he was certainly not prepared to be charitable. The New York 
governorship was the ideal place for a Scottish peer who was seeking colonial riches. 
 After a brief and relatively agreeable nine months in New York, however, Dunmore 
was appointed to the governorship of Virginia in 1771. After the death of the popular Norbonne 
Berkeley, Lord Botetourt, in Virginia, the British government moved Dunmore there. He was 
replaced in New York by the governor of North Carolina, Sir William Tryon. The British 
authorities were unquestionably impressed by Tryon’s ability to put down the Regulator 
Movement in North Carolina’s backcountry.3 Dunmore was surprised and bitter about his 
removal from New York, but he was utterly powerless to prevent it without ending up with no 
official appointment. The patronage of the Bedfords could not help him: a new ministry was 
now in place and Dunmore could not rely on the necessary political connections to keep him 
in his profitable position in New York. He beseeched Lord Hillsborough, the American 
Secretary of State, that he should be allowed to remain as governor of New York. He claimed 
that if he were able to stay in what he described as the colony which would ‘most powerfully 
influence the political conduct of the whole continent’,4 he would be the right person in the 
right place at a critical time in the colonies. When that tactic did not work, he hoped to gain 
Lord Hillsborough’s sympathy by adopting a different argument: 
I grant the advantages in point of emolument but the climate is such that it will oblige me to live 
without my family, which will make my residence in that country where there is little or no society 
so tiresome that I cannot be certain I should not be able to stay there any time, and therefore it might 
be more advantageous for me as well as my family that I should remain in a place where there is a 
harmony between me and the people, and at the same time suits so with my disposition that I cannot 
forsee anything which may interrupt the design I had in coming to this country at first, but may 
continue here as long as His Majesty shall judge proper.5    
                                                          
3 The Earl of Rochford, writing on behalf of Lord Hillsborough, had informed Tryon that his actions against a 
‘body of lawless Insurgents stiling [sic] themselves Regulators’ had received ‘the King’s entire Approbation’. 
Paul David Nelson, William Tryon and the Course of Empire: A Life in British Imperial Service (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 87. 
4 Lord Dunmore to Lord Hillsborough, 9 March 1771, Dunmore Papers, National Archives of Scotland, RH 
4/195/3. 
5 Lord Dunmore to Lord Hillsborough, 2 July 1771, TNA, CO 5/154. 
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While, on the surface, Dunmore’s concerns about his political influence and his family’s health 
seem somewhat desperate, they were certainly not unfounded. After all, the last two governors 
who had taken residence in Virginia, Francis Fauquier and Lord Botetourt, had both died during 
their respective terms as governor. Dunmore surely would have been aware that the 
appointment to Virginia might certainly be regarded as a ‘death trap’. Dunmore, feeling 
helpless, used his charms on his appointed successor in an attempt to persuade him to go to 
Virginia in his place, but Governor Tryon was not prepared to give up on his advantageous 
promotion. When Tryon arrived unexpectedly in New York, Dunmore was not even there to 
greet him: instead, he was in New Jersey scouting for land. On the night that Tryon took the 
oath of office, Dunmore threw a party for the newly appointed governor. After drinking 
excessively, Dunmore, according to first-hand accounts, vented his frustration at his failure to 
remain as governor of New York. He called Tryon a coward, hit out at the councillors and then 
ran into the streets bewailing his fate: ‘Damn Virginia, did I ever seek it? Why is it forced upon 
me? I asked for New York, New York I took and they have robbed me of it without my 
consent’.6 In all probability, this account has been embellished, but there are numerous other 
reports which substantiate Dunmore’s propensity for heavy drinking and it is certainly evident, 
from letters sent to Lord Hillsborough, that Dunmore was distraught at his lack of connections 
at home.7 Dunmore’s drunken rant contains an important and often overlooked significance: 
royal governors were powerless to prevent themselves from being appointed to any of the eight 
royal colonies, especially if they had lost patronage at home. A royal governor, without the 
necessary support base at home, was little more than a political pawn ready to be moved on the 
colonial chessboard wherever the British chess master desired. 
                                                          
6 ‘Entry for 9 July 1771’, Historical Memoirs from 16 March 1763 to 9 July 1776 of William Smith, ed. William 
H.W. Sabine (New York: Colburn & Tegg, 1956), 106-7. 
7 See James Corbett David, Dunmore’s New World, 41. 
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Despite the lucrative earnings available in New York and despite the gloomy prospect 
of his health deteriorating in Virginia, Dunmore’s cantankerous display after Tryon’s 
inauguration appears particularly odd. Virginia was by far the most prestigious colony to 
govern and the salary was higher than that in New York. Indeed, the widespread eulogising 
after the premature deaths of Fauquier and Botetourt, in 1768 and 1770 respectively, suggest 
that there was a marked respect for royal authority in Virginia. When Fauquier died in the 
Governor’s Palace in Williamsburg, on 3 March 1768, after repeated bouts of illness, most 
probably from testicular cancer,8 there was much public mourning within the colony for the 
loss of a seemingly ‘successful’ governor. Newspapers of the day captured the general sense 
of approbation for a governor who judiciously and in an even-handed manner enforced royal 
policies, but still governed ‘much to his own honour, and the ease and satisfaction of the 
inhabitants’.9 Contemporaries were quick to record their recognition of Fauquier’s abilities and 
their praise for his administration.10 Fauquier’s popularity was immortalised in the famous 
words of his ‘protégé’, Thomas Jefferson, who described him in his autobiography as the 
                                                          
8 In a letter to Benjamin Tasker on 30 May 1767, Robert Carter, a prominent Virginian planter and member of the 
Council, described Fauquier’s illness that had debilitated the lieutenant-governor: ‘Governor Fauquier hath 
schirrus Testicles. This Disorder is o’ft mortal. He forgoes the use of spirits, fermented Liquours, and animal food 
(except small soop [sic]).’ In Susan Eley Briggs, ‘Robert Carter letterbook, 1764-1768’ (Unpublished MA thesis, 
College of William and Mary, 1962), 60. 
9 Rind’s Virginia Gazette, 3 March 1768, published an obituary that was effusive in its praise of the character and 
conduct of the deceased governor: ‘As a faithful Representative of his Sovereign; he was vigilant in Government, 
moderate in Power, exemplary in Religion, and merciful where the rigour of Justice could by any means be 
dispensed with. In the exercise of less  public virtues; he was warm in his Attachments, punctual in his 
Engagements, munificent to Indigence, and in his domestick [sic] Connexions truly paternal.’ 
10 Robert Carter described Fauquier’s administration in glowing terms: ‘During his Administration  every royal 
order, which his Sovereign caused to be transmitted here was spirituously and diligently enforced, he was vigilant 
in government, moderate in power and merciful where the rigours of justice could be dispensed with’ Robert 
Carter to Thomas Bladen, 9 March 1768, ‘The Robert Carter Letter Book’, 100. Carter wrote an identical appraisal 
of Fauquier’s governorship to the Virginian Governor, Sir Jeffrey Amherst on 9 March 1768, see ‘The Robert 
Carter Letter Book’, 106-107. John Blair, who became acting governor of Virginia after Fauquier died, described 
him ‘as a most punctuously diligent man’. Cited in The Official Paper of Francis Fauquier, I: 8. James Horrocks, 
rector of Bruton Parish and president of the College of William and Mary, similarly composed a memorable 
eulogy that was often quoted in the press of the day: ‘On the 3th. Inst. We reciev’d no small Misfortune in the 
Death of our late Governor, not only a sensible Loss to his particular Friends, amongst whom I had the honor to 
be numbered, but in my humble Opinion to this Country in general. According to my Judgement, his 
Administration was conducted with so fair & even a hand between the Prerogative & Authority of our Mother 
Country, & the Rights and Priveleges [sic] of America, that I think he highly merited the Esteem & Affection of 
the People here, tho’ they seemed unwilling to allow them in those Times of Difficulty & Confusion occasion’d 
by the Stamp Act and Repeal of it’. Cited in The Official Papers of Francis Fauquier, I: 8. 
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‘ablest man who ever filled that office’.11 Fauquier’s successor, Lord Botetourt, received even 
more praise for his seemingly benevolent and wise administration when he died after just two 
years in office in 1770. In his diary, Langdon Carter bemoaned Botetourt’s death as a loss to 
the colony that was ‘so great to be expressed’.12 Virginians believed Botetourt was meant to be 
the gubernatorial saviour of Virginia, who would save the colonists from ministerial tyranny, 
but his death opened the way for a new tyranny to raise its ugly head. Thomas Jefferson 
maintained that ‘Lord Bottetourt’s great respectability, his character for integrity, and his 
general popularity, would have enabled him to embarrass the measures of the patriots 
exceedingly. His death was, therefore, a fortunate event for the cause of the Revolution’.13 
Botetourt was not just the Virginian saviour, he was also its friend. The statue of Botetourt 
which was put up in the centre of Williamsburg three years after his death proclaimed him 
America’s ‘Friend’.14 His public funeral was not just a celebration of Botetourt’s 
administration, but was also a celebration of the royal bonds which tied the colony to the mother 
country.15 Instead of presiding over a colony that was creating significant strife for the crown’s 
representative and a colonial political structure which detested the idea and practice of royal 
governorship, the only major problem facing Dunmore when he entered Williamsburg appears 
to have been whether he could match the success of his illustrious and beloved predecessors. 
                                                          
11 Thomas Jefferson to L.H. Giradin, 15 January 1815, in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Alfred A. 
Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh, 19 vols. (Washington D.C.:  Issued under the auspices of the Thomas Jefferson 
memorial association of the United States, 1903-04), XIV: 231-2. 
12 ‘A fine gentleman is dead and truly Noble in his Public character. He, as anecdote says, was picht [sic] upon to 
be the Agent of a dirty tyrannic Ministry; but his virtues resisted such an employment and he became the 
instrument of a dawning happiness; and had he lived we should have been so: for through his active and exemplary 
virtue, order everywhere revived out of that confusion that our own dissipative indolence had thrown us into’. The 
Diary of Colonel Landon Carter of Sabine Hall, 1752-1778, ed. Jack P. Greene, 2 vols. (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 1965), 1: 512. 
13 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, X: 330, cited in Louise Dunbar, ‘The Royal Governors in the Middle and 
Southern Colonies on the Eve of the Revolution’, 238. 
14 The inscription on the statue to the left read: ‘America, behold your Friend! who, leaving his native country, 
declined those additional honours which were there in store for him, that he might heal your wounds, and restore 
tranquillity and happiness to this extensive continent. With what zeal and anxiety he pursued these glorious 
objects, Virginia thus bears her grateful testimony’. Rind’s Virginia Gazette, 13 May 1773. 
15 Graham Hood’s depiction of Botetourt’s funeral is particularly striking. See Hood, The Governor's Palace in 
Williamsburg: A Cultural Study (Williamsburg, VA:  Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 1992), 12-20. 
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Virginia in 1771 appeared to be a distinctly easier colony to govern than the more unsettled 
situation in New York. Unfortunately for Lord Dunmore, he fairly soon became one of the 
most hated figures during the American Revolution. According to Richard Henry Lee, if the 
British government ‘had searched through the world for a person best to ruin their cause, and 
procure a union and success for these colonies[,] they could not have found a more complete 
agent than Lord Dunmore’.16  
This chapter seeks to explain the gubernatorial system in Virginia and demonstrate how 
various governors operated within that system during the imperial crisis. In doing so, this 
chapter will, first, investigate Francis Fauquier’s early governorship from 1758 to 1764 when 
he faced numerous challenges from the legislative assembly. Second, this chapter will focus 
on the reaction in Virginia to the Stamp Act in 1765 and 1766 and will examine how well 
Fauquier coped during this crisis. Third, this chapter will explore Lord Botetourt’s brief spell 
as governor of Virginia and examine his relationship with the legislature and the colonial elite. 
Fourth, it will examine Lord Dunmore’s disastrous spell as governor. 
I 
Francis Fauquier and the Problems of Governance, 1758-1764 
Francis Fauquier’s governorship was continuously beset with difficulties from within the 
colony and from outside. His governorship was a constant struggle: he faced insurmountable 
problems trying to supply Virginian men and money to fight the Seven Years’ War and he 
worked hard, with little success, to defend the frontier effectively from constant Native 
American raids. He created uproar among the Virginian clergy by approving the Two Penny 
Act and he made an enemy out of British merchants and faced the wrath of the Board of Trade 
                                                          
16 Richard Henry Lee to Catherine McCauley, 29 November 1775, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, ed. James Curtis 
Ballagh, 2 vols. (New York: 1911-1914), I: 221. 
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by permitting the issuance of the paper money to alleviate economic suffering in the colony in 
1764. Fauquier also laboured to keep control of the colony during the Stamp Act crisis. All 
royal governors, especially those who were not native-born colonists, entered a society which 
was both unfamiliar and foreign. When Francis Fauquier arrived in Virginia in 1758, after a 
lengthy voyage from England, he frankly commented that he felt that he was ‘an utter stranger 
to the whole colony’.17 The royal governor in Virginia was entering a society and a political 
framework that neither had the necessary support base for him to function properly nor did he 
possess the means by which he could build up that support base once he had arrived. 
Between 1758 and 1766, Fauquier was out of favour with the Board of Trade because 
he was unable to comply with the home government’s direction to him to separate the important 
offices of Treasurer of the colony and Speaker of the House of Burgesses.18 From 1738, until 
his death in 1766, John Robinson had filled the twin posts of Treasurer and Speaker, a custom 
that had begun in 1723 in Virginia. By occupying these two posts for so long and because of 
his personal popularity, Robinson was one of the most powerful political figures in the colony. 
Throughout Dinwiddie’s tenure as governor, he was at odds with the House of Burgesses over 
a number of issues ranging from the pistole fee to the issue of supplies during the Seven Years’ 
War, and Dinwiddie realised that he could not perform effectively with Robinson as Speaker-
Treasurer. When Dinwiddie returned to London in 1758, he laid the whole blame for his 
unsuccessful governorship on Robinson and the power he had accrued because of the nature of 
his dual appointment. The Board of Trade set out to change this procedure and instructed 
Fauquier to separate the two positions, thus ending Robinson’s dominance. It was an attempt 
by the Board to reassert royal authority within the colony. Repeatedly over this eight year 
                                                          
17 Francis Fauquier to the Board of Trade, 31 July 1781, Fauquier Papers, II: 782. 
18 The controversial episode perfectly symbolises the difficult predicament in which a royal governor was placed 
in while he governed a royal colony. For a fuller examination of this episode, see Jack P. Greene, ‘The Attempt 
to Separate the Offices of Speaker and Treasurer in Virginia, 1758-66: An Incident in Imperial Conflict’, Virginia 
Magazine of History and Biography, 71 (1963): 11-18. 
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period, however, Fauquier refused to enforce the Board of Trade’s directive to separate these 
two posts. The Board often reprimanded Fauquier for his failure to enforce its instruction.19  
From the outset, Fauquier clearly believed he had some room for manoeuvre when he 
was meant to be enforcing this instruction.  Indeed, Fauquier argued this very point in a reply 
to a chastising letter he received from the Board of Trade, when he made it clear that ‘it was 
not made an Instruction, because if it had it could not be departed from; and I understood I had 
a Latitude given to me to do as well as I could in this delicate affair’. Fauquier’s belief that he 
could exercise some flexibility with regard to this instruction must have risen from when he 
attended the Board of Trade in London on 9 March before he sailed for Virginia. Two days 
before Dinwiddie had appeared before the Board and had laid the entire blame for his 
governorship on Robinson and his excessively powerful position. Dinwiddie ‘stated to their 
Lordships the improper practice, which the House of Burgesses, there has of little years fallen 
into, by nominating their Speaker to be treasurer of the country duties and revenue, and the 
inconvenience resulting from such practice, and proposed that some directions should be given 
to the Lieutenant Governor now going out’.20 Surely it does not take much to infer that Fauquier 
was aware that Dinwiddie was the author of this instruction. When Fauquier attended the Board 
of Trade ‘his lordships having acquainted him with the late lieutenant Governor of the 
impropriety of the officers of the speaker of the House of Burgesses and Treasurer being united 
in the same person, it was recommended to him to use the endeavours, and to take all such 
measures, as he should judge consistent with the good of his Majesty’s service to put a stop to 
                                                          
19 ‘We are concerned to find that you are of opinion that the practice of appointing the Speaker of the House of 
Burgesses to be Treasurer of the Revenues cannot be set aside without prejudice to his Majesty’s Service and 
obstruction of your government, we are still of opinion, that this practice , however warrented [sic] by long usage 
or the acquiescence of the Crown in the Acts which have been pass’d since 1738, for uniting those Offices, is both 
irregular and unconstitutional, and that a governor ought not to give his assent to any such Acts for the future, if 
it can be refused without manifest prejudice to his Majesty’s service.’ Board of Trade to Francis Fauquier, 18 Jun 
1759, Fauquier Papers 1: 155.  
20 Journals of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 1704-1782, 14 vols. (London: HMSO, 1920-1938), 
XI: 356.  
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a practice, which appeared to them highly improper, liable to great inconveniences and 
prejudicial to his Majesty’s service’.21 The language recorded here is particularly noteworthy: 
the Board did not make the separation an ‘official’ instruction, but ‘recommended’ to the 
governor that he separates the positions by using ‘endeavours’ and ‘all such measures’. 
Fauquier knew he had some breathing space when he arrived in the colony to implement this 
suggestion.  Exploring Fauquier’s reasons for his actions provides an important insight into the 
system of governorship in Virginia and this incident also helps to illuminate the tactics to which 
royal governors often had to resort in order to perform their duties as required by the home 
authorities because of the power of the colonial legislative assemblies. 
Fauquier refused to comply with the Board’s directive because he feared that it would 
precipitate a crisis which would endanger harmonious relations between Britain and Virginia. 
Fauquier was well aware that ‘this delicate’ affair, if badly managed, could affect his entire 
administration. Context is vital in understanding Fauquier’s actions:  ‘the Eyes of the Country 
were upon me on my first Arrival here: all anxious for the fate of their Treasurer’.22  Knowing 
that many of the colonial elite were anxiously waiting for what he would do with John 
Robinson, Fauquier shrewdly ‘sounded many of the principal People of this Country’ to 
ascertain what the best course of action should be. Rather than blindly enforcing his authority, 
Fauquier, in what became common during his entire governorship, consulted the Council and 
other prominent Virginians, in order to reach a conclusion which had much support in the 
colony. This consensual style of governance enabled Fauquier to discover that Robinson was 
‘the most popular Man in the Country: beloved by the Gentleman, and the Idol of the people’; 
he was quite simply ‘the Darling of the Country’.23 John Robinson was undoubtedly the most 
                                                          
21 Ibid., XI: 367. 
22 Francis Fauquier to the Board of Trade, Fauquier Papers, II: 782. 
23 Francis Fauquier to the Board of Trade, 28 June 1758, ibid., I: 43; Francis Fauquier to the Board of Trade, 12 
May 1761, ibid., II: 525. See ‘The Correspondence of William Byrd III’ in The Correspondence of The Three 
William Byrds of Westover, Virginia, 1684-1776, ed. Marion Tinling, 2 vols. (Charlottesville: The University of 
Virginia Press, 1977), II: 611.    
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powerful native-born Virginian in the colony during this period and, it can be argued, he was 
even more powerful than the lieutenant-governor in some respects. His responsibilities as 
treasurer included receiving all revenues collected under provincial laws and distributing the 
money when ordered to by the House or the lieutenant-governor. He received a commission of 
5 per cent on all revenues collected which gave him considerable wealth. While Robinson held 
a powerful position in itself, the very nature of his long tenure of the position together with his 
popularity allowed him to build a substantial support base and to foster a network of friends 
that made him a very powerful figure. Indeed, it has been shown that when John Robinson 
died, many of the most prominent men in Virginia owed him money up to a total of £130,000. 
Thus, many of the most important Virginians were indebted to Robinson, which he surely used 
to his advantage.  
Clearly, Fauquier was impressed by Robinson and knew that he could work with him. 
Repeatedly, he described Robinson in glowing terms to the Board: Robinson ‘is a Man of 
Worth, Probity and Honor’, and his popularity ‘he well deserves ... for his Great Integrity, 
assiduity, and ability in Business’.24 While Fauquier’s sentiments could be interpreted simply 
as a way of convincing the Board that Robinson merited the position, which was surely half 
the reason, it does seem that Robinson and Fauquier actually gelled as a partnership. This was 
a result of the personable nature of Fauquier’s leadership style. Fauquier ‘went directly to 
himself (as your Lordships may remember you gave me leave so to do) and in the frankest 
Manner talk’d to him of it’. While Robinson explained that it was a result of ‘an Old Grudge’ 
of Dinwiddie’s, he ‘was highly pleased with the open Manner in which I dealt with Him. And 
I am told by those who know his Character that I have attach’d him to me in the strongest 
Manner, by the Openness of my Behaviour.’25 Fauquier’s bold and candid meeting showed 
                                                          
24 Fauquier Papers, I: 205.   
25 Francis Fauquier to the Board of Trade, 28 June 1758, ibid., I: 44. 
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Fauquier ingratiating himself with Robinson, and thus highlights the weakness of his position 
if he felt compelled to curry favour with a prominent colonist. It surely must also be concluded 
that Fauquier foresaw the great benefits for his governorship if he were to befriend and support 
Robinson, rather than making an enemy of him and provoking endless difficulties. He knew, 
as he relayed back to the Board, that if he were to separate the two offices, he ‘apprehend[ed] 
bad consequences which as a Man of Integrity charged with the Care of his Majesties Affairs 
I think it incumbent on me to represent your honourable Board’.26 By using the political 
conditions of his day to his benefit, and demonstrating that he was prepared to face the wrath 
of the Board of Trade, in order to preserve royal government and allow him to fulfil his larger 
priorities rather than settling an old grudge for his predecessor, Fauquier exhibited an ability to 
make things work which was rare in other royal governors. With the help of Robinson, Fauquier 
was able to secure supplies for the war. He tried to vindicate his decision to the Board of Trade 
by insisting that if he had not retained Robinson in his place, he would not have been able to 
promote British imperial interests.27 
Despite this effective use of political skills, however, this episode demonstrates that 
Fauquier was essentially a weak executive, in that he failed to implement a directive from 
Britain, appeared to run scared of confronting a major figure in the colony, and complied too 
easily with the wishes of the council and other advisers. Greene used this ‘incident in imperial 
conflict’ to demonstrate the ‘enormous power’ of the Virginia House of Burgesses. While 
Greene did pay tribute to Fauquier’s political ability, he maintained that the incident proved 
that it was impossible to govern Virginia without the active cooperation of the Burgesses.28 
The incident proves that the House of Burgesses was powerful and it was impossible to govern 
                                                          
26 Francis Fauquier to the Board of Trade, 10 April 1759, ibid., I: 204. 
27 ‘Let me add my lords that I believe I owe the Supply I have obtained this Year of Men and Money to the strong 
Support of himself and his Friends. for [sic] I am afraid the Disposition of the House in general was against 
increasing the Debt of the Colony’. Ibid., I: 205. 
28 Jack P. Greene, ‘The Attempt to Separate the Offices of Speaker and Treasurer in Virginia, 1758-66: An Incident 
in Imperial Conflict’, 11-18. 
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without its agreement. It also revealed the inherent weakness of Fauquier’s position. While this 
episode does undoubtedly show that the royal governor’s position was inherently weak, 
compared to the burgeoning powers of the House of Burgesses, as Greene has maintained, 
Fauquier’s political deftness and man-management skills did enable him to transform a 
potentially explosive situation into one that benefited royal government and his own position 
as governor. As a result of Fauquier’s actions and his friendship with Robinson, he could, in 
the main, establish cordial relations with the House of Burgesses; a position he welcomed 
eagerly, even if it came at the cost of strained relations with the Board of Trade. Because of 
Fauquier’s handling of this initial crisis, it meant that, compared to other governors, he had a 
far smoother journey as governor thereafter, in terms of the relations he had with the local 
legislature. Indeed, when Robinson died in 1766, Fauquier did not hide the fact that he had lost 
not just a personal friend, but someone with whom he could work harmoniously in managing 
the colony.29  
Fauquier’s actions encapsulate the fundamental problem facing every royal governor 
in Virginia. Governing a colony without any institutionalised support base, or having the means 
to build up a party of supporters, a royal governor had to improvise if he was to be effective in 
his position. While Fauquier undoubtedly benefited from this relationship with the House of 
Burgesses, it often came at the cost of tense relations with the British government and other 
royal institutions. Fauquier’s entire philosophy of maintaining a successful governorship seems 
to have been based on the premise that he needed to keep the metropolitan officials at arms-
length in order to have a generally agreeable tenure as governor and maintain the small amount 
of authority that still resided with the royal governor in Virginia. Although it would be going 
                                                          
29 ‘This event would have been a sensible Loss at any time but more particularly so now, as I had promised myself 
great Assistance from him in the next Session of Assembly to quiet the Minds of the People and bring him to a 
just and proper Sense of their Duty. He was a man of Integrity and Ability and one for whom I had long entertain’d 
a great Esteem’. Francis Fauquier to the Board of Trade, 11 May 1766, ibid., III: 1359. 
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too far to claim that in order to be effective in his position, a royal governor ought to side with 
the Virginians in every crisis in the colony, it does appear, in Fauquier’s case, that he had a 
deep attachment to the concerns and problems facing Virginians and that he had a genuine 
desire to resolve the disputes fairly, even if it that meant he faced the wrath of his metropolitan 
masters. Without the required patronage at their disposal, royal governors had to work within 
the local political conditions they faced in order to implement royal policy effectively. Thus, 
the system of governorship was inherently weak in Virginia, but if a governor was able to 
improvise and compromise, then it was possible to work effectively within this weak system. 
Fauquier signed the Two Penny Acts into law in 1758, an act passed to provide 
temporary relief to Virginians who had suffered a poor tobacco crop that year. The poor yield 
from the harvest meant that Virginians would be hard pressed to pay taxes at the expected rate 
(including those to Church of England clergy). His concession enabled the colonists to pay 
their taxes at a reasonable market rate. Fauquier did not add a suspending clause to the bill 
because he believed that would have been counterproductive and would have made the Act 
null and void. He justified his actions to the Board by stressing that the bill was a ‘temporary 
law’ to ease the burden on the colonists and by pointing out that there was a precedent in since 
Lieutenant-Governor Dinwiddie had signed a similar law in 1755. Fauquier, moreover, made 
it plain that he was in no position to stop the bill: ‘the Council and the House of Burgesses were 
almost unanimous in their passing it; And I conceived it would be a very wrong Step for me to 
take who was an entire Stranger to the Distresses of the Country, to set my Face against the 
whole Colony in refusing a Bill which I had a precedent for Passing’.30 Although he had to deal 
with a revolt by the Anglican clergy, who protested at the reductions to their income and who 
believed that the very issue of church establishment was at stake, Fauquier was well aware that 
                                                          
30 Francis Fauquier to the Board of Trade, 5 January 1759, Fauquier Papers, I: 144. See Richard Morton, 
Colonial Virginia, II: 751-800, for the best discussion of the Two Penny Acts’ controversy. 
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if he had refused to sign the bill he would despair ‘of ever gaining any Influence either in the 
Council or House of Burgesses’.31 After the Virginian clergy remonstrated to the Board of 
Trade in 1759 and used Fauquier’s disregard for the sixteenth article of his Instructions to 
support their complaint,32 Fauquier received a rebuke from the Board of Trade for not adding 
a suspending clause.33 The veto of the bill by the Board, however, had no effect as it arrived 
too late to affect the 1758 collection of taxes. Fauquier was undoubtedly prepared to face the 
wrath of the metropolitan authorities if it meant that he could alleviate the economic distress 
and improve social stability in the colony, and could establish better relations with the House 
of Burgesses. 
This does not mean, however, that Fauquier was able to solve every crisis by ignoring 
the instructions sent to him from Britain and by responding to pressure from the House of 
Burgesses. Indeed, from the ecclesiastical protests in 1758-9 to the passing of the Currency Act 
in 1764, Fauquier had to grapple unsolicited with the crisis over the increased use of paper 
money that was more symptomatic of the inherent problems of colonial government.34  Because 
of the depressed tobacco markets, from the mid-1750s, the cost of war, and the unscrupulous 
behaviour of the treasurer, John Robinson,35 there was a lack of coinage within the colony. 
British merchants demanded that, with the increased circulation of paper money in the colony, 
these treasury notes should not be made legal tender in payment of debts to them. Because of 
                                                          
31 Francis Fauquier to the Board of Trade, 5 January 1759, Fauquier Papers, I: 144-5. The so called ‘Parsons’ 
Cause’ affected Fauquier quite deeply. He advised the Board of Trade that his position in the colony would have 
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32 ‘The Humble Representation of the Clergy of the Church of England in His Majesty’s Colony and Dominion 
of Virginia’, TNA, CO 5/1329.  
33 ‘We do therefore strictly command and require you for the future, upon pain of Our highest Displeasure and of 
being recall’d from the government of Our said Colony’, punctually to observe and obey the several Directions 
contained in the 16th Article of Our said Instructions’, Additional Instruction to Francis Fauquier, 21 September 
1759, Fauquier Papers, II: 249. 
34 For the best discussion of the paper currency issue and the reason for the Currency Act in 1764, see Joseph 
Albert Ernst, ‘Genesis of the Currency Act of 1764: Virginia Paper Money and the Protection of British 
Investments’, WMQ, 3rd Series, 22 (1965), 33-74. 




the general insolvency in the colony, the circulation of paper money had increased and so did 
the rate of exchange with the British pound. In 1749, the House of Burgesses had passed an 
Act fixing the rate of exchange for all sterling debts. The merchants, however, were worried 
that the prevalence of paper money in the colony and the consequent variable rates of exchange 
would mean there would be little security for the repayment of the debts owed to them. After 
they had expressed their concerns to the Board of Trade, Fauquier was sent additional 
instructions in 1759 to address the situation ‘most urgently’. Fauquier, always aware of the 
delicate position in the colony, simply absolved himself from any responsibility and 
diplomatically forwarded these instructions to the House.36 
Fauquier was not a supporter of paper currency, but he was aware that there was no 
alternative. He tried to reason with the Board of Trade that ‘I do not approve [of paper money] 
... and yet I do not see how it was to be avoided, as the Country is obliged to be at this Expence 
[sic]’ because the colony is ‘drain’d at present by money to be sent to New York’.37 While he 
did not believe in the use of paper money in principle, Fauquier argued that expediency dictated 
that paper money was the only option for the colonists and he maintained that the merchants’ 
fears were ‘groundless’. Indeed, Fauquier accused the Board of double standards.38 He even 
disputed, a couple of years later, that the rise in the exchange rates was purely down to the 
increased usage of paper money. He maintained that ‘I am entirely of Opinion there is a much 
more fundamental cause for this Rise, to wit, the Increase of the Imports’.39 Despite his ‘given’ 
reasons, there can be no doubt that Fauquier was anxious that this controversy should not 
                                                          
36 The Instructions asked the House to provide ‘for the security of the merchants of Great Britain, in the recovery 
of sterling debts due to them from this Colony from any loss they may sustain from our unavoidable emissions of 
paper money’. Journals of the House of Burgesses, 1758-1761, 134. 
37 Francis Fauquier to the Board of Trade, 5 January 1759, Fauquier Papers, II: 145. 
38 ‘If great Britain is obliged to borrow Money on Loans for the current Service, and either can not, or it is not 
thought expedient, She should raise the Money within the Year, how can it be expected from the Colony, And the 
Emissions of paper is a Means of borrowing Money without Int[erest] and a Tax is always laid up by ways of 
sinking Fund for the Redemption of every Emission’. In ibid., I: 145. 
39 Francis Fauquier to the Board of Trade, 3 November 1762, Fauquier Papers, II: 818. 
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impede the promised Supply Bill that was about to be passed by the House in 1759, which 
would provide valuable resources for the prosecution of the war. The House rejected the 
Board’s instructions in 1759 and what follows was a four year stand-off between the Board, 
which attempted to protect the Glasgow merchants’ interests, and the House of Burgesses, 
which refused to comply with the Board’s wishes. 
Fauquier was caught in between these two competing interests and struggled to 
maintain his position with any success. He became embroiled in a debate with local merchants 
and councillors who were anxious to protect their own mercantile interests and he was severely 
rebuked by the Board of Trade for not enforcing his instructions straightaway without 
consulting the House of Burgesses.40 His correspondence suggests he believed there was a 
conspiracy against him among some members of the council.41 Indeed, Fauquier was engaged 
in a very public debate with Richard Corbin, a Council member and a close ally of the 
merchants, that was published in the Virginia Gazette, but has not survived. It appears they 
argued over the reason why the exchange rates fluctuated so much: Fauquier cited the volume 
of imports coming into the colony and Corbin blamed the increased use of paper money.42 Until 
parliament intervened and passed the Currency Act in 1764, Fauquier struggled to control a 
volatile situation. Although he expressed privately that the House would accept the Board’s 
instructions, he was well aware that he needed the House’s support in order to finance a 
                                                          
40 ‘This appears to us to have been the Obvious tendency of your Conduct, upon this Occasion, and what has 
happen’d since confirms us in that Opinion, for tho’ several Acts, for creating paper Bills, of Credit have been 
passed, it does not appear, that you have in any one instance used your Endeavours to carry those Orders into 
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that every Subsequent Measure of this Kind, must in it’s consequences aggravate the injury which the Merchants 
complained of .... In this view of your Conduct, it is Our indispensible Duty to pass this Censure upon it, hoping 
that you will thereby be brought to a Sense of the Duty you owe to His Majesty, and Obedience due to His 
Commands, and that you will leave no means untryed to procure for the Merchants that relief and Satisfaction, 
which their Case appears to require, and which has been so properly recommended by His late Majesty.’ Board 
of Trade to Francis Fauquier, 7 February 1763, Fauquier Papers, II: 909-910. 
41 Fauquier, in a letter to the Governor of Virginia, Sir Jeffrey Amherst, makes mention, rather cryptically, of 
‘Intrigues in relation to the Emission of more paper money’. See Fauquier to Jeffrey Amherst, 25 September 1762, 
Fauquier Papers, II: 803. 
42 See Joseph Albert Ernst, ‘Genesis of the Currency Act of 1764’, 59. 
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regiment for the ongoing war, and so he was not prepared to counter the House’s wishes. In 
walking this tightrope, Fauquier faced the wrath of the Board of Trade and lost friends in the 
council.  
Throughout Fauquier’s administration, he was repeatedly censured and rebuked by the 
Board of Trade for not enforcing the government’s colonial policy or for undertaking actions 
that did not have the pre-approval of the imperial government. Indeed, a brief survey of 
Fauquier’s actions during the decade he was in charge suggests that, as a royal governor, he 
was essentially a failure. He was an inadequate, weak and ineffective governor who was unable 
to enforce colonial policy, who complied too easily to the demands of the powerful House of 
Burgesses and who lacked the willpower to make important decisions. Indeed, Fauquier’s 
entire political philosophy of successful governorship seems to have been based on the premise 
that he needed to keep the metropolitan officials at arms-length in order to have a generally 
agreeable tenure as governor and maintain the small amount of authority that still resided with 
the royal government in the royal colony. Although it would be going too far to claim that 
Fauquier sided with the Virginians in every crisis in the colony, it does appear that Fauquier 
had a deep attachment to the concerns and problems facing Virginians and that he had a genuine 
desire to resolve the situations fairly, even if it meant he faced the wrath of the metropolitan 
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Francis Fauquier, as other royal governors did in other colonies, suffered under the enforcement 
of the Stamp Act in 1765-66. Just as Governor Francis Bernard in Massachusetts and 
Lieutenant-Governor Cadwallader Colden in New York experienced immense difficulties in 
trying to calm the colonial uproar and professed outrage at British imperial policy, so did 
Francis Fauquier despair of his ability to control a virtually uncontrollable situation. While 
Colden and Bernard became enmeshed in the symbolism of colonial tyranny during this period, 
and they were certainly not exempt from personal attack, Francis Fauquier seems never to have 
been included in the rhetoric of the pamphlets or speeches of the day, or personally attacked or 
to have become involved in the revolutionary rhetoric.43 On the one hand, of course, this could 
simply be explained by the fact that such was the perception of Fauquier’s weak and ineffective 
position that Virginians did not feel the need to attack the governor. On the other hand, 
however, it does seem strange that in the other most important royal colonies, governors were 
condemned simply because they represented royal authority. Indeed, in the standard histories 
of the Stamp Act, Fauquier does not get much attention, other than in a few references about 
                                                          
43 For example, an anonymous letter to the acting governor of New York, Cadwallader Colden, on 1 November 
1765, is generally representative of the public perception of him during the Stamp Act: ‘The People of this City 
and Province of New  York, have been inforrn'd that you bound yourself under an Oath to be the Chief Murderer 
of their Rights and Privileges, by acting as an Enemy to your King and Country to Liberty and Mankind in  the 
Inforcement of  the  Stamp-Act which we  are unanimously determined shall never take Place among us, so long 
as a Man has Life to defend his injured Country. .  . We can with certainty assure you of your Fate if  you do not 
this Night Solemnly make Oath before a Magistrate, and publish to The People, that you never will, directly nor 
indirectly, by any Act of yours or any Person under your Influence, endeavour to introduce or execute the Stamp-
Act, or any Part of it, that you will to the utmost of your Power prevent its taking Effect here, and endeavour to 
obtain a Repeal of it in England. So help you God. We have heard of your Design or Menace to fire upon the 
Town, in Case of Disturbance, but assure yourself, that, if you dare to Perpetrate any Such murderous Act, you'll 
bring your grey Hairs with Sorrow to the Grave. You’ll die a martir [sic] to your own villainy, and be hanged, like 
Porteis upon a Sign Post, as a memento to all wicked Governors.’ Cited in F.L. Engleman, ‘Cadwallader Colden 
and the New York Stamp Act Riots’, The William and Mary Quarterly, 10 (1953), 561. The letter was 
representative of the continuous intimidation and general violence committed by extra-legislative groups in New 
York against Colden during his several tenures as governor: he was burned in effigy several times, his house was 
ransacked and his coach was attacked; Colden was a figure of near universal hatred in the colony. See Alice M. 
Keys, Cadwallader Colden: A Representative Eighteenth Century Official (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1906); Alfred R. Hoermann, Cadwallader Colden: A Figure in the American Enlightenment (West Port, 
Greenwood Press, 2002); and Joseph S. Tiedemann, Reluctant Revolutionaries: New York City and the Road to 
Independence, 1763-1776 (London: Cornell University Press, 1997). In Massachusetts, the lieutenant-governor, 
Thomas Hutchinson’s house was ransacked and his property was destroyed. He largely bore the personal 
resentment for the Stamp Act. See, Edmund S. Morgan, ‘Thomas Hutchinson and the Stamp Act’, New England 
Quarterly, 21 (1948), 459-492.  
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him being the most important source for Patrick Henry’s Stamp Act Resolutions.44 Some 
historians have even argued that Fauquier was more concerned with frontier activities rather 
than the Stamp Act because his correspondence includes more letters concerning 
confrontations between Virginians and Native Americans than reports about the Stamp Act and 
the unrest in Virginia.45 
The Stamp Act, which was passed by the Westminster Parliament on 22 March 1765, 
was an internal duty on almost every piece of printed paper that Americans used, including 
legal documents, licenses and newspapers. The British government hoped that the money 
raised by the tax would be used to pay for the British defence of the American colonies near 
the Appalachian Mountains.46 Although the actual cost of the duty was relatively small in 
comparison with other duties of the day, a considerable number of Americans protested the 
principle that they should pay taxes that had the direct purpose of raising money and not to 
regulate commerce. They also protested the fact that the Westminster Parliament imposed a tax 
on the American colonies without prior consultation with the colonial legislatures and the fact 
that Americans had to accept a tax from a legislative body in which they were not represented. 
Virginians began to protest against the Stamp Act as soon as rumours circulated of 
George Grenville’s proposals in 1764. A letter from London was published in the Virginia 
Gazette which stated that ‘You will soon have a parcel of Myrmedonian ravens, who will feed 
upon and rip open your very vitals, such as Officers of Stamp Duties …. The Ministry are 
determined to make you pay for the Peace which you like so well’.47 When the legislature’s 
                                                          
44 See Edmund S. and Helen M. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina, 1953), 92-123.. For Patrick Henry’s resolutions, see letter to Board of Trade, 5 June 1765, 
Fauquier Papers, III: 1252-3. 
45 For examples of letters concerning frontier activities, see Francis Fauquier to Board of Trade, 14 June 1765; 
Fauquier to the Earl of Halifax, 14 June 1765; Fauquier to Board of Trade, 1 August 1765; in Papers, III:1257, 
1258, 1265-6. Fauquier was trying to advert a war between the Overhill Cherokees and the settlers of the Blue 
Ridge Mountains. 
46 Edmund S. and Helen M. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis, 54-72. 
47 Virginia Gazette, 27 April 1764. 
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standing Committee of Correspondence met on 15 June 1764, with members from both the 
Council and the House of Burgesses present, they wrote a letter to their London agent, Edward 
Montague, stating that ‘the colony is much alarmed at the Attempt in Parliament to lay a Duty’. 
They instructed Montague to ‘oppose this with all his Influence, & as far as he may venture 
insist on the Injustice of laying any Duties on us & particularly taxing the internal Trade of the 
Colony without their Consent’.48 Virginians acknowledged the right of the Westminster 
Parliament to make laws concerning trade and set external custom duties, but they protested 
that ‘no Subjects of the King of great Britain can be justly made subservient to Laws without 
either their personal Consent, or their Consent by their representatives’.49 
Whereas in 1764 Virginians protested against the imposition of an internal tax, by 1765, 
their hostility to it had hardened. Edmund Pendleton wrote to James Madison on 17 April 1765 
that ‘the House of Commons have resolved and ordered in a bill to establish a stamp duty, by 
which every kind of business transacted on paper is taxed, supposed to amount to £50,000 
sterling a year on this colony. Poor America!’50 In other words, Virginians disliked the duty, 
but had not yet decided to oppose it. By May 1765, however, the Burgesses were ready to defy 
Parliament. On 29 May, George Johnstone, a representative from Fairfax County, moved that 
the House should ‘consider the steps necessary to be taken in consequence’ of the Stamp Act. 
After seconding the motion, and the House agreeing approving of it, Patrick Henry moved his 
Virginia Resolves. There is an historical debate as to how many resolutions were in Henry’s 
original motion.51 There are four Resolves in the journal of the House, but Francis Fauquier 
informed the Board of Trade that Henry had proposed 5 resolutions, but only four passed the 
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House. The Resolutions that did pass the House on 30 May 1765 placed the House on a 
collision course with Westminster: 
Resolved, that the first adventurers and settlers of His Majesty's colony and dominion of Virginia 
brought with them and transmitted to their posterity, and all other His Majesty's subjects since 
inhabiting in this His Majesty's said colony, all the liberties, privileges, franchises, and immunities 
that have at any time been held, enjoyed, and possessed by the people of Great Britain. 
Resolved, that by two royal charters, granted by King James I, the colonists aforesaid are declared 
entitled to all liberties, privileges, and immunities of denizens and natural subjects to all intents and 
purposes as if they had been abiding and born within the Realm of England. 
Resolved, that the taxation of the people by themselves, or by persons chosen by themselves to 
represent them, who can only know what taxes the people are able to bear, or the easiest method of 
raising them, and must themselves be affected by every tax laid on the people, is the only security 
against a burdensome taxation, and the distinguishing characteristic of British freedom, without 
which the ancient constitution cannot exist. 
Resolved, that His Majesty's liege people of this his most ancient and loyal colony have without 
interruption enjoyed the inestimable right of being governed by such laws, respecting their internal 
policy and taxation, as are derived from their own consent, with the approbation of their sovereign, 
or his substitute; and that the same has never been forfeited or yielded up, but has been constantly 
recognized by the kings and people of Great Britain.52 
These Resolves are centred on the argument that the Westminster government do not have the 
right to impose an internal tax on the colony without the colonists’ consent. The ‘distinguishing 
characteristic of British freedom’ was the fact that the people’s own representatives in their 
legislative assemblies were best placed to tax the people in order to prevent them being subject 
to unjust and ‘burdensome taxation’. Although the House repealed the Fifth Resolution, which 
stated that the ‘General Assembly of this Colony have the only and exclusive Right and Power 
to lay Taxes and Impositions upon the inhabitants of this Colony’, the same argument is 
implicit in the remaining four Resolves. Francis Fauquier was placed in a difficult predicament. 
Fauquier attempted to defuse this potentially volatile situation. He advised the Board 
of Trade that the opposition to the Stamp Act was simply ‘rash heat’, that the ‘Speaker, the 
King’s Attorney and Mr Wythe’ were ‘overpowered by the Young, hot and Giddy members’, 
led by a Mr Henry a young Lawyer’ who used ‘very Indecent language’.53 Despite the fact that 
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he included Henry’s resolutions, which claimed the exclusive right of raising internal taxes on 
Virginians, Fauquier did not believe that it was a cause for serious alarm, for he wrote in the 
same letter: ‘so that I hope I am authorised in saying, there is cause at least to doubt, whether 
this would have been the Sense of the Colony, if more of their Representatives had done their 
Duty by attending to the end of the Session’.54 While it is possible, as certain historians have 
done, to excuse Fauquier’s interpretation by claiming that Fauquier did not want to alarm the 
Board of Trade, it does seem Fauquier was a little too trusting of the innate loyalties of 
Virginians to the British crown.55 Fauquier was definitely more prudent than Francis Bernard, 
however, who sent disquieting reports of colonial unrest which had a considerable impact on 
the government’s reaction and the decision to support eventual repeal.56 Indeed, Bernard 
actually claimed on 15 August 1765  that ‘two  or  three  months ago I thought that this people 
would submit to the Stamp  Act  without  actual opposition …. But the publishing of the 
Virginia Resolves proved an alarm bell to the disaffected’.57 In later months, Fauquier began 
to realise that his reading of the opposition to the Stamp Act was a misjudgement. After 
numerous protests in the colony and an attack on the Stamp Distributor, Mercer, he came to 
realise that the protests did not originate simply because a minority of representatives had taken 
advantage of a poorly attended House of Burgesses.58 
Fauquier publicly stepped in to prevent widespread disorder in the colony. He was 
optimistic that ‘we shall weather the Storm which seems ready to burst over the northern 
colonies’. The Stamp Act was the main topic of conversation in the colony and once it became 
known that Colonel George Mercer accepted the position as stamp distributor, resentment 
                                                          
54 Ibid. 
55 Nellie Norkus, ‘Francis Fauquier, lieutenant-governor of Virginia, 1758-1768’, 428. 
56 See Colin Nicholson, Infamas Govener, 139-140. 
57 Francis Bernard to the Earl of Halifax, 15 August 1765, TNA, CO5/891/270-274. 
58 ‘At the time the Resolutions were passed in a very thin House, I hoped a fuller house would have quashed 
them ... I fear I was mistaken in that point’. Francis Fauquier to Henry Seymour Conway, 11 December 1765, 
Fauquier Papers, III: 1317. 
79 
 
stirred in the backcountry where effigies of Mercer were made and defaced. In October 1765, 
Fauquier waited nervously for Mercer’s impending arrival and he hoped that ‘the Winds would 
detain him till the Tryals [sic] were over, and the Town [Williamsburg] rid of that Class of 
People who attend on that Occasion’.59 Unfortunately for Fauquier, Mercer arrived in 
Williamsburg as expected on 30 October, two days before the Stamp Act was meant to be put 
into effect.  When a mob assembled to meet Mercer arriving in the colony, and was purportedly 
ready ‘to destroy all Stamp’d papers’ (as Fauquier relayed back to the Board of Trade), 
Fauquier had to intervene to prevent any harm coming to Mercer. Fauquier made an appearance 
at a coffee house in an area of Williamsburg called the Exchange, ‘where all money business 
is transacted’. He wrote to the Board of Trade that ‘My particular Reason for going then was, 
that I might be an Eye witness of what did realy [sic] pass’.60 Fauquier later informed the Board 
that ‘a Mob’ which was ‘chiefly if not altogether composed of Gentlemen of Property in the 
Colony’ and ‘Merchants of the Country, whether English[,] Scotch, or Virginians’, 
congregated outside Mercer’s residence. At the agreed signal of ‘One and all’ being shouted, 
this mob sought out Colonel Mercer and ‘demanded of him an Answer whether he would resign 
or act in his Office as Distributor of the Stamps’.61 Mercer replied that he would give an answer 
at 10 o’clock on Friday morning, but this did not satisfy the waiting horde of people and they 
followed him to the coffee house, where Fauquier was observing the spectacle. He informed 
the Board that the mob ‘followed [Mercer] to the coffee house, in the porch of which I had 
seated my self with many of the Council and the Speaker who had posted himself between the 
Crowd and my self’.62 Fauquier’s description perfectly encapsulates imperial politics in 
Virginia: on the one side, Fauquier and the Council are shielding the imperial tax distributor 
and on the other side, a crowd hoping to prevent Mercer from distributing stamps. In between 
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the competing sides was John Robinson, the Speaker, who had spent years building up his 
influence and respect in the colony.  
When the mob was about to ‘rush in’ on Mercer, Fauquier entered the fray: ‘I 
immediately heard a Cry see the Governor take care of him, those who were before pushing up 
the Steps immediately fell back and left a small Space between me and them’. Fauquier 
believed that it was ‘owing to the Respect they bore to my Character, and partly to the Love 
they bore to my person’ that the crowd ceased their immediate onslaught, though there are no 
sources to corroborate his conviction. It could be easily interpreted as a vain attempt by 
Fauquier to prove to his superiors that he was held in high esteem by the colonists. Fauquier 
urged Mercer to accompany him to the Governor’s mansion and they ‘accordingly walked side 
by side through the thickest of the people who did not molest us; tho’ there was some little 
murmurs’.63 Fauquier had banked on the general goodwill he had built up over the last seven 
years and he was utterly convinced that the propertied elite still respected authority. By his 
actions, Fauquier believed that he ‘saved [Mercer] from being insulted at least’.64 
 Fauquier consistently bemoaned the ineffective nature of royal government in Virginia 
during his entire tenure as governor. He quickly realised after arriving in the colony that he 
could not govern without the active support of the House of Burgesses and learned, through 
harsh experience, that he lacked the patronage needed to be an effective governor. During the 
Stamp Act crisis, Fauquier perfectly conveyed the inherent weakness of his position and of 
royal authority in general within the colony to his benefactor the Earl of Halifax. In a letter 
dated 14 June 1765, he informed Halifax of ‘the melancholy Situation of Affairs in this 
Colony’, where the ‘Government is set at open Defiance, not having Strength in her hands to 
enforce Obedience to the Laws of the Community’ which ‘renders them uneasy, peevish, and 
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ready to murmur at every Occurrence’.65 The inability of the royal governor to enforce 
government policies led to a vicious cycle in which the colonists became emboldened to 
‘encrease the general Dissatisfaction’ against all royal policies.66  
Although Fauquier’s depiction and analysis of the reaction to the Stamp Act in Virginia 
was inaccurate, he was able to keep control of the members of the House of Burgesses 
throughout the Stamp Act crisis, which directly affected Virginian involvement in the Stamp 
Act Congress of 1765. Historians have credited Fauquier with acting with considerable political 
skill to clamp down on any Virginian involvement within the Stamp Act crisis on the national 
stage, though the available source material does not wholly substantiate this.67 The major 
criticism that can be levelled against Fauquier during his tenure as governor is that he was too 
amenable to Virginian demands and was not more forthright in his implementation of imperial 
policy. Such a claim cannot be made with regard to the Stamp Act however. After Patrick 
Henry’s ‘revolutionary’ resolves in the House of Burgesses, Fauquier dissolved the assembly 
on the 31 May 1765 and did not convene it again for seventeen months. Whether Fauquier 
deliberately prorogued the Assembly in order to stop it electing delegates to the Stamp Act 
Congress to be held in New York is purely speculative as there is no evidence to substantiate 
such a conclusion. It is possible, however, to infer that Fauquier did not want to give the House 
any latitude to cause more trouble. This is made clear in a letter to the Secretary of State for 
the Southern Department, Henry Seymour Conway, in which Fauquier articulated his reasons 
for not calling for a new session of the House. He revealed that he had consulted with the 
Council and the ‘unanimous’ decision was that it would not be prudent to convene the 
Assembly: 
Indeed Sir no Good was to be expected from calling men together to consider cooly [sic] of the 
Circumstances of the Times when they are so heated as to shut up all Avenues to Reason, but on 
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the occasion it was probable more violent measures would have been proposed ... At present the 
minds of the Colonies reciprocally inflame each other and where the Fury will stop I know not. At 
some Times I think the Present Confusion and Distress of people by having no Courts open to which 
they can apply for a Redress of Wrongs, will open their Eyes and Bring them to another Way of 
thinking: at other Times I see so much heat, Violence, and Resolution that I dread the Consequences. 
In short I can by no means see my Way thro’ this gloomy prospect.68 
Fauquier deliberately refused to convene the Assembly in order to avert future trouble and he 
hoped that by preventing the law courts opening, the colonists would come to their senses and 
stop this ‘fury’. While Fauquier was indeed gloomy about the prospects of colonial government 
being restored to its normal functions, he did resolve ‘that the best thing I can now do for His 
Majestys Service is to be patient and cool, and take no Step which would be likely to irritate 
the Minds of the people, waiting for some favourable Events which I may turn to some 
Advantage by the meeting of the Assembly’.69 Whether Fauquier prevented the Assembly 
convening so that it could not elect delegates to the Stamp Act Congress is very much open to 
conjecture. When the letter from the New York assembly was sent to John Robinson, Speaker 
of the House of Burgesses, it seems likely that Robinson informed Fauquier of the purposes of 
the proposed Congress. Whether this influenced Fauquier’s actions, it is uncertain, but when 
Fauquier wrote that the ‘Colonies reciprocally inflame each other and where the Fury will stop 
I know not’, it seems reasonable to assume that Fauquier was referring to the inter-colonial 
assembly that had met the previous month. Fauquier’s general popularity is also borne out 
when he reconvened the House of Burgesses after a seventeen month interval. The House’s 
address was effusive, if a little affected, in its praise of Fauquier’s conduct during the entire 
crisis.70  
III 
Lord Botetourt and the Re-establishment of the Virginian Governor 
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According to the Virginia Gazette of 6 October 1768, ‘Yesterday Lord Botetourt kissed his 
Majesty’s hand at St. James’s on being appointed Governour of Virginia’.71 For the past fifty-
four years, the governor of Virginia had never taken up residence in Virginia, leaving 
lieutenant-governors to fulfil their duties.  The appointment of Botetourt was made not simply 
to assist a peer out of his financial difficulties, but was because of far more pressing political 
concerns. When Fauquier died on 3 March 1768, John Blair, the president of the council, 
assumed the powers of the lieutenant-governorship on a temporary basis. Lord Hillsborough 
wrote to Blair and asked him to ‘not omit any opportunity of acquainting me, in the fullest & 
most circumstantial Manner, of every incident that has occurred, or may be expected to happen, 
relative to the state of the Colony, & the Administration of its Government’.72 Hillsborough 
duly received disturbing resolutions from Blair that were originally sent from the speaker of 
the House in Massachusetts. These resolutions contained a an address to the king, a memorial 
to the House of Lords, and a remonstrance to the House of Commons. The Massachusetts’ 
legislature protested against the recently passed Mutiny Act and the Townshend Duties. The 
Virginian Council had agreed to comply with the wishes contained in the Massachusetts’ 
documents and duly ordered its agent in London to submit them to the appropriate bodies.73 It 
was decided in London that soldiers and armed ships were to be sent to Massachusetts in order 
to pacify the colony during its perceived disobedience and, at the same time, it was decided 
that a governor, and not a lieutenant-governor, should be sent to Virginia in order to maintain 
control of Britain’s largest and most prosperous  North American colony. When Sir Jeffrey 
Amherst was informed that the Board of Trade was going to discontinue the practice of sending 
a lieutenant-governor to Virginia, he immediately resigned his commission as governor 
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because he was unwilling to go to Virginia. It was hoped that this token of royal favour would 
restore a modicum of the crown’s authority in the colony.  
When Lord Botetourt arrived in the colony, in 1768, he immediately sought to impose 
royal authority. He was instructed to issue writs for a new assembly to convene at a time which 
Botetourt thought best. Botetourt wrote to Hillsborough on 24 November 1768 that he had 
issued a proclamation which had ordered the new assembly to convene on 8 May 1769 as he 
believed that ‘it will be the fittest for promoting those measures to which by His Majesty’s 
instructions my attention is particularly instructed’.74 While Botetourt may have privately had 
high hopes for his first session on 17 May, he was ‘with great astonishment’ to find the House 
of Burgesses in open defiance of parliamentary sovereignty.75 He was forced to dissolve the 
Assembly because of its resolves against recent parliamentary taxation without its consent and 
other perceived injustices. Botetourt was instructed that if the House of Burgesses should by 
any votes, resolutions, or addresses to the governor persist in its open denial of parliamentary 
supremacy, he was to dissolve it immediately and suspend any council members who may have 
concurred in such actions.  Botetourt did not hesitate to comply with the Board of Trade’s 
directive. He informed the Assembly that ‘I have heard of your Resolves, and augur ill of their 
Effect: You have made it my duty to dissolve you; and you are dissolved accordingly’.76 He 
assured Lord Hillsborough that ‘no one of His Majesty’s Council has had any [of] the smallest 
share in any part of this abominable measure’.77 Botetourt was utterly powerless, however, to 
prevent a majority of the Burgesses thwarting the exercise of his prerogative by meeting extra-
legally in the house of Anthony Hay in Williamsburg. Because they judged ‘it necessary that 
some Measures should be taken in their distressed Situation, for preserving the true and 
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essential Interests of the Colony’, they appointed a committee to prepare resolves and, the 
following day, they signed an agreement banning the importation of goods that were taxed by 
the Townshend Duties.78  
Although it appeared that Lord Botetourt and the House of Burgesses were heading for 
a collision, Botetourt was relieved to receive letters from Lord Hillsborough on 13 May and 17 
July 1769, in which Hillsborough informed the governor that the British government was 
preparing to repeal the Townshend duties. Hillsborough gave Botetourt permission ‘to declare 
these principles in the fullest manner’.79 Botetourt duly convened the House of Burgesses on 7 
November and related the news to its members: ‘His Majesty’s present Administration have at 
no time entertained a design to propose a Parliament to lay any further Taxes upon America 
for the purpose of raising Revenue’.80 The Burgesses wrote a reverential address to Botetourt: 
‘Your Lordship’s great Regard and Attention to the Welfare and true Interest of this Colony 
had before endeared you to us all; but your generous and noble Declarations, upon this 
Occasion, demand our warmest and most grateful Acknowledgements’.81 
Botetourt sought to quash rumours circulating in Williamsburg, that the Westminster 
Parliament would reverse its recent repeal of the Townshend Duties, by putting his own 
reputation at stake: 
It is my firm Opinion that the Plan I have stated to you will certainly take place and that it will never 
be departed from, and so determin’d am I for ever to abide by it that I will be content to be declared 
Infamous. If I do not to the last hour of my life, at all times, in all places, and upon all occasions, 
exert every power with which I either am or ever shall be legally invested, in order to obtain and 
maintain for the Continent of America that satisfaction, which I have been authorized to promise 
this day, by the Confidential Servants of our Gracious Sovereign, who by certain knowledge rates 
his honour so high, that he would rather part with his crown, than preserve it by deceit.82  
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He wanted to assure the Virginians that he was certain that British ministers would not 
reintroduce the kind of policies that had produced so much consternation in the colony. It is 
clear that Botetourt, in a similar fashion to Fauquier, tried to calm fears in the colony by 
stressing that his personal honour and that of George III were at stake. Botetourt, however, was 
severely reprimanded by Lord Hillsborough for appearing to commit the king to a future course 
of action.83  
According to Robert Beverley, a notable Virginian loyalist, Botetourt’s governorship 
served as a happy interlude in a period of  political disagreement between the colony and the 
imperial centre. He cited two pieces of evidence for this claim: the House of Burgesses’ address 
to Botetourt after the partial repeal of the Townshend Duties and the statue erected in memory 
of Botetourt after his death.84 Beverley, however, misunderstood personal goodwill for 
Botetourt and dutiful loyalty to George III in person as evidence of Virginian loyalty to the 
British government and parliament. A closer inspection of the Burgesses’ address reveals 
evidence of an implied warning: ‘We will not suffer our present Hopes, arising from the 
pleasing Prospect your Lordship hath so kindly . . . displayed to us, to be dashed by the bitter 
Reflection that any future Administration will entertain a wish to depart from that Plan’.85 
While the members of the Virginian legislature had great respect for Botetourt, as is 
demonstrated by the statue which they erected in his honour, they never believed that Botetourt 
personally supported recent British imperial policies. Botetourt’s statue represented the 
veneration Virginians had for Boteourt himself as a person, but it did not represent Virginian 
acceptance of the sovereign authority of the Westminster Parliament.  
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The colonial elite did not allow Botetourt to forget their concern about the Westminster 
Parliament’s sincerity. When, in December 1769, the Burgesses gave a party in the capitol in 
honour of Botetourt, nearly one hundred of the ladies present wore dresses that were made in 
the colony, whereas it was usually common to wear the latest fashion from London.86 These 
concerns about the survival of the Townshend Duties hardened when it became known that the 
Westminster Parliament had retained the duty on Tea. Once more, the Burgesses formed an 
association, on 22 June 1770, and signed an agreement against importing all British 
manufactures, tea and slaves until the tea duty was repealed.87 Botetourt did not see the result 
of this imperial disagreement because he died on 15 October 1770, after suffering with a fever 
for three weeks. 
The crucial question to be addressed when explaining the system of governorship in 
Virginia was how such royal governors as Fauquier and Botetourt were apparently so well 
received, when Dunmore became the epitome of tyranny to most Virginians? The answer is 
not as simple as one might expect. Undoubtedly, Fauquier possessed considerable ability in 
terms of managing various difficult problems and was always able to acquit himself in a 
professional manner. He was often able to avoid bitter confrontations and, at the same time, to 
pursue British imperial interests with great energy. While Fauquier’s political abilities cannot 
be denied, the general popularity of his governorship surely cannot be explained simply by 
acknowledging his political dexterity. What were the reasons behind Fauquier’s and 
Boteoturt’s unqualified popularity within the colony, and Dunmore’s gradual demonisation? 
 Graham Hood, in his material culture study of the Governor’s Palace at Williamsburg, 
maintains that ‘to the colonists, Governors Fauquier and Botetourt personified the best 
elements of the English gentry tradition and culture’. In other words, Fauquier’s and 
                                                          
86 Virginia Gazette (Purdie and Dixon), 14 December 1769. 
87 JHB, 1770-72, xxvii-xxxi. 
88 
 
Botetourt’s interaction with the people must be seen through the medium of the anglo-centrism 
which was so ingrained in the Virginian gentry’s psyche. Hood highlights the comments of 
various correspondents at the time in order to substantiate his claim, including those of Edmund 
Randolph, who disclosed that Virginia had an ‘idolatrous deference to the Mother Country’ 
and stated that ‘every political sentiment, every fashion in Virginia appeared to be imperfect 
unless it bore a resemblance to some precedent in England’.88 The latest London magazines, 
newspapers and pamphlets were regularly sent by British merchants to their Virginian business 
partners and such fashionable literature was widely circulated among the colonial gentry.89 
Thus, according to Hood, Fauquier and Botetourt were essentially cultural icons: they 
represented the cultural transference of cultures, practices and thinking from the Mother 
Country to the new world. 
Hood’s argument is entirely credible. It was widely publicised in Virginian elite society 
that Botetourt was a prominent figure in Court politics in London and his noble heritage was 
also well known.90 It was no coincidence that this heritage was printed in Rind’s Virginia 
Gazette on 6 October 1768.91 This was a man from the British nobility coming to a society that 
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yearned to have its own nobility recognised as being on a level with that of Britain. Both 
Fauquier and Botetourt wore the latest fashions from London; Fauquier was extremely well 
read and conversant with the latest thinking in all matters political, religious and philosophical. 
Both Fauquier and Boteourt’s manners were particularly English and the annual celebration of 
the King’s birthday at the Governor’s palace was the highlight of the cultural calendar in 
Williamsburg. Virginians paid great deference to Fauquier and Boteourt: there is one report, 
used by Hood, of the Virginian gentry doffing their hats to Fauquier when they met him in the 
street.92 The great landowners of Virginia, when they visited the governors’ palace, would have 
doubtless appreciated Fauquier’s and Botetourt’s social virtues: their manners, their classical 
and scientific learning, and their love of music. Fauquier displayed a fashionable understanding 
of major enlightenment thinking and unquestionably made a point of using it in conversation. 
Fauquier’s and Botetourt’s old world sensibilities found new meaning and gained respect in 
the New World. 
Botetourt’s and Fauquier’s position in Virginia can, however, also be seen in a different 
way. It was not so much that Fauquier and Botetourt were glamorous icons to be copied, as 
that they were well integrated into Virginian society. Fauquier’s intellectual pursuits, his love 
of science, music and the arts, his stress on the importance of education and his appreciation 
of the enlightenment, unquestionably meant that he was well suited to be governor of colonial 
Virginia. Before Fauquier arrived in Virginia, his cultural interests and his published works 
suggested that he would have much in common with a typical Virginian gentleman. Not only 
was he a notable philanthropist in London, but his election as a Fellow of the Royal Society of 
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London and his membership of the Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures, and 
Commerce, indicate that he would have fitted well into Virginian life and especially with the 
intellectual elite of Virginian society. He developed a keen interest in economic and financial 
affairs and his published essay on an alternative way to fund the Seven Years’ War reveals that 
he was a thoughtful and logical thinker. In this pamphlet, Fauquier maintained that the best 
way to raise money for the war was to have a graduated income tax on estates and consumption 
rather than taxes on manufacturers or the working poor.93 While his policies were never 
adopted, he did cause considerable public debate and his pamphlet was printed in three editions. 
At the beginning of his governorship, moreover, he sent to the Royal Society in London an 
account of a hail storm which occurred in the colony. He also regularly recorded the weather 
which he kept in a diary which was later published by an English clergyman, Andrew 
Burnaby.94 His interests in natural phenomenon, science and education marked him out to be a 
perfect fit for Virginian society. Even his will, moreover, suggests that Fauquier was a man of 
science and of benevolence: he wanted an autopsy on his body so that he could ‘become more 
useful to my fellow creatures in death than I have been in life’.95  Fauquier transformed the 
governor’s palace at Williamsburg into a hub of intellectual activity with a close circle of 
friends including George Wythe, William Small and the young Thomas Jefferson, who were 
all in frequent attendance. Fauquier was an enlightened governor for what was fast becoming 
an enlightened colonial gentry. Indeed, if one goes back to Jefferson’s description of Fauquier 
‘as the most able man to have ever filled that office’, it does not necessarily mean that Fauquier 
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was a successful governor in his official role, but he was undoubtedly a most gifted governor 
as an individual.96  
There are other reasons why Botetourt and Fauquier were well respected by the 
Virginian gentry. In both Botetourt and Fauquier’s inventories, there are several names, which 
are the most interesting aspect of these inventories: they are the names of their slaves.97 Both 
Botetourt and Fauquier had a number of slaves (Fauquier in his inventory had seventeen, which 
was a substantial number in view of the fact that the Governor’s Palace did not have any land). 
They were like educated and propertied Virginian gentlemen: owners of slaves, conversant 
with matters of politics and culture, lovers of science, music and the arts. Fauquier was also a 
compulsive gambler. This last point has been exaggerated by historians, but it does seem that 
Fauquier did enjoy gambling and helped make gambling acceptable in society.98 Fauquier even 
admitted to Richard Bland that ‘I acknowledge to you freely that I have become so much a 
Virginian’.99 In certain respects, therefore, it would be difficult to distinguish Fauquier and 
Botetourt from the Virginian gentry over whom they governed. Undoubtedly, their adoption of 
London fashions, their cultural interests and understanding and their archetypal English 
manners appealed to the Virginian gentry, and hence it was these traits which helped these two 
governors to fit into Virginian society. As Lord Botetourt remarked to Lord Hillsborough on 
arriving in Williamsburg, ‘I like their stile [sic] very much’.100 
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While it is certainly correct to maintain that Virginians lauded Botetourt and Fauquier 
for their British culture and manners and it cannot be denied that they both fitted well into 
Virginian society, there was a larger symbolism at play here which is extremely important in 
understanding how governors and governed interacted. Brendan McConville, in his recent 
study of the fate of monarchy in colonial America, has claimed that the colonists viewed the 
monarch within a ‘benevolent royalism’ paradigm.101 In other words, up to 1774, Americans 
largely revered monarchy and were not shy of participating in royal iconography. George III 
was the symbolic link between mother country and colony and the colonists celebrated him as 
such. This paradigm can easily be seen in the governorship of Fauquier and of Botetourt in 
terms of their ceremonial functions. Lord Botetourt, dressed in an expensive costume which 
was red with gold trim, would travel to the House of Burgesses on his remarkable gold state 
coach, which the Duke of Cumberland, uncle of George III, had presented to him and which 
bore the Virginian crest and was drawn by six white horses. He looked the part of a substitute 
king. There are reports that suggest even his slow speech was reminiscent of the way George 
III himself spoke.102 Both Fauquier and Boteourt were heavily involved in local patronage: 
Fauquier commenced plans to open up a hospital (which opened after his death) for those that 
suffered with mental health issues; and Botetourt was a patron of the College of William and 
Mary, even bestowing medals for academic excellence in natural philosophy, mathematics and 
classical learning.103 Anne Blair recalled an episode when Botetourt visited her family when it 
was singing and he 
Stopped to listen to our enchanting Notes ... The Invader ... call’d out in a most rapturous Voice, 
Charming! Charming! Proceed for God sake, or I go Home directly – no sooner were these words 
utter’d, than all as with one consent sprung from their seats, and the Air echo’d with ‘pray, Walk in 
my Lord’; No – indeed, he would not, he would set on the step’s too; so after a few ha, ha’s, and 
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being told what we all knew – that it was a delightfull Evening, at his desire we strew’d the way 
over Flowers etc, etc, till a full half hour we elaps’d, when all retired to their respective homes.104 
The deference and respect are unmistakeable: Virginians regarded Fauquier and Botetourt not 
only as representatives of the king, but also appreciated the fact that they acted in a royal 
manner. 
This interpretation can be taken even further. In McConville’s monograph, he has 
unearthed evidence to suggest that colonists in America, up to around 1774, perceived George 
III as detached from the ministerial policies which were causing such disturbance in the 
colonies. George III was ‘the king above dispute, king as father, king as honest broker’.105 If 
we look at the rhetoric in Virginia during the 1760s, we can see the same dynamic at play: 
Virginians viewed Fauquier and Boteourt as being detached from those ministerial policies 
which were creating serious resentment in the colonies. Fauquier was not blamed for the 
introduction and enforcement of the Stamp Act,106 while, after Botetourt dissolved the 
Assembly in 1768, Robert Fairfax wrote that the Assembly ‘suppose[d] he was obliged to do 
so; he is universally esteemed here for his great assiduity in his office, condescension, good 
nature and true politeness’.107 Whereas Francis Bernard and Thomas Hutchinson in 
Massachusetts were inextricably entangled in the colonial propaganda war against British 
policies, Fauquier and Botetourt in Virginia were not regarded as being part of this ministerial 
‘tyranny’ and not viewed as accomplices of the specific British policies which were alienating 
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the colonists. They were regarded as the embodiment of the royal ties connecting colony to 
Mother Country and were treated as such. 
 Understanding the Virginian mode of deference to authority is crucial in this respect. 
Historians have long debated the significance and meaning of the role of deference in colonial 
American society.108 It is misleading to assume that because there was an appearance of 
deference to royal symbols in colonial Virginia, this represented unconditional obedience to 
royal authority. These forms of celebration were not unconditional, but were contingent on a 
mutual understanding and respect between governor and people. By deferring to the 
gubernatorial symbols of authority and professing their allegiance to the king and governor, 
the Virginian people were also promoting their own interests. Relations between governor and 
people were conditional: as long as the governor helped them to further their own ends, the 
governor could expect their allegiance. Neglect of the interests of the elite in particular bode 
very ill for the governor, however. In other words, the relationship between governor and 
people was a marriage of convenience and there were always grounds for divorce if the 
governor proved hostile to the colonists’ interests. This conditional relationship is easily 
identifiable in the example of Dunmore’s governorship.  
 
V 
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Lord Dunmore and the Loss of the colony of Virginia 
John Murray, Lord Dunmore, was never really accepted in the higher echelons of Williamsburg 
Society. Dunmore was certainly not as popular among the Virginian elite as his esteemed 
predecessors. He was plagued by the fact that every action he took was often compared to those 
of his illustrious predecessors and he was often found wanting in the eyes of many 
Virginians.109 For most Virginians, Dunmore was a poor substitute for the revered Botetourt. 
Reports of his drunken behaviour, his reluctance to come to Virginia and his avaricious appetite 
for land did not sit well with the Virginian elite. Rumours circulated in the inner circles of 
Virginia about his repeated philandering, ‘ignoble’ links with Jacobitism, and lack of social 
graces.110 His Scottish heritage and his links with Scottish Jacobitism ensured that many 
Virginian gentry were quietly suspicious of him. It was widely reported that his father had 
supported Bonnie Prince Charlie, the Jacobite Pretender, in 1745 and Dunmore could never 
escape his family’s past history. Because Jacobites contested the settlement achieved in the 
years after 1689 and joined in major uprisings in 1715 and 1745 for the ‘tyrannical’ Stuarts, 
eighteenth-century Virginians, who were mostly of English origin, had natural misgivings 
about the political loyalty and reliability of Scots with such tendencies. Tensions simmered 
between the Glaswegian tobacco merchants in the northern neck and the Virginian gentry in 
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this period.111 Scottish merchants were fast becoming the most successful tobacco merchants 
in the colony and, by the 1770s, the main Glasgow merchants controlled around half of the 
tobacco market in Virginia. Virginian settlers were jealous of the increasingly vibrant Glasgow 
trade and depicted Scottish people as greedy, untrustworthy and dishonest.112 These misgivings 
ensured that Virginians would never entirely trust as their governor a Scottish peer, who was 
suspected of having ties to the Stuart family. 
Despite Dunmore’s failure to gain acceptance within the Virginian elite, he was not 
immediately castigated or demonised as the perpetrator of British tyranny. Indeed, prior to 
1774, he was generally well received in the press of the day. The respect and general reverence 
for British aristocracy exhibited by Virginians are evident in their rapturous reception of Lady 
Dunmore and her children, when jubilant crowds greeted their arrival in February 1774. 
Effusive and poetic tributes filled the pages of the Virginian press, which gave the impression 
that Virginians had tremendous respect for Dunmore and his family.113 In December 1774, 
Lady Dunmore gave birth to a daughter whom the parents called Virginia, clearly as a sign of 
affection for the colony. As one Virginian merchant remarked, Dunmore ‘is as popular as a 
Scotsman can be amongst prejudiced people’.114 In just over a year, however, the same 
newspapers were filled with diatribes against Dunmore.115  
Dunmore managed to placate the colonists when he acceded to their demands. On key 
issues, he aligned himself with the most influential Virginians in order to curry favour with the 
provincial elites. For example, in March 1772, the House of Burgesses passed a law that raised 
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the tariff on imported slaves from neighbouring colonies, including the colonies in the 
Caribbean, as well as from the Atlantic Slave Trade. The Burgesses firmly believed that they 
needed to protect the existing slave population in the colony from an influx of slaves from the 
Atlantic Slave Trade, which would ultimately dilute the value of their existing holdings. In 
direct contravention of his instructions, Dunmore assented to the bill. While there is scope to 
his question his motives,116 there can be little doubt that Dunmore was primarily seeking to 
ingratiate himself with the most influential men in the colony.117 He enjoyed some temporary 
popularity after ‘Dunmore’s War’. His successful expedition against a coalition of Shawnee 
and Mingoe warriors in the Ohio River Valley proved a triumph for Dunmore’s public relations 
with the colonists. The press of the day was filled with congratulatory messages praising not 
only Dunmore’s subjugation of the Native Americans, but also his own exemplary conduct and 
resilience.118 There was even a parade in the streets of Williamsburg when Dunmore returned 
to a hero’s welcome.119 Dunmore was treated as a brave conqueror because he had complied 
with Virginian demands to provide security for them in western lands.120 While clearly 
motivated by his own interest in western lands, Dunmore was also aware that his actions would 
be effective propaganda for royal interests.121  
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Although Lord Dunmore was grateful for the positive support his actions received, he 
was also aware that the governor of Virginia was inherently ineffective in controlling events in 
the borderlands of the colony. He frequently lamented his inability to control those Virginians 
seeking to move west. He frankly acknowledged that ‘The established Authority of any 
Government in America, and the Policy of Government at home, are both insufficient to 
restrain the Americans’.122 Because royal governors in Virginia did not have a broad patronage 
system at their disposal capable of winning loyal support throughout the whole colony, they 
had to depend upon their personal abilities and status to encourage loyalty within some parts 
of Virginian society. While royal governors did not have sufficient patronage in some areas, 
they did have the ability to bestow land grants to Virginians, which was an important means of 
building a support base. Land was an important commodity in colonial Virginia: without land, 
a Virginian man could not vote nor hold political office, and the size of a man’s holding 
determined how far he could rise up the political ladder.123 Granting legal titles to land, 
however, could create unforeseen problems for royal authority in the colony. The promise of 
land grants in order to gain support could in fact cause problems for the governor. The granting 
of lands encouraged Virginians to move west and consequently to move to areas not under the 
control of the governor whose power was largely based in and around Williamsburg. While a 
governor could secure a Virginian’s favour by granting him land, he was at the same losing his 
ability to control him after his movement west. 
The hero quickly became a villain in the eyes of many Virginians.  Dunmore was 
powerless to placate an exasperated House of Burgesses when its members reacted angrily 
against the coercive measures undertaken by the British government against Boston after the 
Boston Tea Party. In May 1774, when Dunmore dissolved the assembly for declaring a day of 
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fast and prayer in support of Boston, the House of Burgesses foiled the governor’s attempt to 
reassert imperial authority by adjourning to the Raleigh Tavern. In this session, the members 
called for an annual meeting of colonial delegates in a ‘general congress … to deliberate on 
those general measures which the united interests of America may from time to time require’.124 
In other words, the Burgesses called for a Continental Congress. It was one thing to appease 
the Virginian legislature by complying with their demands in direct defiance of the British 
government’s instructions, but quite another to prevent the Virginian legislature acting 
independently of royal authority. A few days after their extra-legal meeting in the Raleigh 
Tavern, a circular letter arrived from Boston, which called for a cessation of colonial trade with 
Britain. A convention was summoned to meet in Williamsburg on 1 August 1774 in order to 
consider Boston’s request. Two-thirds of county meetings and all the towns in Virginia 
recommended supporting Boston’s course of action. Since the Council had already persuaded 
Dunmore to convene a new assembly in August, elections were held in the same meetings as 
the ones that debated Boston’s call to restrict trade. Inevitably, the representatives for the 
Convention were generally the same as the ones elected to the new session of the House. In 
other words, Dunmore had legitimised the convention. After receiving Dunmore’s report of 
this incident, which was written in December 1774, Lord Dartmouth appears to have been 
genuinely astonished that Virginians had sided with their colonial cousin in Massachusetts: 
‘The steps which have been pursued in the different Counties of Virginia to carry into execution 
the Resolutions of the General Congress are of so extraordinary a Nature, that I am at a loss for 
words to express the criminality of them, and my Surprise, that, the people should be so 
infatuated, as tamely to submit the Acts of such Tyranny and Oppression’.125  
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From thenceforth, Lord Dunmore and the Virginian patriots were on a dividing path 
that only widened in the coming months which increased the suspicion and paranoia between 
the royal governor and the colonists. The Virginian Convention in March 1775 resolved to arm 
the militia, a decision taken after Patrick Henry’s ‘Give me liberty, or give me death’ speech. 
In the middle of the night of 20 April, Dunmore, fearing an armed uprising, secretly ordered 
the removal of gunpowder from the public magazine in Williamsburg. Lieutenant Henry 
Collins led a small group of marines and removed fifteen half-barrels of gunpowder. Dunmore 
gave instructions for the gunpowder to be stored on board HMS Fowley, docked at Yorktown. 
For Dunmore, this was a precautionary measure, but it was quickly regarded by Virginians as 
a provocative move.  Dunmore was unaware of the events in Lexington and Concord, 
Massachusetts that had occurred a day earlier, where Americans had essentially sparked the 
American War of Independence into life. McDonnell has insisted that Dunmore’s seizure of 
gunpowder ‘precipitated a calamitous chain of events that led to armed conflict – and to 
Virginians’ declaring their independence from Britain’.126 In Williamsburg, an armed crowd 
gathered outside the Governor’s palace and demanded that Dunmore return the powder and 
issued threats that they would kill the governor and anybody who helped him.127 The crowd 
feared that there could be a slave uprising and white Virginians did not possess the ammunition 
to put it down. Patriot leaders, including Peyton Randolph, the Speaker of the House of 
Burgesses, managed to defuse the crowd’s anger by preparing a remonstrance that was going 
to be presented to Dunmore ‘in a decent and respectful manner’. The address asked Dunmore 
to explain his actions. Dunmore, perhaps not realising the colonial elite’s attempt at restraining 
the mob from committing violence, berated the crowd’s ‘treasonable’ actions and accused them 
of ‘one of the highest insults, that could be offered to the authority of his majt’ys [sic] 
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Govern[men]t’.128 Dunmore believed that rather than trying to rein in the mob, the colonial 
elite had used the presence of the crowd to intimidate him. He later informed General Gage 
that the leaders presented their address ‘under the muskets of their independent company which 
they only left only at a little distance from my house’.129 Dunmore insisted that the gunpowder 
was ‘too much exposed there to the attempts of the people’ and could be a means to begin an 
insurrection.130 
Continued rumours and intrigue flourished in the colony which not only undermined 
royal government in Virginia, but also undermined the Patriot leaders’ attempts to control the 
‘lower sort’ in the colony. While many Virginians began to suspect that Dunmore was ready 
to fortify the palace and even arm his slaves, Dunmore claimed that parties of armed ‘men were 
continually coming into town from adjacent Counties’. Dunmore was irritated at his lack of 
control over the movement of Virginians, while Virginians began to believe the rumours 
circulating around the colony about Dunmore’s evil purpose. He attempted to act decisively to 
reinstate royal authority by ordering the arrest of two of the leaders of the local militia in 
Williamsburg, George Nicholas and William Finnie.  Dunmore fuelled further paranoia when, 
as reported in a first-hand account by a doctor in Williamsburg, Dr. William Pasteur, ‘his 
Lordship then proceeded to make use of several rash expressions & said that tho' he did not 
think himself in danger, yet he understood some injury or insult was intended to be offered to 
[the marines] … & then swore by the living God, & many such like expressions that if a grain 
of powder was burnt … or that if any injury or insult was offer'd himself … he would declare 
freedom to the slaves & reduce the City of Wmsburg to ashes’.131 Dunmore would ‘have a 
Majority of white People and all the Slaves on the side of the Government’ and he ‘declared 
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that in a short time he could depopulate the whole country’.132 Clearly there was a breakdown 
in communication between Dunmore and the colonists. Dunmore had made an egregious 
misjudgement when he threatened to liberate the slaves because he precipitated a torrent of 
abuse against him. According to Edmund Randolph, in his History of Virginia, ‘it was believed 
at the time, and more strongly suspected from what happened afterwards that [Dunmore] 
designed, by disarming the people, to weaken the means of opposing an insurrection of the 
slaves … for a protection against whom in part the magazine was first built'.133 
By May, Dunmore himself followed the kegs of gunpowder and took refuge on board 
HMS Fowley. He believed that around two thousand Virginian volunteers were ready to 
descend on the capital.134 He informed Gage that ‘there is scarce a County of the whole Colony 
wherein part of the people have not taken up arms and declared their intention of forcing me to 
make restitution of the powder’.135 He also sent his wife and children back to Great Britain on 
board the Magdalen. Although the naval command disagreed with this move and did not 
authorise it, Dunmore maintained that the government at home must be informed of his position 
as soon as possible. The members of the House of Burgesses begrudged Dunmore’s implication 
that his wife and children ‘were in danger amongst a people by whom they were universally 
esteemed and respected’.136 Dunmore further declared that he would not accept any business 
emanating from the House unless it was presented to him in person on board the ship. The 
members of the House themselves declared that Dunmore had abandoned his executive 
position and so they established a committee of safety to be the new executive authority in the 
state. To all extents and purposes, royal government had collapsed in Virginia. Dunmore 
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insisted to General Gage that he was powerless in his position as royal governor without a 
military force to support him: ‘Their conduct has already afforded sufficient evidence of a 
rebellious spirit with which they are possessed, and therefore if His Maje’s thinks it necessary 
to maintain appearance of authority in this Colony during the unhappy struggle between 
America and Great Brittain [sic], it cannot be affected without a force to support it’.137 In other 
words, Dunmore was articulating the inherent problem of royal government in Virginia: royal 
authority in the colony was essentially vacuous without at least the appearance of military 
strength. 
Dunmore was increasingly vilified by Virginians and his demonic status for many white 
Virginians was confirmed when he issued his infamous ‘Dunmore Proclamation’. Perceiving 
a rising tide against British interests in the colony and realising that his small army had become 
alarmingly outnumbered, Dunmore issued a proclamation intended to bolster the British army 
and to disrupt Virginians in their preparation of defences. On 7 November 1775, Dunmore 
issued the following proclamation: 
I do require every Person capable of bearing Arms to resort to His Majesty’s STANDARD or be 
looked upon as Traitors to his Majesty’s Crown and Government and therefore be liable to the 
Penalty the Law inflicts upon such offences, such as forfeiture of life, confiscation of land &c. & c. 
And I do hereby further declare all indentured Servants, Negroes or others (appertaining to Rebels) 
free that are able and willing to bear Arms, they joining His Majesty’s Troops as soon as may be, 
for the more speedily reducing this colony to a proper sense of their Duty to His Majesty’s Crown 
and Dignity.138 
This offer was a conditional freedom to black slaves and indentured whites: join the British 
effort in suppressing the revolutionary movement and you will be ‘free’. Dunmore had finally 
carried out his threat. Dunmore was not a fervent abolitionist, however.139 His actions were a 
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strategic calculation intended to disrupt the Virginian war effort. He knew that the colonial elite 
was worried about the potential of a slave uprising in its- midst and Dunmore hoped to benefit 
from this fear. Within two weeks of the proclamation, Dunmore gleefully reported that two to 
three hundred slaves had fled their masters and joined him on his ships.140 He set about forming 
an ‘Ethopian Regiment’, which quickly numbered 800 men. 
It was only after such actions, however, that the deep-seated feelings about Dunmore’s 
Jacobite family heritage surfaced in the newspapers in Virginia. Dunmore was ‘the tyrannical, 
cruel, and destructive executioner of ministerial vengeance’ and together with ‘his banditti of 
blacks, and Scotch Tories and Jacobites’, he was attempting to disrupt and destroy the 
Virginian way of life. To Virginians, it made sense that someone who had previously been in 
league with Jacobites would mastermind such a ‘cruel proclamation’.141 Dunmore’s actions 
were ‘treason against the State, for which such men as Lord Dunmore, and even Kings, have 
lost their heads’.142 Earlier governors in Virginia had never been embroiled in the kind of 
propaganda war which was now being waged in the colonies. It was only when Dunmore 
sought to destroy the very fabric of Virginian society that he became the epitome of tyranny. 
The call to arms which was printed in the Virginia Gazette made reference to Dunmore’s 
heritage: 
The present ministry and rebels and traitors to their prince; they are endeavouring to make him 
forfeit his crown. The earl of Dunmore, late governour, may be called a genuine rebel. His father 
was in two rebellions, strictly and properly so called; and he is now himself engaged in one of a 
more artful and dangerous nature, and he has the effrontery to shift the odious charge on us. If there 
are loyal subjects in the world, they are in America; they are in Virginia. But enough of this. 
Independent of these arguments, my countrymen, we may urge, that we have a right to take up arms 
in self-defence, since we have been threatened with an invasion of savages, and an insurrection of 
slaves, and have had our negroes and stocks piratically taken from us. The laws of God and nature, 
and the principles of the constitution, justify it; and, at present, all the feelings of humanity, every 
suggestion of policy, and the cries of our insulted and imprisoned countrymen, loudly call you TO 
ARM.143 
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Dunmore’s actions ensured that Virginians became ‘forced founders’. The sight of runaway 
slaves joining the British ranks shaped Virginian planters’ convictions that revolution was 
necessary in order to establish their own system of government and also to quell this slave 
rebellion within their society.144 Dunmore’s own Council denounced the Proclamation 
publicly, including Robert Carter Nicholas who wrote that Dunmore’s Proclamation was proof 
that the royal governor was the ‘executioner’ of the ‘system of tyranny adopted by the Ministry 
and Parliament of Great Britain’.145 Dunmore had called for a slave rebellion and, as a result, 
he was forever to be remembered as the perpetrator of tyranny. Royal government ended in 




The contrasting fortunes of Lord Dunmore, Francis Fauquier and Lord Botetourt as royal 
governors expose an important problem at the heart of this study of gubernatorial power. 
Fauquier and Botetourt were well-respected and revered governors in Williamsburg at a time 
when most other royal governors in the colonies were becoming embroiled in the propaganda 
war involving revolutionary rhetoric and initiating popular protests. This demonstrates that 
royal governors were not always ineffective executives and were not always castigated as 
puppets carrying out the policies of ministerial tyrants. Nevertheless, while this chapter has 
shown that Fauquier and Botetourt were certainly skilled politicians and were undoubtedly 
more capable than Lord Dunmore, their power and authority in the colony was not as 
substantial or as strong as an effective executive required. Rather, their careers as governor 
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illustrate what limited achievements an able man could accomplish under such a weak system 
of executive authority. 
The system of royal governorship in Virginia could, in some ways, give the illusion of 
effectiveness and acceptance, but seen in a broad context, governors could exert very little 
control in some counties of the colony. The Virginian system of governorship was not just a 
weak system in the exertion of political power at the centre, its influence with the wider and 
dispersed population at large was virtually non-existent. While Fauquier, Botetourt and (to a 
lesser extent) Dunmore managed to build successful relations with the Virginian elite 
particularly in the central areas of the colony, they failed to achieve unqualified allegiance 
throughout all ranks in the colonies. Thus, although the propertied elite mourned the passing 
of Fauquier and Botetourt, their platitudes disguised a deep-seated distrust and widespread 
suspicion of gubernatorial authority that was unmasked during the unfortunate governorship of 
Lord Dunmore.  
The system of government in Virginia required a consensual style of governance in 
which the governor had to prove flexible, sometimes had to ignore his instructions from Britain, 
had to respect Virginian interests and respond to local demands, and use all his personal skills 
in order to placate an increasingly troublesome colony. Royal governors in this period were 
never strong and effective executives, but they could be effective managers of the propertied 
elite. The actions of Dunmore from 1775 onwards, however, were those of a man who lacked 
the abilities shown by Fauquier and Botetourt and who ensured that e royal governorship in 
Virginia would always be remembered as a tyrannical and arbitrary office. Indeed, when 
Americans began to devise their own constitutions for their respective states in 1776, the 
actions of royal governors such as Dunmore ensured that gubernatorial authority in the new 




The Virginia Constitution of 1776 and the Creation of a Republican Governor 
The position of the executive within a republican framework of government was an immediate 
and significant problem faced by Virginia as soon as independence was declared in 1776. For 
many Americans seeking independence, giving one person any substantial power in the 
political system was the greatest threat to their newly acquired liberty. Although the examples 
of the Roman Republic and the contemporary Dutch Republic furnished useful historical 
precedents on which to base their new constitutional systems, the respective constitutions in 
the American states, as some historians have shown, were in effect laboratories in which they 
tested political principles and theories garnered from their experiences and various political 
documents of the colonial era, and their interpretations of major British Whig theorists of the 
late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.1 It is essential to consider both the ideological 
and practical origins of gubernatorial power in the first state constitutions because it is 
important to understand the extent to which American Patriots relied upon or abandoned British 
constitutional thinking. 
Historians have placed the reason for the deliberate weakening of the executive 
authority in the first wave of state constitutions on the colonial experience of royal governors. 
They have maintained that American Patriots acted from a widespread fear that an executive 
similar to that on the royal model would corrupt the newly created republics. The experiences 
of the pre-revolutionary decade or so, when the American Patriots believed that they had to 
endure overbearing royal governors with considerable prerogative powers, ensured that the 
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new constitutions would make the executive little more than a prestigious ceremonial office.2  
In other words, it was a natural reaction for these Americans, who most actively opposed 
British policies, to strip the executive of any meaningful powers and to give those powers to 
the legislative branch of government. There is little doubt that the perceived tyranny of royal 
governors in the run up to independence had a direct bearing on the adoption of weak 
executives in the first state constitutions. Indeed, at the same time as the Virginian Convention 
was debating the various provisions of the proposed new Constitution, including the executive 
branch, Lord Dunmore, the beleaguered royal governor of Virginia, was taking refuge in 
Gwyn’s Island and was still intent on leading an armed force against the rebellious Virginians. 
The pages of the newspapers in Virginia were littered with abuse against Dunmore and his 
followers, after his slavery proclamation and his seizure of the stocks of gunpowder.3 
The revisionist school of the 1960s and 1970s overhauled how historians interpreted 
and understood the motivations and ideological origins of the American Revolution. They 
completely refuted the liberal consensus of the first-half of the twentieth century that argued 
that John Locke was the greatest influence on the American colonists during the revolutionary 
upheaval. Through the seminal monographs produced by such historians as Caroline Robbins, 
Bernard Bailyn and J.G.A Pocock, American Revolutionary political thought was decisively 
defined as a non-Lockean tradition.  These scholars contended that the ideological tradition 
that inspired the American colonists originated instead with such writings as James Harrington 
and other ‘commonwealthmen’ during the turbulent Civil War and interregnum years. These 
writings were developed and adapted through such later Country Whig political thinkers as 
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Algernon Sidney, John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, and Viscount Bolingbroke in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.4 Although this ‘oppositional’ thought was 
consistently rejected by Court Whig politicians in Britain, it was, according to Bernard Bailyn, 
‘devoured’ by the colonists.5 While the Country Whig tradition can be perceived as a fringe, 
fragmented and inconsequential political force in Britain, the revisionist school has argued that 
this tradition, transplanted into the colonies three thousand miles away, was well received, was 
largely incorporated into revolutionary writings, and proved a determining factor in the 
outcome of the American Revolution.  
American Patriots and critics of Britain’s imperial policies from the 1760s regarded 
themselves as ‘Whigs’ and accused British ministers, their supporters in Britain and loyalists 
in the colonies of being ‘Tories’.6 What did American Patriots mean when they classified 
themselves as ‘Whigs’? In Britain, Whigs accepted the rule of law, accepted a number of civil 
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(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press), II: 682. 
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liberties (including trial by jury and due legal process), advocated representative government 
imposing financial restraints on the crown’s income and initiating statute laws, and rejected 
divine right, absolute monarchy and a Catholic ruler.7 American Patriots were mainly Country 
Whigs in that they were increasingly critical of the actions, policies and powers of those 
servants of the king (and his court) in both Britain and the colonies. They were often, therefore, 
greatly influenced by the Court-Country Whig division seen in practical politics in both Britain 
and the colonies between those anxious for office at the political centre and those critical of the 
centre as corrupt and faction ridden and who wished to have limited government at the centre 
and power mainly at the hands of local men who exercised great influence in their local areas. 
The colonists saw ministers in Britain calling themselves Whigs, but perceived them to be very 
anxious to accept crown patronage for themselves, use crown and their own patronage to win 
majority support in both houses of parliament, and raise taxes and loans to create a powerful 
state apparatus. These British politicians were seen as Court Whigs and most colonists 
distinguished themselves from such men by stressing that they were Country Whigs anxious to 
defend the interests of the localities (that is, of the colonial periphery of the British empire).8 
The Country Whigs were the opposition to the Court Whigs in Britain in the early 
eighteenth century. They disagreed with their Court opponents over many issues, not least the 
constitutional balance attempted in the Glorious Revolution settlement of 1688-89. The 
Country Whigs feared that the Revolution had not gone far enough as the constitutional 
settlement left too much power in the hands of the monarch and the aristocratic elite. They 
feared the impossibility of achieving a balanced constitution if the executive was able to exert 
considerable influence over the legislature, especially the House of Commons. The Country 
Whigs launched a movement to impose limits on the executive and its corrupting influence on 
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the British political scene. Country Whig ideology, however, served as a blueprint to be 
improved upon and the newly independent Americans radicalised, adapted, and modified these 
ideological lessons into a workable and sustainable constitutional attitude which had a 
profound effect on their views of executive authority. A host of historians have shown how the 
theories postulated by radical Country thinkers had a wide readership in the colonies, and have 
shown that these theoretical standpoints greatly motivated and spurred the colonists during the 
revolutionary era.9 Because the American Revolution was a rejection of British power, which 
they saw as too much based on a Court Whig or even Tory ideology, and because American 
Patriots were fearful of the survival of their new-found republic and mindful of historical 
precedents in history, historians have maintained that Americans wholeheartedly embraced the 
radical Country Whig theories concerning executive power in 1776. Country Whigs in the 
colonies, therefore, believed that the British government and parliament were abusing their 
powers and the trust bestowed on them and believed that the colonists had the right to resist 
this abuse of power. Country Whigs in the colonies maintained that the greatest threat to the 
colonies was from an over mighty, tyrannical and corrupt executive. Because of this, they 
stipulated that a stable government could only be achieved if there was a representative 
legislature accountable to the electorate. They advocated that most power in a functioning 
system should be located in the legislature. 
Country Whigs, however, were not all united in ideological terms. They disagreed over 
what was the best form of government to adopt and which form of government was most 
legitimate and justified. Historians have shown that there were essentially two different strands 
of radical Country Whigs. There were those (stressed by historians such as Caroline Robbins, 
John Pocock and Bernard Bailyn) defined as being neo-Harringtons, Commonwealthmen or 
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Classical Republicans. Radical Whigs of this kind wished effective political power to be in the 
hands of public spirited, independent, propertied men (especially landowners) who had 
sufficient virtue to defend their rights by bearing arms and showing a readiness to form a citizen 
militia. They wanted a limited, propertied franchise because they were fearful of the 
propertyless as a potential many-headed hydra who wanted to take property and power from 
this natural elite and who would be easily corrupted by crown patronage or manipulated by 
popular demagogues.10 
Historians have disagreed with Pocock and Bailyn when they have maintained that 
American colonists were mainly Classical Republicans. Historians, such as Thomas Pangle, 
Joyce Appleby and Stephen Dworetz, have tried to reassess Locke’s influence on American 
republicanism as manifested during the American Revolution. They have identified a second 
strand of radical Whiggism, which was greatly influenced by the natural rights ideology of 
John Locke in particular. This ideology was, at least potentially, far more democratic because 
it stressed that God had created all men equal and all men possessed the right to life, liberty 
and property. These rights were universal and inalienable. The only legitimate form of 
government was created by an original contract involving all men. The civil government so 
created (both executive and legislature) could be resisted by force if it seriously abused the 
trust and the powers bestowed on it. This was feared by other radical Country Whigs as 
potentially leading to the rule of the poor and political instability. Natural rights arguments can 
be detected in much of the political discourse of the American Revolution, including Thomas 
Paine’s Common Sense and the Declaration of Independence. According to Stephen Dworetz, 
‘the Lockean-liberal spirit played a very important role in the formation of the American myth 
and, ideologically, in the making of the American Revolution’.11 Clearly historians should not 
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discard the importance of Lockean thought on the period just after Independence: such 
principles as the consent of the governed, religious toleration and limited government were all 
employed by Americans and were undoubtedly inspired by Locke.12 Joyce Appleby, in 
particular, has criticised the Classical Republican interpretation. She maintains that Americans 
were ‘Liberal Republicans’ during and just after the American Revolution. She has claimed 
that leading American Patriots, such as Thomas Jefferson, were inspired by Lockean 
Liberalism rather than Classical Republicanism. ‘Deliverance from the strictures of classical 
republicanism came from the ideology of liberalism,’ asserts Appleby, ‘from a belief in a 
natural harmony of benignly striving individuals saved from chaos by the stability worked into 
nature's own design.’13 According to Appleby, Americans were motivated by egalitarian 
individualism rather than the civic virtue advocated by Classical Republicanism. 
This historiographical disagreement is perfectly understandable when one takes into 
consideration the fact that most American Patriots were not philosophers, seeking logical, 
intellectual coherence. Rather, they were like lawyers (many were indeed lawyers) who used 
any argument to win their case. Although J.G.A Pocock is certainly correct to claim that 
Country Whig ideology ‘ran riot in America’ during the American Revolution,14 it is important 
to emphasise the point that within Country Whiggism there were two different strands – 
Classical Republicanism and Lockean Liberalism – and American Patriots made use of both 
strands. The differences between the two strands within Country Whiggism were over who the 
legislature should represent and how extensive the franchise should be. As a slave owning 
colony, Virginia could never be quite as Lockean as Massachusetts with its much wider 
distribution of property and wealth. Thomas Jefferson used Lockean terminology in the 
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opening of the Declaration of Independence, but his ownership of slaves shows he was never 
a complete adherent of Lockean principles.15  Indeed, historians are in agreement that one of 
the most important texts that inspired American Patriots was Trenchard and Gordon’s Cato’s 
Letters. J.G.A Pocock classifies this text as fundamentally classical republican, but Richard 
Hamowy has emphasised the Lockean nature of Cato’s Letters, in that Trenchard and Gordon 
perceived the role of government as a product of a contract ‘designed to enforce men’s natural 
rights’.16 It is possible to identify both strands of Country Whig thought in the language and 
constitutional documents of the American Revolution. 
It is impossible to understand fully the practical and political behaviour of the various 
state governors of Virginia without giving due consideration to the different provisions for 
executive power outlined in this state constitution. In doing so, this chapter will, first, outline 
the process by which Virginians wrote the state’s constitution. Second, it will examine 
Virginia’s Declaration of Rights and the use of popular sovereignty in the Constitution. Third, 
this chapter will analyse Virginia’s application of the separation of powers principle and, most 
important, it will examine the governor’s position within the political framework. This chapter 
will maintain that Virginia established a system of government which was modelled on English 
Country Whig ideology. In particular, it will contend that the powers granted to the governor 
demonstrate that they had created in their new constitution their own distinct model of 
executive power based on Country Whig principles and attitudes. 
I 
The Making of the Virginia Constitution, 1776 
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After nine days of arduous debating in the Capitol in Williamsburg, 112 delegates passed three 
resolutions without opposition: the first declared an end to royal government in Virginia; the 
second declared that Virginia should establish a Declaration of Rights and a written 
constitution; and the third called for Congress to declare its independence, to form a 
‘confederation and perpetual union’ among the thirteen colonies and to make alliances with 
foreign powers. Excited crowds had gathered outside the Capitol building and, before any vote 
had even been taken or announced, they hauled down the British Union flag on top of the 
building and replaced it with the Grand Union Flag of Washington’s army. There were ‘other 
demonstrations of joy’: troops paraded, cannons were fired and there were illuminations in the 
evening.17 Thomas Nelson rode directly to Congress to present this Virginia Resolution. On 7 
June 1776, inspired by Virginia’s resolution, Richard Henry Lee, one of Virginia’s delegates 
to Congress, proposed a motion, ‘That these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free 
and independent States, that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and 
that all political connection between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to be, 
totally dissolved’.18 
 The Virginian Convention decided not to wait for Congress to declare its independence 
from Britain, but immediately set about filling the void that the absence of royal government 
had created. Rather than elect a body for the sole purpose of adopting a constitution, however, 
the delegates to the Convention took it upon themselves to act as if they represented the popular 
will of the Commonwealth. The Convention appointed a constitutional committee under the 
chairmanship of Archibald Cary. It assigned over one-quarter of the delegates in the 
Convention to the committee; among them were George Mason, James Madison and Patrick 
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Henry.19 Mason believed that the committee was too large and complained that it was 
‘overcharged with useless members’, who were clearly intent on devising a plan of government 
‘form’d of heterogeneous, jarring, and unintelligible Ingredients’.20  
There was one notable absentee from this Constitutional Committee, however. Thomas 
Jefferson was not present during the Convention’s discussions over a new constitution. He 
attended Congress from May until September 1776 and, thus, was unable to influence the 
constitution as strongly as he had hoped. This did not deter Jefferson, however, from trying to 
shape his state’s future political framework. Virginia was close to his heart and he wanted to 
share the responsibility of influencing the Commonwealth’s future political direction. He wrote 
to Thomas Nelson, ‘It is a work of the most interesting nature and such as every individual 
would wish to have his voice in’. For Jefferson, declaring independence was not enough to 
achieve real independence from Britain. Americans had to establish a workable and long-
lasting political structure in their individual states in order to ‘gain’ independence: ‘In truth it 
is the whole object of the present controversy; for should a bad government be instituted for 
us, in future it had been as well to have accepted at first the bad one offered us from beyond 
the water without risk and expense of contest’.21 Jefferson believed that the first constitutions 
of the newly independent states were particularly important to the survival of America as a 
republic. If the states could not establish permanent, functioning and viable constitutions, the 
contest with Britain would ultimately prove to be futile. He stressed that Americans ought to 
establish constitutions which were radically different from the ‘bad one offered us beyond the 
water’. Independence, therefore, would be achieved by the success of the new constitutions 
which were being devised. 
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Although Jefferson was absent from the Constitutional Convention, Virginians did have 
help from other notable American political theorists. The actual author of the Virginian 
Constitution of 1776 is debatable. While George Mason wrote the main draft for the 
constitutional committee, there were many contributions made by others to that document. 
Edmund Randolph, who was a member of the Convention, recollected: ‘A very large 
committee was nominated to prepare the proper instruments, and many projects of a bill of 
rights and constitution discovered the ardour for political notice, rather than a ripeness in 
political wisdom. That proposed by George Mason swallowed all the rest, by fixing the grounds 
and plan, which after great discussion and correction, were finally ratified’.22 By 1776, four 
different draft constitutions had been offered to the Convention for consideration. 
 As early as November 1775, when Americans began to contemplate creating a possible 
republican government, a prominent Virginian, George Wythe, had approached John Adams 
and asked him to explain in writing how he would establish a workable constitution. Adams’s 
letters were eventually published in the spring of 1776, by Richard Henry Lee, under the title, 
Thoughts on Government: Applicable to the Present State of the American Colonies. This ten-
page pamphlet was well-received in the colonies, particularly in Virginia. Adams wanted this 
pamphlet published in order to counteract Thomas Paine’s general views on government, which 
included a single legislative assembly, that had been suggested in Common Sense.23 Adams 
believed that ‘a single assembly is liable to all the vices, follies and frailties of an individual’ 
and strongly urged all states to establish an upper house in order to curtail the possibility of 
establishing a collective despotism. Although Virginians ignored Adams’s promotion of a strict 
separation between executive and legislative branches, they accepted wholeheartedly his 
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proposal for a bicameral legislative branch. George Mason’s draft constitution bore a 
remarkable resemblance to the tone and form of Adams’s pamphlet.24 
While Adams’s plan was wholeheartedly welcomed, there were others who were 
determined to retain the British form of government. Carter Braxton wrote a pamphlet in direct 
response to Adams’s plan, which was entitled, Address to the Convention of the Colony and 
Ancient Dominion of Virginia, on the Subject of Government in General, and Recommending 
a Particular Form to Their Consideration, By a Native of the Colony. Braxton maintained that 
Virginia should reject Adams’s republican constitution and instead restore the British 
constitution to its original state, which would herald ‘more happiness than any other’.25 
Virginians rejected this appeal to establish a British form of government in Virginia, and 
Richard Henry Lee described Braxton’s plan as ‘this Contemptible little Tract, [which] betrays 
the little Knot or Junto from whence it proceeded’.26 Virginians rejected the British system of 
government and were determined to establish their own uniquely republican system. 
Jefferson himself sent a draft constitution to the Convention, which was delivered by 
George Wythe, in mid-June, but the Convention decided not to treat it as a feasible draft 
proposal because it had arrived too late. George Mason had already prepared a draft 
constitution and the delegates were keen to debate a constitution which had been drawn up by 
their own constitutional committee. They allowed Jefferson’s draft to be considered for the 
purpose of amending Mason’s constitution and they adopted Jefferson’s preamble, which 
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contained charges against King George III.27 Jefferson, subsequently, sent two further drafts to 
the Convention; clearly he was anxious to influence this ‘momentous occasion’. Few of 
Jefferson’s proposals were adopted in the final text, however; apart from clauses concerning 
the court system and the disputed territories in the west.28 By 29 June, after weeks of 
deliberation and debate, the Virginia Constitution was ready for adoption. Thus, three days 
before the Continental Congress was scheduled to vote on Jefferson’s Declaration of 
Independence, the Commonwealth of Virginia had established a republican system of 
government.  
II 
The Declaration of Rights: The Application of Popular Sovereignty 
The Constitution of Virginia in 1776 did not just outline the powers belonging to the several 
branches of government, but contained two important lists. The first list was a Declaration of 
Rights, which established the theoretical and contractual basis from which Virginians were 
able to construct their framework of government. The second was a list of charges against the 
British king, which was written by Thomas Jefferson (and later included, in a slightly altered 
form, in the Declaration of Independence). Both lists provide revealing insights into the reasons 
why the executive branch was transformed in Virginia’s new political system. 
 The Declaration of Rights was originally drafted by George Mason and it was the first 
document deliberated upon by the constitutional committee, even before it considered a draft 
constitution. In his first draft, Mason put forward ten points which he believed were ‘the 
Foundation and Basis of Government’.29 The Committee added eight new points to Mason’s 
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28 PTJ, I: 333. 
29 George Mason to R.H. Lee, 18 May 1776, Papers of George Mason, I: 271. 
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draft and placed it before the Convention for debate. Among these 18 ‘rights’ were the right to 
trial by jury, the right to freedom of the press, and the right to create a state militia. After weeks 
of discussion, when there was heated debate among the delegates, especially on points 
concerning freedom of religion and the thorny issue of slavery, the Convention finally adopted 
its first Declaration of Rights on 12 June 1776, with a reduced number of sixteen articles. 
Of the sixteen articles adopted, the Convention made an explicit acceptance of popular 
sovereignty in the second article: ‘All power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the 
people; the magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them’.30  
This declaration clearly reflected what had been propagated in the writings in this period within 
the newly independent states.31 Willi Paul Adams has clearly shown that, while several 
constitutions affirmed the principle of popular sovereignty, none spelled out exactly the 
ramifications and practical consequences of this for the state governments, leaving instead for 
the full implications to be worked out through future political action.32 Historians, who have 
discussed the concept of popular sovereignty in the first American constitutions, have generally 
concentrated on the question of the division of sovereign power between the state governments 
and the Articles of Confederation.33 
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The conception and application of popular sovereignty within the framework of 
government devised by Virginia created substantial problems for the location and nature of 
executive power in the state. By acknowledging the sovereignty to the people, Virginians raised 
an important, though awkward, issue which was the relationship between the sovereign people 
and their elected rulers. The nature of representative government, where the popular will was 
embodied in the elected representatives in the legislative assembly, created a gap, or even a 
division, between the people and their representatives.34 This transferral of sovereignty could 
create fear among the electors that their representatives might set their own agenda and pursue 
their own interests. This suspicion partly stemmed from a reading of  Cato’s Letters, written 
by John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, which stressed that ‘Whatever is good for the people 
is bad for the governors; and what is good for the governors is pernicious to the people’.35  In 
terms of executive power, there remained the issue of what was the proper relationship between 
the governor and the people: whether there was a direct relationship through popular election, 
or whether this relationship should be indirect through a third party, namely the legislature. In 
essence, therefore, the constitution of Virginia had to decide whether the governor was 
appointed and accountable to the people or to the legislature. For executive power, the clear 
issue was from whom did the governor derive his power and influence: the people or their 
elected representatives? 
The issue of sovereignty had saturated the polemical disputations between Britain and 
the colonies that eventually led to revolution. Governor Thomas Pownall perfectly described 
the ubiquitous prevalence of the subject: ‘we have neither knowledge, nor system nor principle, 
we have but one word ... sovereignty – and it is like some word to a mad-man which, whenever 
                                                          
34 The major works on representation within this period are J.R Pole, Political Representation in England and the 
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mentioned, throws him into his ravings’.36 The doctrine of sovereignty pervaded the literature 
of the transatlantic debate as writers grappled with abstractions in order to contest the feasibility 
of the British taxation policy on the colonies and, ultimately, the right of Britain to impose any 
tax or legislation at all upon the colonies.37 From the 1760s to 1787, from the early 
constitutional dispute with Britain to the contested Federal Constitution, the issue of 
sovereignty was the most divisive subject in the heated political atmosphere of America.  
Sovereignty was the conviction that there had to be in every state a supreme power which had 
the right to exercise ultimate (and incontestable) authority, and all other powers in the state had 
to be subordinate to this authority. Alexander Hamilton provides a good example of the 
commonly held belief in 1775: ‘In every civil society, there must be a supreme power, to which 
all the members of that society are subject; for, otherwise, there could be no supremacy, or 
subordination, that is no government at all’.38 
From the outset, however, Virginians did not fully comply with their dogmatic 
affirmation of popular sovereignty because their constitution lacked popular consultation or 
ratification. Hence, they were not pure Lockean Whigs. Although Virginians used the name 
‘Convention’, it does not mean that this body of delegates was specially convened for the sole 
purpose of devising a constitution or that the constitution was subsequently ratified by the 
people.39  The constitution, therefore, emanated and derived its authority from a legislative 
body. Thomas Jefferson, in his Notes on the State of Virginia, maintained that, while the 
constitution was formed when ‘we were new and unexperienced in the science of government’, 
it contained ‘very capital defects in it’.  Among these defects, according to Jefferson, was the 
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ability of the ‘ordinary legislature’ to alter the constitution itself.40 In other words, the Virginia 
Constitution of 1776 proclaimed its belief in popular sovereignty, but, in practice, adhered to 
the more traditional belief in legislative sovereignty. In this way, they followed the example of 
major Country Whig thinkers. 
Legislative sovereignty reigned supreme in the writings of major Whig theorists of the 
late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Britain. John Locke in his Second Treatise of 
Government clearly stated that ‘the legislative is not only the supreme power of the 
commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed 
it’.41 Although Locke did not explicitly mention England, it is apparent that he regarded the 
sovereign legislature in his work to the combined institutions of king, lords and commons.42 
Locke’s doctrine concerning legislative sovereignty quickly became common currency, even 
among Court Whigs, in eighteenth-century British politics to the extent that it was perceived 
to be incontestable. The introduction of William Blackstone’s commentaries into the colonies 
by the 1770s reaffirmed the need for ‘a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, 
in which the jura summi imperii, or the rights of sovereignty, reside’. Blackstone was in no 
doubt that this ‘sovereignty of the British constitution’ resided in the king-in-parliament.43 
While colonists likewise argued in support of legislative, that is colonial legislative, 
sovereignty, the belief in popular sovereignty became more widespread than in Britain after 
independence.44  
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Although some fringe elements of Country Whig thought fully advocated popular 
sovereignty in Britain, the great majority of Whig theorists, most especially those who enjoyed 
an extensive readership in America, never openly supported the idea. Instead, there was a tacit 
role for the people in relation to legislative authority in their works, which contain the 
embryonic roots of the concept of popular sovereignty. There has been a tendency among 
historians to overemphasise the role Whig theorists envisaged for the people at large. Lee 
Ward, for example, has claimed that Algernon Sidney held popular sovereignty to be the logical 
and moral implication of natural liberty and equality, and that he had a populist conception of 
the proper form of government.45 Locke’s legislative sovereignty was premised on the consent 
of the people, because government originated in a social contract, and thus made the people, 
by implication, superior to the legislature. Indeed, if the contract was broken, by a tyrannous 
regime, then Locke argued that the people had a right to resist such an unlawful government. 
This right of resistance had a substantial bearing in the colonies.46 It is tenuous to argue from 
this basis, however, that all or even most Country Whigs advocated popular sovereignty. Whig 
theorists had no desire to see manifested what was latent in their concept of government by 
consent. Locke was not prepared to grant the people a continuously active role in government: 
once the original contract was in effect, the legislature was supreme. Sovereignty only reverted 
to the people when government was dissolved and the social contract broken. Indeed, 
Dickinson has shown that the ‘people’ referred to in such Whig writings as Locke, Sidney, and 
Tyrrell must be interpreted in a relatively narrow sense: it was a ‘limited definition’ closely 
resembling the electorate already in place.47  Popular sovereignty was simply alien to most of 
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the major Whig thinkers in this period. It was in America where popular participation in politics 
had already become more apparent, and where the king’s influence, including his 
representatives, had diminished considerably, that a far more acceptable and welcoming 
laboratory for popular sovereignty was created. 
Fear of the power of the chief magistrate clouded Virginia’s application of the doctrine 
of popular sovereignty within its constitution. Virginia did not cater for a popularly elected 
governor; instead, it dictated that ‘a Governour, or chief magistrate, shall be chosen annually, 
by joint ballot of both Houses, to be taken in each House respectively’.48 Rather than entrusting 
the people with the choice of their magistrate, gubernatorial elections were kept within the 
bounds of legislative prerogative. Thus, the governor was not the servant or representative of 
the people, but the choice of the legislature. Denying a popularly elected executive, moreover, 
was rooted in the Classical Republican strand of the Country Whig tradition. The executive 
authority in Harrington’s Commonwealth of Oceana, for example, was exercised by the 
magistrates and various councils, which were chosen by the Senate from among its own 
members.49 By making the governor a legislative appointment, Virginians made sure that a 
popular champion could not usurp the political system in place. Clearly, by denying the people 
a say in the election of their governor, the constitutional committee were tacitly admitting that 
they did not trust the electorate to make the right choice. As Thomas Jefferson himself made 
clear to Edmund Pendleton, a popularly elected governor would be a hindrance: ‘I have ever 
observed that a choice by the People themselves is not generally distinguished for it’s [sic] 
wisdom. This first secretion from them is usually crude and heterogeneous. But give to those 
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chosen by the people a second choice themselves, and they will generally chuse wise men’.50 
In other words, for Jefferson, the choice of governor should be made by the members of the 
legislature because they would exercise greater wisdom and discretion than the people at large 
in choosing the best person to execute the laws that the legislators passed.51 Thus, the Virginian 
governor could never be a popular champion, but would always be a creature of the legislature. 
Not only was the governor elected by the legislative branch, but he could also be 
dismissed by the legislators as well. A clause in the Constitution of Virginia stipulated that the 
governor was always subject to the will of the legislative branch. If the governor proved to 
‘offend the state’, by means of ‘maladministration, corruption or by other means’, which 
endangers the State, he ‘shall be impeachable by the House of Delegates’.52 In other words, the 
executive was wholly accountable to and removable by the legislative branch and not the 
people. 
Because the radical Country Whigs believed that the corrupting influence of the court 
was so dangerous, they often advocated the annual rotation of offices so that no official or 
representative would hold power for more than a year. Virginia instituted the rotation of office 
principle and practice within its framework of government. The governor could serve three 
successive one-year terms, but could not run for the governorship again for another four years. 
This prevented a governor from accruing a substantial powerbase from which he could exert 
greater control which might eventually corrupt the government.53 John Adams, in his pamphlet, 
Thoughts on Government, advocated a rotation of offices because he believed that long tenure 
led to corruption and made an office appear hereditary.54 The Virginian Constitution placed all 
elective power within the legislature as representatives of the people, and made the governor 
                                                          
50 Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton, 20 August 1776, in PTJ, I: 504. 
51 Jeremy D. Bailey, Thomas Jefferson and Executive Power, 33. 
52 ‘The Final Draft of the Virginia Constitution, 1776’, in Papers of George Mason, 1: 308 
53 Ibid, I: 306. 
54 Papers of John Adams, IV: 63-90. 
127 
 
subordinate to it. Thomas Jefferson later described the powers enjoyed by the legislature in his 
Notes on the State of Virginia as an ‘elective despotism’.55 Virginia, displaying a radical 
Country Whig fear of executive power, situated the majority of powers and supremacy within 
the legislature. The governor, therefore, had no direct relationship with the people. 
II 
The Denigration of Executive Power: The Charges against George III 
While the application of popular sovereignty was modified in respect to the governorship, the 
second list which prefaced the Constitution explicitly formed the platform from which 
Virginia’s weak governor position was created. Thomas Jefferson judged that it was necessary 
to validate Virginia’s actions and to explain and justify it to the American people and the world. 
He provided twenty charges against George III, which, Jefferson believed, proved that 
Virginians had a right to dissolve this tyrannical government and create a new one. According 
to the Virginian Constitution, George III by his actions had acted against the best interests of 
the people: ‘Whereas George the Third, King of Great Britain and Ireland, and Elector of 
Hanover, heretofore intrusted with the exercise of the Kingly office in this Government, hath 
endeavoured to prevent, the same into a detestable and insupportable tyranny, by putting his 
negative on laws the most wholesome and necessary for the publick good’.56 What follows is 
a list of charges against George III which was designed to portray the king as an architect of 
tyranny.  
Fear of executive power is the prevailing tone of Jefferson’s list of charges. From the 
outset, he suggested that George III abused his position of authority and trust by exercising his 
prerogative powers against the ‘publick good’. Jefferson depicted George III as an arbitrary 
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executive who deliberately used his power in order to disrupt and destroy American colonial 
liberty. He ‘prevented necessary colonial legislation from being passed’ and acted ‘arbitrarily’ 
by ‘dissolving legislative assemblies’ without cause and ‘taking military control over the 
colonies’.57 By dissolving the assemblies of the people and failing to recall them for long 
periods, his actions represented nothing less than repeated ‘invasions of the rights of the 
people’. According to Jefferson’s charge sheet, George III had approved legislation which was 
passed by the Westminster Parliament, but which was very harmful to the interests and wishes 
of the colonists. The king revealed his ‘tyrannical’ self when he agreed to having ‘large bodies 
of troops quartered’ among Americans, ‘for cutting off’ American trade to all other parts of the 
world, for imposing taxes without colonial consent and for depriving Americans of the benefits 
of trial by jury.58 In other words, according to Jefferson, George III had deliberately attempted 
to subvert and undermine the natural rights belonging to Americans.  
Most of the charges which Jefferson levelled at the king were in actual fact initiated by 
minsters, passed by Parliament and implemented by royal governors. It was the governors who 
had dissolved the legislative assemblies, attached suspending vetos onto colonial legislation, 
and refused to call legislative assemblies into session. In particular, it was Lord Dunmore who 
had prompted ‘our negroes to rise in arms against us, those very negroes whom, by an inhuman 
use of his negative, he hath refused us permission to exclude by law’.59 While royal governors 
may have committed these abuses, the king refused to overturn these decisions; in other words, 
he had failed to protect his people against abuses which threatened their liberty. Jefferson 
concluded his list of accusations by maintaining that because of these ‘several acts of misrule, 
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the government of this country, as formerly exercised under the crown of Great Britain, is 
TOTALLY DISSOLVED’.60 
 Undoubtedly, the list of charges against George III was included in the Constitution by 
the Convention because it gave political justification for and legitimacy to the document. In 
true Lockean fashion, by delineating all the apparent abuses perpetrated by the Crown, 
Virginians were able to justify their establishment of a new government. George III’s tyranny 
gave the Americans a right to resist, to break the existing link with Britain and to establish a 
new form of government. It also served a secondary function, however. By prefacing their 
republican form of government with their perception of monarchical government and its 
apparent abuses, they were able to draw a sharp distinction between the ‘old’ system of 
government and the ‘new’ system which they had just devised. In other words, they juxtaposed 
the British system of government, which committed numerous injustices against the 
Americans, to their Virginian system of government, which they believed would herald a new 
era of freedom.  
Jefferson’s list, however, exposed an important problem facing the Virginia Convention 
in 1776. The king was removed from the political framework, but the question remained about 
what should happen in this republican framework to the kingly prerogatives, exercised 
previously by the royal governor on his behalf. Jefferson believed that the constitution had to 
tackle the problem of replacing the ‘kingly office’. In his draft constitution, he ensured that the 
governor would inherit the kingly office, but would be denied all the powers previously 
pertaining to that position.61 In other words, Jefferson’s ‘administrator’ would resemble the 
                                                          
60 Jefferson continued: ‘We therefore, the delegates and representatives of the good people of Virginia, having 
maturely considered the premises, and viewing with great concern the deplorable conditions to which this once 
happy country must be reduced, unless some regular, adequate mode of civil polity is speedily adopted, and in 
compliance with a recommendation of the general Congress, do ordain and declare the future form of government 
of Virginia to be as followeth’. Ibid., I: 379. 
61 In his third draft, Jefferson wrote that George III ‘hereby is deposed from the kingly office with this government 
and absolutely divested of all it’s rights, powers and prerogatives’. In other words, the kingly office remains but 
130 
 
king in terms of ceremonial significance, but would be denied the exercise of any kingly 
prerogatives. His ‘Administrator shall possess the powers formerly held by the king: save only 
that, he shall be bound by acts of legislature tho’ not expressly named’.62 Jefferson was 
concerned to ensure that the governor was simply an executive official with limited powers. 
As he wrote to Edmund Pendleton:  
should we not have in contemplation and prepare for an event (however deprecated) which may 
happen in the possibility of things; I mean a re-acknoledgement [sic] of the British tyrant as our 
king, and previously strip him of every prejudicial possession? Remember how universally the 
people run into the idea of recalling Charles the 2d. after living many years under a republican 
government.63 
 
In other words, Jefferson was concerned in case Virginia re-established monarchical 
government should its republican government prove unsuccessful. Jefferson evidently 
remembered the Virginian gentry’s deep admiration for Fauquier and Botetourt when Virginia 
was a royal colony, and republican government seemed a fragile entity in the face of the 
fickleness inherent in the people at large. Jefferson maintained that Virginia should install a 
governor who would be an officer in the form of a king, but would lack the king’s powers and 
prerogatives, so that absolute or arbitrary monarchy could not rear its ugly head again.64 The 
Virginia Constitution had a significant problem to overcome: which institution would wield 
the prerogative, which body was to be the law-making authority, and where did power lie in 
the constitution? 
III 
The Framework of Government: The Implementation of the Separation of Powers 
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The Virginia constitution boldly declared that it had instituted the doctrine of the separation of 
powers into its governmental framework: ‘The legislative, executive, and judiciary 
departments, shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly 
belonging to the other; nor shall any person exercise the powers properly belonging to the 
other; nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time’.65 
The Convention maintained that this tripartite system of government would be kept separate 
and no one could exercise the powers of more than one branch at the same time. It established 
a legislative General Assembly, consisting of a House of Delegates and a Senate, an executive, 
consisting of a governor and Privy Council, and a separate justice system. What was implied 
when Virginia affirmed its belief in the doctrine of the separation of powers? How independent 
would each branch be, and would equal power be parcelled out to each branch of government? 
Virginia adapted the accepted practice of the separation of powers by following a radical 
Country Whig version of the doctrine. 
No other constitutional concept has defined the particular aspects of the American 
system of government over the centuries than the concept of the separation of powers.66 No 
other constitutional concept, however, during the era of the first state constitution making, has 
suffered from such conflicting and ambiguous definitions. Indeed, next to the institution of 
popular sovereignty, no other constitutional concept has become more relevant to the study of 
the evolution of gubernatorial power in Virginia, than the practical application of the separation 
of powers in its constitution. Historians have failed to agree about the significance, etymology 
and implications for the explicit acceptance and application of the separation of powers 
doctrine within the constitution of Virginia. Gordon Wood has argued that, in the first wave of 
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constitutions, particularly in Virginia, the separation of powers meant little more than 
‘insulating the judiciary and particularly the legislature from executive manipulation’.67 
Another interpretation, however, has claimed that the acceptance of this doctrine within the 
constitutions was not purely because it protected the legislature from executive corruption, but 
also because it reduced the American fears of governmental power in general, either in one 
man or in a body of men.68 Indeed, there has been a tendency among some historians to interpret 
the use of the separation of powers doctrine as a prelude to the Federal Constitution’s institution 
of this constitutional principle. They have interpreted the first state constitutions as a part of an 
evolutionary process that produced the eventual manifestation of the separation of powers 
which appeared in 1787 and which was engineered by James Madison.69 
This dispute among historians is due, in part, to the fact that by the middle of the 
eighteenth century, there was not a single definition of the concept of the separation of powers 
that had achieved widespread acceptance. Americans still thought of their own colonies/states 
as a microcosm of the balanced constitution present in Britain. Indeed, such was the general 
ambiguity of the notion of the separation of powers within the colonies, that historians have 
contested who bore responsibility for having the greatest influence on them for developing the 
doctrine. Montesquieu has generally been considered the most obvious influence as he was the 
first directly to define the separation of powers concept, when analysing the ‘Constitution of 
England’ in his The Spirit of Laws.70 Montesquieu positioned the separation of powers as an 
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essential prerequisite in any framework of government if ‘liberty’ was to be maintained. In 
other words, for Montesquieu, the lack of a separate and distinct tripartite system of 
government would endanger liberty because governmental power would become absolute and 
arbitrary. Montesquieu’s political ideology did have a sympathetic readership in the colonies.71 
It has been argued, however, that the notion of the separation of powers did not originate 
with Montesquieu, but was implicit within several works of Whig political thinkers in Britain 
that preceded the publication of Montesquieu’s work in 1748 and had a direct bearing on the 
prevalence of the notion in the colonies before independence.72 Indeed, Vile has shown that the 
doctrine of the separation of powers was ‘born’ and developed in the particular circumstances 
of the English Civil War and the Interregnum.73  In this period, the separation of powers was 
advocated as a means of safeguarding the legislature from executive encroachment. John Locke 
was really the first major writer to employ the doctrine in his Second Treatise of Government, 
but he still failed to demarcate clearly the various separate functions of the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary. He argued that ‘well-framed governments’ are those that have ‘the 
legislative and executive power’ in ‘distinct hands’.74 Similarly, other major thinkers, such as 
Bolingbroke and Trenchard and Gordon, have been credited with promoting a doctrine of the 
separation of powers in their political writings, although this remains a matter of debate.75 
There was little coherent theoretical development of the principle of the separation of powers 
in this era and, where it was discussed, it was often closely entwined with the theory of mixed 
government.  
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The prevalence and general acceptance of the theory of the separation of powers in the 
colonies was primarily based on the desire to neutralise the power of the executive. It is in this 
way that it had an unmistakeable radical Country Whig tone in the literature published in the 
colonies by 1776. Most Americans subscribed to Montequieu’s interpretation that the 
establishment of the separation of powers within the structure of government was necessary to 
protect civil liberty: ‘It is essential to liberty that the legislature, judicial and executive Powers 
of Government be, as nearly as Possible, independent of and separate from each other; for 
where they are united in the same persons, there will be wanting that natural check, which is 
the principal security against the enacting of arbitrary Laws, and a wanton Exercise of Power 
in the Execution of them’.76  Indeed, Daniel Shute’s rationale for the separation of powers 
seems to reinforce the view that Montesquieu’s writings greatly influenced the colonists:  
It is necessary that each should keep the line of his own particular department; every excentric [sic] 
motion will introduce disorder and be productive of mischief: But each keeping a steady and regular 
course in his own sphere, will dispense a benign influence upon the community and harmoniously 
conspire to promote the general good: As in the solar system, every planet revolving in its own orbit 
round the sun produces that order and harmony which secures the conservation of the whole.77 
 
The separation of powers, where each arm of government keeps to its own sphere, was essential 
for the ‘order and harmony’ of good government and the security of the people’s liberty.  
If one looks past the superficial acceptance of the doctrine of the separation of powers 
proposed by the major pamphleteers, however, and attempts to pinpoint the exact reasoning 
behind their acceptance of it, there appears a widespread fear of executive manipulation and 
corruption of government. Crucial to this is the experiences of plural office holding under royal 
government in the colonies. John Adams in his Novangulus essays of 1775 severely criticised 
royal government in Massachusetts and was particularly vehement in his condemnation of the 
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concentration of legislative, executive, and judicial power in the persons of Francis Bernard, 
Thomas Hutchinson and Andrew Oliver.78 The colonists’ desire for a separation of powers was 
also clearly heightened by the fact that their own royal governors possessed patronage powers. 
While this patronage was not as vast in practical terms as it may have seemed, governors could 
confer some well-paid and influential appointments which could give rise to charges of 
corruption.79 This fear of executive manipulation of the legislature was not solely produced 
from the use of patronage by the royal governors, but also arose because of the colonial practice 
of combining legislative and executive powers in the same hands. A Virginian contended that 
‘it is a solecism in politicks to invest the different powers of legislation and the execution of 
the laws in the same hands’. According to a letter written in the Boston Evening Post in 1763, 
‘there can be no liberty where he who exerciseth the executive power, has any share in the 
legislature’.80 The experiences of royal government in Virginia under the detested Lord 
Dunmore inevitably conditioned how the practice of the separation of powers was later applied 
in Virginia. Clearly, by 1776, in the tumultuous political environment of Virginia, the 
separation of powers had come to be understood as a preventive measure: a way of ensuring 
that the executive was not too potent and effecive arm of government. 
The logical reason for implementing the separation of powers principle was to prevent 
one branch of government encroaching on another, increasing its own powers at the expense 
of the other, and thereby upsetting the balance of the institutions of government. James 
Madison, a Virginian, claimed in The Federalist:  
                                                          
78 Papers of John Adams, II: 238. See also C. Thomas Bradley, John Adams and the Spirit of Liberty (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1998), 212-216; and Richard Alan Ryerson, ‘John Adams, Republican Monarchist: 
An Inquiry into the Origins of His Constitutional Thought’ in Empire and Nation: The American Revolution in 
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But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, 
consists in giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and 
personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defence must in this, as 
in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to 
counteract ambition. The interest of the man, must be connected with the constitutional rights of the 
place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the 
abuses of government.81 
 
This is the classic defence of mixed government and a balanced constitution. In theory, 
according to Madison, a separation of powers between the three branches of government 
involves granting enough powers to each branch in order to ensure that one branch does not 
overpower either or both of the other two branches. The executive branch, therefore, should be 
granted enough powers in order for it to remain independent of the legislative and judicial 
branches. This was not the case with the Virginian constitution. Although many Virginian 
Whigs favoured a separation of powers, they did not desire an equality of powers. They may 
have signalled their intention of separating the three powers, but they did not have any intention 
of keeping them wholly independent of each other. Indeed, it can be argued that Virginia paid 
only lip-service to the concept of the separation of powers.  
The Virginian Convention ensured that the legislative branch would be the superior 
branch in the government and the executive would be relatively powerless in comparison. The 
constitutional committee had rejected Jefferson’s belief in preserving the form of the ‘kingly 
office’. Instead, they favoured Mason’s proposal that the governor and council would ‘exercise 
the executive powers of government’. In other words, it denied the governor any law-making 
authority, but specified that the executive branch would simply execute the laws passed by the 
legislative branch. The constitution was unambiguous in its intention that the governor should 
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not have any of the prerogatives or extent of patronage that his royal predecessors had enjoyed: 
‘[the governor] shall not, under any pretence, exercise any power or prerogative by virtue of 
any law, statute, or custom, of England’.82 Even though it was elected by the legislature, 
Virginians still regarded the executive as the greatest danger to the Commonwealth’s political 
framework. The constitution stripped the governor of all of the prerogatives he possessed when 
Virginia was a royal colony.  
The Virginian constitution, therefore, insisted that there should be an executive branch 
in the government framework, but it ensured that this branch would have very little real power. 
The most important point about the governorship in the Virginia Constitution was that it did 
not exercise the powers of the executive alone. Instead, the governor was only head of the 
executive branch and was assisted by an eight-man Council of State, or Privy Council. This 
council was to be elected by a joint vote of the legislature and its members were selected from 
existing delegates or senators, or ‘from the people at large’.83 Of course, the royal governor in 
Virginia had been assisted by a council in order to perform his duties. The new Virginian 
Constitution, however, ensured that the governor was no longer simply assisted by the council, 
but now could act only with the consent of the council. While the Constitution specified that 
the governor would function with the ‘advice of the council’, it did not mean that the council 
was purely an advisory body. The constitution decreed that ‘four members shall be sufficient 
to act [as a quorum], and their advice and proceedings shall be entered on record, and signed 
by the members present, (to any part whereof, any member may enter his dissent) to be laid 
before the General Assembly, when called for by them’.84 The General Assembly wanted a 
record of the discussions of the council, in order presumably to determine the constitutionality 
of a governor’s actions and to use this as a basis to re-elect or impeach a governor. The governor 
                                                          
82 ‘Final Draft of the Virginian Constitution of 1776’, in Papers of George Mason, I: 306. 




had to execute the laws passed by the legislature with the assistance of the council. In other 
words, the constitution established a plural governorship: because the governor could not 
exercise his powers without the consent of the council, the office of governorship consisted of 
the governor and his council. Not only did the legislative branch elect the governor, but it also 
elected his council. The executive branch, therefore, was not separate from the legislative 
branch; in effect, it was the creature of the legislature.  
The legislative branch was the focal point of all law making activity and it had taken 
over all the prerogatives and patronage typically at the disposal of royal governors before 1776. 
The legislative branch was to be formed of two distinct houses: the House of Delegates, acting 
as the lower house, and the Senate, acting as upper house. Together they were to be called the 
‘General Assembly of Virginia’. The House of Delegates was elected in the same manner as 
the members of the House of Burgesses had been when Virginia had been a royal colony. Two 
representatives were elected from every county and a representative for the ‘city of 
Williamsburgh, and one for the borough of Norfolk, and a Representative for each of such other 
cities and boroughs, as may hereafter be allowed particular representation by the legislature’.85 
Each delegate was elected for a one-year term. The electors had to be ‘free’, white males over 
the age of twenty-one who had owned one hundred acres of unimproved land or twenty-five 
acres on which there was a house or plantation, for at least one year in the county in which they 
voted.  
The members of the Senate were elected in a different way from the delegates in the 
lower house. The composition and accountability of the upper house proved to be a substantial 
problem for the Virginia Convention. Because it was the upper house, the Senate had to have 
a different constituency from the lower house, but it still had to be accountable to the electorate. 
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George Mason devised a plan which divided the state into twenty-four districts, in which voters 
were able to pick ‘sub-electors’ who would, in turn, select their senator. In this electoral 
college, senators would have a different constituency to the lower house, but still remain 
answerable to the people. While the Convention accepted Mason’s basic premise, it altered his 
plan so that the people in each district would elect senators directly. Each senator served four 
years, but not all were to be elected at the same time. Only one-quarter of its membership stood 
for election each year.86  
The Convention ensured that the House of Delegates would be substantially superior to 
the Senate. The constitution dictated that ‘All laws shall originate in the House of Delegates’. 
The Senate was not permitted to initiate legislation, but it could reject or approve any legislation 
passed by the lower house. The senate could also suggest amendments to the legislation passed 
by the lower house, so long as the House of Delegates accepted the changes, but it could not 
amend any money-bills. Just as the House of Burgesses previously had exercised tight control 
of the public finances of the colony, so the Convention ensured that the lower house would 
continue with this privilege in the Commonwealth era.87 The Senate was designed to be ‘an 
aristocracy of talent’, which could moderate the delegates’ actions.88 
The House of Delegates assumed all the important patronage which was nominally at 
the disposal of the royal governor. It appointed the treasurer, all important judicial officers and 
also elected the governor and the Council of State. One of the few remaining powers at the 
disposal of previous royal governors, which they exercised regularly, was their ability to 
prorogue, adjourn or dissolve the legislative assembly. This was a power which was explicitly 
denied the governor: ‘Either House of the General Assembly may adjourn themselves 
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respectively. The Governor shall not prorogue or adjourn the Assembly, during their sitting, 
nor dissolve them at any time’.89 He was able to call the General Assembly into session ‘if 
necessary’ before they were scheduled to sit, but only on the advice of the Council of State or 
by an ‘application of a majority of the House of Delegates’.90 The governor also did not have 
a veto on legislation passed by the legislative branch. The royal governor had previously 
possessed a ‘suspending’ veto on all legislation passed by the House of Burgesses. The new 
republican governor had no influence or control over the legislature and was excluded 
completely from sharing in any law-making activity. The governor, therefore, was completely 
stripped of all influence in terms of passing legislation. The governorship in the new 
constitution, therefore, was mostly form with little substance. The governor was more a 
creature of the legislature than an independent branch of the government and more of an 
‘administrator’ of government policies decided by others rather than one who could dictate or 
initiate policy.91  
While the constitution stripped the governor of all of its prerogative powers, it also 
acted to strip away some of his powers of appointment. In order for a governor to exercise 
influence over the legislature and the people at large in the eighteenth century, he required the 
ability to offer positions of status, value or influence in order to gain the occupants’ loyalty and 
support. The legislature in the new constitution took away the governor’s powers to appoint to 
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the judiciary, the treasury and the legislative assembly. The constitution did allow the governor 
to make some appointments: ‘the governor, with the advice of the Privy Council shall appoint 
Justices of the Peace for the counties’. The Sheriffs and Coroners were nominated by the 
various county courts, but had to be approved by the governor. He was granted the powers of 
pardon or reprieve in the state except ‘where the prosecution shall have been carried on by the 
House of Delegates, or the law shall otherwise particularly direct: in which cases, no reprieve 
or pardon shall be granted, but by resolve of the House of Delegates’.92  These powers, 
however, did not furnish the governor with much influence or power within the state.  
The military was the only area in which the constitution equipped the governor with 
meaningful powers. The only remnant of the royal gubernatorial authority in this new 
republican form of government was the executive’s powers over the military: ‘The Governour 
may embody the militia, with the advice of the Privy Council, and, when embodied, shall alone 
have the direction of the militia under the laws of the country’.93 Even in this provision, 
however, there was a radical Country Whig tone to it: by placing a civilian at the head of the 
military, there was less chance of a military coup taking place. Clearly, with a conflict ongoing 
with the British, an effective military was extremely important to the Virginia Convention. 
Apart from a powerful executive, the Convention was also afraid that a powerful military leader 
could overrun the state and destroy the Commonwealth. They allowed the governor to have 
full military powers because they believed that keeping the military under civil control ensured 
the Commonwealth’s safety. The governor could not create a military dictatorship because he 
was kept on a very short leash by the legislative branch.  
During the period of royal government in Virginia, all governors had apparent control 
over the third branch of government, the judiciary. As with nearly every prerogative and power 
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previously enjoyed by the governor in colonial Virginia, the Constitution stripped away all 
gubernatorial influence over the legal system. Influenced greatly by Jefferson’s third draft, the 
Convention created a ‘Supreme Court of Appeals’, a ‘General Court, and separate courts of 
admiralty and chancery. The Convention rejected Jefferson’s proposal that the governor should 
appoint all judges. Instead, they decided to keep this prerogative within the legislative branch. 
All judges were to be appointed by a joint vote of the General Assembly.94 The Attorney-
General was also appointed by the legislature and all judges were impeachable by the House 
of Delegates. The governor could not exercise any influence over the judicial system in the 
new Commonwealth’s constitution. 
Thus, the separation of powers that was devised by Virginia was strongly influenced by 
a radical Country Whig belief which dictated that the executive and its potential influence over 
the other branches of government was the single greatest danger to the constitution. 
Independent Virginians ensured that the legislature assumed all the prerogatives and patronage 
typically at the disposal of a royal governor. This did not produce a strict separation of powers, 
but a fundamental radical Country Whig-inspired insulation of the constitution from any 
possible corrupting influence at the disposal of the executive. In The Federalist, James Madison 
encapsulated the problem with Virginia’s application of the ‘separation of powers’ principle: 
‘Yet we find not only this express exception, with respect to the members of the inferior courts; 
but that the chief magistrate, with his executive council, are appointable by the legislature … 
that all the principal officers, both executive and judiciary, are filled by the same department.’95  
IV 
Conclusion 
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The creation of a republican governor was obviously a difficult and problematic process in the 
first state constitution-making era of the early Republic. There was no definitive philosophical 
guide or historical precedent available on which to create a successful republican framework 
of government that could be guaranteed to be long lasting and effective. Virginians when they 
were reconstructing the gubernatorial office turned to and modified their shared Country Whig 
heritage. They proclaimed their belief in popular sovereignty, but denied the people a choice 
over who should become their governor. Although they maintained that they had adopted the 
‘separation of powers’ principle in their constitution, they ensured that the governor would be 
controlled by the legislative branch of government. In other words, the Virginians had modified 
their radical country Whig beliefs and created a gubernatorial model which they believed would 
lack the powers of patronage to endanger their newly established constitution. While they 
rejected the British constitution with its elements of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, 
they did rely on a British constitutional ideology, particularly a Country Whig ideology, which 
advised that the legislature should be the superior branch of government and that the executive 
should be considerably weakened. 
 The problem with adopting a new constitution based on such principles was that 
Virginia’s political system was about to come under enormous strain as the British invaded the 
state and threatened the collapse of republican government. In other words, it can be argued 
that the Virginia Convention was considerably short-sighted. Instead of contemplating what 
would ensure the defeat of the British and the safety of their state, it created a constitution 
which was dominated by a desire to reduce the influence which the executive could exert over 
the rest of the political system. In the next five years, Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson, as 
governors, struggled manfully to manage a state facing major crises when hampered by 
inadequate powers.  Fortunately, while the Constitution of 1776 established a weak executive 
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branch, thanks to the efforts of Henry and Jefferson the power and influence of the 







‘The Grave of all Useful Talents’1: Virginian Governorship and the Revolutionary War 
 
When Patrick Henry, the widely-popular orator and former colonel of the Virginian militia, 
was elected by the Virginian Convention as the first governor of the commonwealth of Virginia 
on 1 July 1776, there were certain factors which remained unchanged from the colonial period 
for the head of the executive branch. The Virginia Convention of 1776 granted the governor 
the same salary which his royal predecessors had received and he was also provided with an 
extra one thousand pounds to refurbish the old royal governor’s palace, which became the 
residence for the new state governor. Patrick Henry was to be addressed as ‘His Excellency’ 
and, it has been reported by one of his biographers, that the new governor took the unusual step 
of seldom appearing ‘on the streets of Williamsburg, and never without a scarlet cloak, black 
clothes and a dressed wig’.2 In outward appearances, at least, there was some continuity in the 
office of governorship from the royal colonial days in Virginia, this did not extend very far. 
When Patrick Henry eventually took up residence in the old royal governor’s palace in 
Williamsburg in the autumn of 1776, after a period of prolonged illness, he could be forgiven 
for wishing that he could have taken over more than the royal governor's dwelling, title and 
salary. Patrick Henry was perfectly aware of the ineffectual nature of the position before he 
became governor (he described it as ‘a mere phantom’ during the constitution debates), and he 
may have hoped during his three difficult years as governor of Virginia that he would gain 
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possession of some of the powers which his royal predecessors had enjoyed.3 In his first 
address, Patrick Henry expressed his gratitude to the Convention for electing him, but he 
lamented his ‘want of talents’ and claimed that he was ‘unequal to the duties of that important 
office’.4 In the coming months, he would come to lament the weakness of the office which he 
now occupied. 
Henry was not the only governor of Virginia in 1776: Lord Dunmore, the royally 
appointed governor, was still proving to be a menace on Gwyn's island.5 Both of these 
governors, however, did not govern as they were appointed. Dunmore still had his commission 
empowering him with apparent kingly powers, but had already fled from Williamsburg. Patrick 
Henry was too 'ill' to perform his duties and he spent the summer recuperating and his duties 
fell on the lieutenant-governor, John Page. In effect, during the summer of 1776, these two 
governors of Virginia did not govern at all because they could not perform their appointed 
duties. Henry’s faltering first few months as governor was an inauspicious start to Virginia's 
experiment with plural governorship and, through the successive administrations of Patrick 
Henry and Thomas Jefferson, Virginia’s executive branch proved to be inadequate as it was 
soon apparent that a strong executive was required in a time of war and uncertainty. 
In his chapter on the first three governors of Virginia – Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson 
and Thomas Nelson – Emory G. Evans has maintained that the first three governors, despite 
having limited prescribed powers and despite the fact that they governed during an uncertain 
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and difficult period of war, were effective holders of the executive powers of the state. He 
provides four key reasons for his claim: temporary and expedient extensions of their authority 
during wartime; their ability to maintain influence in order to keep the government functioning; 
their comprehension of the war in a broad perspective; and their own innate abilities and 
national experience. Indeed, Evans makes the bold claim that any assessment of the first three 
governors ‘must conclude that they did a remarkable job’ and that any historian who 
emphasises the weakness of the executive in Virginia during this period ‘misperceive[s] the 
situation in the context of the time’.6 Evans, however, seems to elevate the position of governor 
to a loftier position in the framework of government than was actually achieved and he makes 
an unwarrantable attempt at defending all three governors even when the evidence clearly 
points to another conclusion.7 
 This chapter does not seek to assess whether Patrick Henry or Thomas Jefferson were 
capable chief executives, nor does it attempt to exonerate their actions as governor or assess 
which governor achieved the better results, but it does seek to explain the system of 
governorship with which they had to contend. Rather than delving into minute detail over the 
actions of Henry and Jefferson while they were governor, it will provide examples from their 
respective administrations in order to explain and analyse the system of governorship in 
Virginia in this period. It also does not seek to provide an in-depth account of Virginian politics 
and society for the first five years of the war; rather it attempts to contextualise the actions of 
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Henry and Jefferson where it is appropriate to do so and to utilise the sources available to 
construct an accurate analysis of the system of governorship in this period.8 In doing so, this 
chapter will explore, first, the governors’ legislative election and the consequences this had on 
the system of governorship in this period. Second, it will assess the system of governorship in 
Virginia through an analysis of Patrick Henry’s governorship. Third, it will analyse Thomas 
Jefferson’s governorship during a period of crisis and invasion. This will include Jefferson’s 
‘flight’ from Monticello and the last days of his governorship and an assessment whether this 
event is indicative of the weak gubernatorial position in Virginia in this period. This chapter 
will seek to demonstrate that the system of governorship in Virginia, that was devised by the 
Virginia Convention in 1776, was inherently weak and woefully inadequate to confront an 
enemy which eventually invaded the state. It will also demonstrate, however, that the system 
of governorship did evolve over the period from 1776 to 1781 when it had to adapt to the 
changing and alarming circumstances which Virginia found itself combatting. While it does 
not intend to justify or vindicate the actions of Henry or Jefferson, it will demonstrate that, 
because of the nature of their appointment to the governorship and their natural ability to work 
within a difficult situation, the governorship in Virginia was able to evolve over this period. In 
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Library of Virginia, and the Journals of the Council, House of Delegates and the Senate have all been published. 
See OFLG of the State of Virginia, ed. H. R. McIlwaine, 3 vols. (Richmond: Davis Bottom, Superintendant of 
Public Printing, 1926). A calendar of the manuscript collection of letters and other documents received in the 
Governor’s Office of Virginia for the first six governors is available through the Library of Virginia’s catalogue 
and is searchable. This is available at <http://lva1.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/F/?func=file&file_name=find-b-
clas07&local_base=CLAS07>. Other useful resources for Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson are William Wirt 
Henry, Patrick Henry: Life, Correspondence and Speeches, 3 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1891); 
and Calendar of Virginia State Papers and other Manuscripts, 1652-1781, ed. Wm. P. Palmer (New York: Kealis 
Reprint Corporation, 1968). Thomas Jefferson’s edited correspondence is an outstanding resource for his 
governorship. See PTJ, volumes 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
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order for the governors to navigate the ship of state safely through the troubled waters in which 
it constantly found itself, they were able to accrue more temporary powers which helped them 
to act more decisively in their executive position.  
I 
Legislatively Elected: The State Governor as a Creature of the Legislature 
The Virginian Constitution of 1776 sought to ensure that the governor would be completely 
under the direct authority of the legislative branch of government. In the words of the 
Constitution itself, the governor ‘was to exercise the Executive powers of government 
according to the laws of this Commonwealth’.9 In other words, the head of the executive was 
essentially an administrator: implementing legislation passed by the legislative branch, and 
thus, carrying out the legislative branch’s bidding. Central to this legislative control over the 
governorship was the legislature’s election of the governor. The framework of government, 
devised in radical Country Whig terms, made the executive completely subordinate to the 
legislature because it rejected the notion that the chief magistrate should be popularly elected, 
but provided instead for a governor who would be elected for one-year terms by a joint vote of 
the two houses of the legislature. This form of election ensured that the governor could not 
build up a popular support base which might have made the governor more powerful than was 
originally intended. 
 Between 1776 and 1781, Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson were elected 
consecutively to the governorship. On 29 June 1776, after the Virginian Convention adopted 
the Constitution, its members elected Patrick Henry as governor by sixty votes to forty-five for 
Thomas Nelson, and a single vote for John Page. Henry did not put himself forward for office 
and did not canvass support for himself, as was the custom of the day. In 1777 and 1778, he 
                                                          
9 ‘Final Draft of the Virginian Constitution of 1776’, in The Papers of George Mason, I: 306. 
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was re-elected unopposed by a joint vote of the two houses of the legislature. After Henry had 
completed his maximum allowed three consecutive annual terms as governor in 1779, Thomas 
Jefferson achieved a much narrower electoral victory over his friends, Thomas Nelson and 
John Page. In a joint vote by the House of Delegates and the Senate, Jefferson was elected 
governor on 1 June 1779, eventually defeating John Page by 64 votes to 61 in the second ballot. 
It was taken to a second ballot, because none of the three candidates was able to win an overall 
majority in the first vote.  
The executive role performed by the governor was completely new territory for both 
men: neither had any executive experience, nor had they much military experience. Henry had 
been a colonel of a regiment of the Virginian milita, but had been overall commander for only 
six months, while, in 1770, Thomas Jefferson had been appointed lieutenant, with the rank of 
colonel, of the Albemarle County Militia, but this position mostly involved administrative and 
logistical tasks and he never served in the field. While Jefferson and Henry had no experience 
of performing the tasks required of the governor under the new constitution, they did not enter 
the governor’s palace as political novices. Although the nature of the gubernatorial election 
process meant that the man elected by the legislative branch almost inevitably came from the 
legislature with minimal executive, administrative or military experience, it does not 
necessarily follow that the man elected did not deserve the office. Indeed, one of the major 
contrasts with the nature of the appointment of their royal predecessors was that the election 
by the legislative branch ensured that the man chosen for the governorship would be selected 
more on merit rather than as a result of patronage. Both Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson 
had extremely impressive résumés prior to their first election as governor in 1776 and 1779 
respectively. Patrick Henry had served as a member of the House of Burgesses from 1765 to 
1774, was an early critic of British authority as is evident in his Stamp Act Resolves in 1765, 
was one of the six Virginian delegates to the First Continental Congress in Philadelphia in 1774 
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and, in 1775, the Virginia Convention had appointed him colonel of the 1st Virginia Regiment 
and overall commander of the Virginia militia. By 1776, Patrick Henry had helped write 
Virginia’s new constitution, its Declaration of Rights and a resolution to Congress proposing 
independence. Thus, Henry had been very active in the forefront of Virginia’s rebellion against 
Britain and he was a natural choice as first governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia. 
 While the election of Henry was a decision taken by the Virginian Convention, the 
members in the Convention undoubtedly elected him on the basis of his overwhelming 
popularity with the people. Patrick Henry, as is clear from the press of the day, was an 
overwhelmingly popular choice as governor.10 While there was considerable opposition to the 
election of Henry as governor within the legislature, especially given his often fiery 
temperament, which made some moderates in the assembly uncomfortable, his election must 
be seen as a way of validating the new constitution.11 Among the people, Henry had long been 
considered as one of the popular voices of rebellion in Virginia, from his Stamp Act Resolves 
to his denunciation in the Proclamation issued by Lord Dunmore.12 His resignation as overall 
commander of the Virginia militia in December 1775, in a fit of pique, sparked vociferous 
                                                          
10 For example a letter written by ‘An Honest Farmer’ lavished praise on Patrick Henry: ‘Virginia may truly boast, 
that in him she finds the able statesman, the soldier’s father, the best of citizens, and liberty’s dear friend. Clad 
with innocence, as in a coat of mail, he is proof against every serpentile [sic] whisper. The officers and soldiers, 
who know him, are riveted to his bosom: when he speaks, all is silence; when he orders, they cheerfully obey; and 
in the field under so sensible, so prudent an officer, though hosts oppose them, with shouts they meet their armed 
foe, the sure presages of victory and success. Let us, my fellow countrymen, with grateful hearts, remember that 
he carried off the standard of liberty, and defeated Grenville in his favourite Stamp Act.’ The Virginia Gazette 
(Purdue), 15 March 1776. 
11 Henry’s election to the governorship made some prominent Virginians uneasy. Francis Eppes wrote to his 
brother-in-law, Thomas Jefferson, and revealed his deep-seated animosity towards Henry: ‘You have heard no 
doubt before this that Patrick Henry is our Governour. What strange infatuation attends our Convention. At a time 
when men of known integrity and sound understanding are most necessary they are rejected and men of shallow 
understanding fill the most important posts in our country. What but inevitable ruin can be the consequence of 
this?’ Eppes to Jefferson, 3 July 1776, PTJ, I: 576. Thomas Jefferson, himself, was unimpressed by Henry’s 
legislative record. Writing in 1812, Jefferson remembered that ‘in ordinary business he was a very inefficient 
member. he could not draw a bill on the most simple subject which would bear legal criticism, or even the ordinary 
criticism which looks to correctness of stile & idea: for indeed there was no accuracy of idea in his head’. ‘Thomas 
Jefferson’s Notes on Patrick Henry [before 12 April 1812], The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Retirement Series, 
ed. J. Jefferson Looney, 11 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), IV: 601. 
12 Lord Dunmore castigated ‘a certain Patrick Henry ... and a number of deluded followers, [who] have taken up 
arms ... and put themselves in a posture of war .... All persons, upon their allegiance, not to aid, abet, or give 
countenance to the Said Patrick Henry’. ‘Proclamation’, The Virginia Gazette, 6 May 1775. 
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protests among his soldiers who threatened to resign. Patrick Henry resigned because the 
Virginian Convention failed to nominate him for the position of overall commander of the 
Virginian forces, giving the position instead to William Woodford. Henry gave back his 
commission and ‘retired’. His resignation provoked a massive protest among soldiers and 
citizenry alike. It was reported that his regiment went ‘into deep mourning’ and some feared 
mutiny was possible.13 It was only after Henry persuaded them to put country before personal 
loyalty that they agreed to continue to serve.  
Henry was venerated in Virginia and the legislature could not simply ignore his 
reputation. By electing a popular hero to be chief magistrate, moreover, very few Virginians 
could complain about the adopted constitution if that was an important result of its processes. 
There was very much a sense that the Virginian elite could not ignore the will of the people 
with regard to the constitution and in the choice of the chief magistrate. By electing a popular 
hero as governor, it increased support for the new form of government. Indeed, Michael 
McDonnell has claimed that the election of Henry was a way not only of validating the new 
constitution, but was also a way of removing Patrick Henry from of the House of Delegates 
and putting him in a position where he could not interfere with its legislative actions. The House 
of Delegates was well aware of the powerless and symbolic nature of the gubernatorial position, 
and by sidelining the ‘firebrand’ Henry, the House rendered him incapable of achieving very 
much. The Convention, moreover, elected known conservatives to the Council, which was an 
attempt to neutralise Henry even further. Since Henry had to execute his duties with the consent 
of the council, he would be outnumbered. Although McDonnell does not present any evidence 
to support this claim, it does seem plausible. The governorship, therefore, was regarded as a 
                                                          
13 See ‘An Address to Patrick Henry by the officers of the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Regiments and 
of the Minute Service’, Patrick Henry Papers, Virginia Historical Society; William Wirt Henry, Life, Speeches 
and Correspondence of Patrick Henry, I: 348-357; Richard Henry Lee to John Page, 19 March 1776, Letters of 
Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789, ed. Paul H. Smith, 25 vols. (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, 1976-
2000), III: 408;  and Michael A. McDonnell, The Politics of War, 181-183. 
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position of symbolic and ceremonial significance, but it was also a position of political 
insignificance.14 The election of Henry, therefore, is indicative of the legislature’s perception 
of that office: inherently weak, but ceremonially useful.  
 Thomas Jefferson’s substantial contribution to the American Revolution and his efforts 
to revise Virginia’s legal code post-1776 clearly marked him out to be the most obvious 
successor to Patrick Henry once the latter’s third and final term had ended. Thomas Jefferson, 
by 1779, had a substantial record of public service: a member of the House of Burgesses from 
1769, Jefferson wrote a set of resolutions for Virginia’s delegates to the First Continental 
Congress in 1774.15 He was elected as a delegate to the Second Continental Congress in 1775 
and was the principal author of the Declaration of Independence which was adopted by 
Congress on 4 July 1776. While he was clearly regarded as a prominent and skilled Patriot, his 
work in the Committee of Revisors during Patrick Henry’s three years as governor, moreover, 
essentially made him the principal legislator in the House of Delegates. Why elect such a 
prominent figure to the governorship when Henry had been elected in order to sideline him? 
The answer lies in the fact that the perception of the importance of the governorship to the 
political system had changed by 1779. Only a month before Jefferson’s election, Virginia was 
subjected to a British raid on the Virginian coast. The state was in danger and thus needed an 
able man even as its ceremonial head. The close electoral contest may also suggest that some 
delegates were unsure of Jefferson’s administrative and military experience. What is obvious 
about the choice of Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson was that they were better qualified in 
terms of political experience and abilities than the royal governors who had preceded them. 
They had an established reputation within Virginia before their appointment that no  royal 
governor ever possessed. 
                                                          
14 Michael A. McDonnell, The Politics of War, 243-4. 
15 This was later published as the The Summary View of the Rights of British America (1774). 
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The most ironical aspect of Henry’s and Jefferson’s relationship with the legislature is 
the fact that they achieved far more legislatively when they were not the head of state in 
Virginia. During Patrick Henry’s three years as governor, Thomas Jefferson led a Committee 
of Revisors charged with redrafting Virginia’s legal code. Jefferson drafted over a hundred 
bills with the clear intention of reforming the state’s constitution and legal system. He worked 
tirelessly at drafting legislation, including the abolition of primogeniture and entail, the revising 
of the penal code and proposals for a system of education. While he was not always successful 
with these legislative bills, his work in this Committee is indicative of Jefferson’s skill as a 
legislator. In other words, Jefferson in these three years acted almost as a modern parliamentary 
executive. In the same way, after Patrick Henry left the governorship, he was re-elected to the 
House of Delegates where he busied himself in debating new currency initiatives and the House 
appointed him chairman of the Committee of Propositions and Grievances and of the Courts 
of Justice. Both Jefferson and Henry, therefore, had successful legislative careers when not 
governors during the early years of the Commonwealth. As governors, they did not come close 
to achieving what they, as legislators, accomplished in the House of Delegates. 
 The governor of Virginia between 1776 and 1781 had a frustrating relationship with 
the legislative branch of government. Both Henry and Jefferson were not shy of venting their 
frustration at the general powerlessness of their position and the perceived ineptitude of the 
House of Delegates. Clearly, one of the consequences of the gubernatorial election by the 
legislature was the fact that the governor would always be inferior in status and power to the 
legislature, but this legislative election also had some unforeseen consequences. Although the 
gubernatorial position was in itself a weak position, the nature of the legislative election of the 
governor and, most especially, the choice of men with extensive legislative experience for the 
governorship position, had a significant impact on the power that the governor enjoyed and on 
the nature of the relationship between the head of the executive and the legislative branches. 
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While it is obvious that the executive was innately weak because of the way the governor was 
controlled by the legislative branch, their legislative experience and their existing relationship 
with the legislators meant that both Henry and Jefferson could exert a modicum of influence 
over the actions of the House of Delegates.  
While it was not in their constitutional remit to interfere with legislative activity in the 
House in any way, both Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson felt compelled to do so. At the 
beginning of each legislative session, Patrick Henry wrote a letter to the House, stating ‘several 
matters for the consideration of the General Assembly’, which were dutifully considered by 
the delegates.16 Because of his close personal relationship with those in the House, Henry was 
able to exert some influence within it. On 13 May 1778, Henry, with the advice of the Council, 
sent eighteen points of discussion concerning the state of existing legislation, including Henry’s 
tentative suggestions where and how the House could improve the situation in Virginia.17 
Because of Henry’s experience in the legislature prior to the new constitution and because of 
the fact that the composition of the House of Delegates was essentially the same as the colonial 
House of Burgesses, Henry was able to use his personal contacts with key legislators to make 
his life as governor more tolerable. Plainly all his suggestions were not heeded, but he did make 
useful contributions to the discussions in the House, which resulted in certain changes. For 
example, in a letter to the House of Burgesses in 1778, Henry inquired whether the Assembly 
should create a Board of Trade to alleviate some of the difficulties the governor and council 
had to endure.18 This provision was included in Jefferson’s reorganisation of the state 
administration in the spring of 1779. By this time, because the volume of military and trade 
affairs had grown too burdensome for the governor and council, as Patrick Henry himself made 
clear, a Board of Trade and a Board of War were established. While it is debatable whether the 
                                                          
16 See, for example, ‘From the Journal of the House of Delegates’, 12 May 1777, OFLG,  I: 148,  
17 Patrick Henry to the Speaker of the House of Delegates, Benjamin Harrison, 13 May 1778, ibid., I: 270-3. 
18 ‘Fragment of a Communication from Patrick Henry to the General Assembly, 14 October 1778, ibid., I: 314. 
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increase in bureaucracy changed a great deal for the executive branch, there can be little doubt 
that Henry’s fingerprints can be found on the legislation which created these administrative 
bodies.  
In a similar manner, Thomas Jefferson made repeated suggestions to the House of 
Delegates during his two years as governor.  While Jefferson was usually careful that the 
‘Executive … do[es] not intermeddle’ in the ‘determination of the Legislature’, he was not 
above offering solutions to numerous problems while he was governor.19 In May 1781, he 
wrote to the Speaker of the House of Delegates to report not only on the military situation, but 
also tacitly offered advice on how to improve the state’s defences. He had become entangled 
in a disagreement with General Greene over the impressment of horses and over the apparent 
abuses committed by officers executing the impress. Greene, frustrated with the exercise of 
civil control over the state’s militia, stressed that ‘civil polity must accommodate itself to the 
emergencys [sic] of the war, or the people submit to the power of the enemy’. If the legislature 
was to accede to Jefferson’s suggestions, it would imply, according to Greene, that the 
government believed that ‘Horses are dearer to the Inhabitants than the lives of Subjects or the 
Liberties of the People’.20 Jefferson passed on his own and Greene’s letters on the subject to 
the legislature and deferentially advocated continuing with the impressment, but specified that 
the legislature should make some sort of compensation to the people affected by the 
impressment.21 The House amended its practices as Jefferson had hoped and stipulated that the 
impressment should continue, but the government should pay for the horses not yet returned to 
their masters. Jefferson, rather than remaining an essentially weak executive, manipulated his 
position as a skilled legislator in order to turn his essentially weak executive position into one 
                                                          
19 See, for example, Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Harrison, 2 October 1779, ibid., II: 47; Thomas Jefferson to 
Benjamin Harrison, 30 October 1779, ibid., II: 51; Thomas Jefferson to Richard Claiborne, 17 February 1781, 
ibid., II: 354; Thomas Jefferson to Richard Henry Lee, 3 March 1781, ibid., II: 384; and Thomas Jefferson to the 
Speaker of the House of Delegates, 9 March 1781, ibid., II: 395. 
20 Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, 28 April 1781, PTJ, 5: 568. 
21 Thomas Jefferson to the Speaker of the House of Delegates, 10 May 1781, OFLG, II: 512. 
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of greater strength. This does not mean he was necessarily a dominant or strong executive, but 
it is indicative of what a governor could do given his close personal ties to certain members in 
the legislative branch. It cannot be denied that both Henry and Jefferson were able to use their 
political skills and their close relations with key legislators in order to have some input into the 
legislative activity of the House of Delegates. This was as a direct result of the nature of the 
legislative election of the governors. While they contributed to the discussion of future 
legislation, there can be no doubt that, in their duties, both governors had to struggle manfully 
to exert any control over the legislature during what became a deteriorating and pressured 
situation. 
II 
Governor Henry and the prosecution of the War 1776-1779: The problem with plural 
governorship in wartime conditions 
The Virginian Constitution of 1776 ensured legislative supremacy and the emasculation of the 
governorship. It was a political framework which may have seemed workable in theory, but 
the practical weaknesses within this framework were exacerbated during a time of conflict, 
invasion and political upheaval. John Page, the lieutenant-governor in 1776, who performed 
all executive duties during Henry’s illness, encapsulated the problem facing the newly-
appointed state governor: 
From the dispersed situation of our troops, the number of navigable rivers, exposing our country to 
the ravages of the enemy’s fleet, the great demand of men and arms on our frontiers, on account of 
the Indian war, and from the present state of General Clinton’s army near Charlestown, which we 
conceive might be employed to a greater advantage here, we have reason to apprehend an invasion, 
and have therefore ordered a number of minute-men and militia into duty, to supply the want of our 
two regiments ordered to the Jerseys.22 
 
                                                          
22 John Page to John Hancock, President of Congress, 3 August 1776, OFLG, I: 24. 
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Henry was facing threats from Native Americans on the western frontier, the internal threat of 
a slave rebellion, and Dunmore’s menacing forces on the eastern coastline, and there was a 
constant fear that the British could overrun the state.  Because of this difficult situation, this 
section will focus purely on the actions of Henry and how well he coped with the pressures of 
organising the war effort against the British. 
The main responsibilities of the governorship in this period were inextricably linked 
with the direction of the military in Virginia. In reality, this was the only realm of responsibility 
in which the Constitution furnished the governor with any meaningful powers: ‘The Governour 
may embody the militia, with the advice of the Privy Council; and, when embodied, shall alone 
have the direction of the militia under the laws of the country’.23 How did Henry, with his 
Council of eight men, embody the militia?  Essentially his responsibilities involved recruiting 
sufficient troops for the state militia and for the Continental army, ensuring that all these troops 
were adequately supplied with equipment and provisions, and readying both land and naval 
forces for the defence of the state. It needs to be emphasised that where the constitution states 
that the governor and his council were in sole charge of the militia, it precisely meant that they 
‘alone’ were in charge. They were responsible for managing the entire Virginian war effort and 
for the supply of troops, provisions and equipment to the Continental army. Jefferson’s 
description of the governor as an ‘administrator’ in his draft of the Virginian Constitution took 
on a new meaning in practice. The governor and council, with the help of a handful of clerks, 
shouldered a significant administrative burden for they had to deal with all the paperwork in 
order to manage Virginia’s war effort. Patrick Henry complained that ‘As usual I am in a great 
hurry ... I am  really so harassed by the great load of Continental business thrown on me lately, 
                                                          
23 ‘Final Draft of the Virginia Constitution of 1776’, in Papers of George Mason, I: 307. In Jefferson’s proposed 
draft of the Constitution, he granted the governor appointing powers in the military, but did not grant the governor 
the power of command, see ‘Jefferson’s drafts of the Virginian Constitution’, in PTJ, I: 329-386,  and Jeremy D. 
Bailey, Jefferson and Executive Power, 45. 
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that I am ready to sink under my burden, & have thoughts of taking that rest that will I doubt 
soon become necessary. For my strength will not suffice’.24 Although the legislature attempted 
to alleviate the pressures on the governor and council in this period by creating new 
administrative bodies, such as the Board of War and the Board of Trade in 1779, historians 
have generally agreed that they only created more trouble for the state governor. While both 
bodies were established to coordinate all day-to-day trade and military activities, tasks which 
were supposed to lighten the load for the executive branch, they had to clear all actions with 
the executive making them less effective and saddling the executive branch with more 
bureaucratic tasks.25 Unlike previous royal governors, the new state governor could not 
delegate his responsibilities. The Virginian state governor at times appeared nothing more than 
a glorified clerk because his day-to-day activities were consumed with routine administrative 
duties. On any given day, Henry had to review invoices for expenditures made by a number of 
officers requiring equipment, review pay for soldiers, provide written authorisation for 
delivering supplies to trading partners, attend council meetings, draft letters, proclamations and 
orders which were issued from the council, and receive visitors with complaints or requests. 
These tedious tasks involved a substantial amount of paperwork and consumed energy and 
time. Henry was soon to lament, ‘From morning till night I have not a minute from business, I 
wish it may all [be] do[ne], for there are a thousand things to mend, to begin’.26 
In much the same way as royal governors had struggled with prescriptive royal 
instructions, newly-elected state governors found it difficult to work under similar prescribed 
constitutional restraints. Facing a situation which required not only more emergency powers, 
but greater flexibility, Patrick Henry struggled to exercise much authority. Virtually all 
government action depended upon prior legislative approval, and Henry walked a metaphorical 
                                                          
24 Patrick Henry to Richard Henry Lee, 7 April 1778, OFLG, I: 260-1. 
25 Emory G. Evans, ‘Executive Leadership in Virginia’, 203. 
26 Patrick Henry Lee, 9 January 1777, OFLG, I: 90. 
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tightrope during his three consecutive terms as governor. Unlike the majority of royal 
governors, however, Henry was not prepared simply to ignore his constitutional constraints to 
make his life as governor easier. Instead, he endeavoured to be a strict constructionist, 
respectful of legislative supremacy where possible and sensible of the limits of his authority as 
an executive. Henry was well aware of the constitutional constraints on his authority and the 
widespread apprehension about the dangers of a powerful executive.27 By the same token, 
however, he was equally protective of the few prerogative powers which he did have at his 
disposal. For example, in July 1777, Henry denounced the actions made by Brigadier General 
Edward Hand, who informed Henry that he was going to call up the western militia. Henry, 
clearly frustrated by this usurpation of his constitutional powers, described this action as 
‘officious intermeddling’ and reminded Hand that the militia were under the ‘sole Direction of 
the Governour’.28 
Between 1776 and 1779, Henry and his Council were tasked with the recruitment of 
troops both for the Virginian militia and the Continental Army. In the autumn of 1776, 
Congress requested Virginia to provide fifteen of the eighty-eight battalions of the Continental 
Army; there were already nine Virginian battalions in service. In December 1776, Henry was 
empowered ‘to carry into execution such requisitions as may be made for this Commonwealth 
by the American Congress for the purpose of encountering or repelling the enemy’. The 
governor and council could replace officers who were unsuccessful in enlisting recruits, and 
offer bounties in money and land as incentives for enlisting.29 Henry quickly discovered that 
                                                          
27 This was the same for Thomas Jefferson. He had to remind General Nathanael Greene that ‘tedious as is the 
operation of reasoning with every individual on whom we are obliged to exercise disagreeable powers, yet free 
people think they have a right to explanation of circumstances which give rise to the necessity under which they 
suffer’. Thomas Jefferson to Nathanael Greene, 5 April 1781, ibid., II: 456. 
28 Henry to Edward Hand, 3 July 1777, ibid., I: 167-8; Henry to Edward Hand, 7 July 1777, ibid., I: 170-1. 
29 ‘From Journal of the House of Delegates’, 21 December 1776, OFLG, I: 82-3; and The Statutes at Large; Being 
a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia, From the First Session of the Legislature, in the Year 1619, ed. William 
Waller Hening, 13 vols. (New York, Philadelphia, and Richmond, Va.: Published For the Editor, by George 
Cochran, 1819-1823), IX: 178, 179-84, 192-198. 
161 
 
this was a near impossible and thankless task. According to the records of the Continental 
Army, Virginian enlistment in the Continental forces was fell far short of what was required: 
between 1776 and 1780, the Virginian First Regiment shrank from 590 men to a pitiful 195. 
Virginia did not come close to the stipulated quotas expected of it since the state only raised 
between 40 to 45 per cent of its allotment.30 Henry was increasingly exasperated by the lack of 
support shown by the majority of Virginians when it came to enlisting in the army. Henry, 
reflecting on his own troubles with troop enlistment, wrote to his successor: ‘Tell me do you 
remember any Instance, where Tyranny was destroyed and Freedom established on its Ruin 
among a people possessing so small a Share of the Virtue and public Spirit? I recollect none; 
and this more than the British Arms, makes me fearfull of our final Success’.31  
 On the one hand, state governors during the war lacked the requisite powers and 
authority to raise the required number of troops necessary for the defence of Virginia and for 
the needs of the Continental Army. Patrick Henry complained that his executive powers were 
‘too much cramped’, and lamented his lack of influence with the local militia officers in the 
state.32 The governor in Virginia in this period did not possess much influence at the local level. 
Local militia officials possessed a great deal of autonomy and control over the administration 
of state laws. If they did not want to enforce conscription or punish misbehaving militiamen, 
which repeatedly happened, they could simply resign their commissions or refuse to prosecute 
as ordered. As McDonnell has shown, court-martialling these officers was pointless because 
local courts were usually comprised of neighbours or colleagues.33 Gubernatorial influence to 
enforce legislation was practically non-existent at the county level. Henry’s irritation about his 
lack of influence is obvious: ‘I am sorry to observe a remissness among the officers, over whom 
                                                          
30 The Sinews of Independence: Monthly Strength Reports of the Continental Army, ed. Charles H. Lessler 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 33; and John Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 131. 
31 Patrick Henry to Thomas Jefferson, 15 February 1780, Papers of Jefferson, III: 293-4. 
32 Patrick Henry to Richard Henry Lee, 7 April 1778, ibid., I: 160-1. 
33 Michael McDonnell, Politics of War, 300. 
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the executive of this country can exercise no command in the opinion of most people. Indeed 
they have a general want of necessarys [sic] to struggle with. But they do not in general exert 
themselves as they ought’.34 The executive had to rely on citizens to ‘become a militia of 
freemen’ and had to rely on the compliance of local officials, which was never going to be 
easy. 
 The ability of the governor in this period to maintain an effective military response and 
to increase the number of troops enlisting was not helped by a legislative branch which was 
infrequently in session and, when it was, it passed laws which were generally ineffective. All 
legislation passed by the House of Delegates did not produce the desired results and they failed 
to produce a workable strategy in order to increase enlistment. The House’s original plan was 
to offer bounties in the hope that this would encourage Virginians to volunteer. By June 1777, 
this strategy had clearly failed, and the House legislated for a partial draft to fill six battalions. 
This system of enlistment, which required each county militia to put forward one man to a 
separate division, fell short of expectations. A second scheme was attempted, which dictated 
that officers and justices of the peace themselves were to pick the required men to be drafted. 
By the autumn of that same year, because this partial draft strategy failed, the House of 
Delegates passed a law to draft 2000 men using a quota system. This law was to prove 
immensely unpopular and did not produce the desired results. The legislature then resorted to 
offering extortionate bounties which placed a heavy tax burden on the state. Legislators were 
generally unwilling to take the necessary steps to bolster troop enlistment and were particularly 
afraid of instituting a state-wide draft policy. The legislative branch was evidently apprehensive 
about upsetting its constituents and, according to Edmund Pendleton, ‘Drafting in any Shape 
is so unpopular a measure, that our Assembly have laid it aside’.35  
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The major problem with depending upon the legislative assembly to produce adequate 
legislation for the effective prosecution of the war was that legislators were often divided over 
the right strategy to achieve the required results. For example, in November 1777, there was 
little agreement in the chamber on how to raise more troops. Some delegates favoured another 
draft, others, mindful of the previous uproar, suggested that they should target ‘vagabonds’ as 
potential recruits. A ‘middle way’ was agreed upon whereby a draft would be instituted through 
a fair lottery of ‘single men’. The legislature’s inconsistent strategy was fundamentally flawed: 
those Virginians that were expected by the government to serve in the militia were either 
subsistence farmers or labourers and they found it impossible to leave their homes, families 
and places of work. Moreover, the wealthier Virginians who owned property or paid taxes on 
more than three slaves were exempt from serving in the militia. Thus, the Virginians who were 
expected to serve were unable to comply and those who probably could have served were not 
called upon to do so.36 While Washington, Congress and other Continental leaders wanted 
soldiers for the long term, the House of Delegates diluted its draft legislation by making a 
draftee’s term of service last for only one year. Governor Henry was hampered by ineffectual, 
compromised and inefficient legislation passed by a body which was often divided within itself. 
One contemporary agreed that the General Assembly ‘go very slowly, and entangle themselves 
at every step’.37 Any suggestions, moreover, made by George Washington to Henry to increase 
troop numbers were simply forwarded to the House for consideration.38 The governor lacked 
the autonomy and authority to act on these policy suggestions himself. Henry found it 
particularly frustrating that the decision making of the House of Delegates was so ineffective.  
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It has to be recognised, however, that even if the general assembly had passed the 
requisite laws, we cannot presume that more troops would have been recruited. Support for the 
war effort in Virginia seemed particularly unenthusiastic in the early years of the conflict, and 
the number of enlisted men increased in 1780 and 1781 only because Virginia was actually 
invaded. The 1777 draft law, which one contemporary described as ‘generally execrated’, 
caused much disaffection, bordering on ‘insurrection’.39 The longer the war lasted, the more 
unpopular it became: the burden of the war effort, in terms of taxes,  inflation, and food and 
manpower shortages, caused considerable consternation among ordinary Virginians.40  With 
so many white Virginians reluctant to serve, the Virginian elite even turned to the lowest classes 
in the state, even enslaved men, to serve in the army.41 Despite offering attractive and sizeable 
bounties, there was a general reluctance in Virginia to volunteer. Richard Henry Lee believed 
that instituting a draft was the only solution to make ‘our lazy, worthless young men’ come 
forward and serve their country.42 The mobilisation of troops in a republic was therefore a 
considerable challenge for a governor with few meaningful powers. 
Henry found it challenging to balance the competing military demands from the 
Continental Congress and from his own state legislature. The governor of Virginia was caught 
in a conflict of interest between meeting the needs of the defence of his home state and 
complying with the wider demands of the nation.43 The system of governorship in Virginia 
meant that the executive had to contend not only with legislative supremacy, but also with 
issues to do with state and national sovereignty. There was a problematic dynamic between 
governor and legislative body in this period: when the governor tried to exert his authority over 
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the militia, he often challenged the supremacy of the legislature. Because of the demands made 
on the executive in this period, whether it was directing the militia or supplying the Continental 
Army, the governor often had to contend with an intransigent legislature. Although the 
governor was apparently ‘in sole charge’ of the militia, it was never that simple. Patrick Henry 
often had his executive decisions questioned by the elected representatives and some of his 
orders were even overturned.  
In 1776, Henry’s ability to defend the state was hampered by direct interference from 
the House of Delegates. The main theatre of war was located in the northern states between 
1776 and 1778. In the summer of 1776, General William Howe’s British army of 32,000 men 
arrived on Staten Island, New York, and it was assisted by a naval force numbering seventy-
three ships under the command of Admiral Richard Howe, William’s older brother. In order to 
counter the British campaign in the North, the Continental Congress pressed the various state 
governments to assist the cause by sending men and munitions. They requested two of the 
recently created Continental regiments in Virginia to be sent to join the main army. John Page 
(who was acting governor at the time) and the Council reluctantly agreed. Virginians were 
particularly worried that Virginia was still under threat from Dunmore’s forces and concerned 
about ongoing attacks from Native Americans on the western frontier. Their fears were 
exacerbated when General Howe’s forces moved to attack New York in September. Congress, 
desperately seeking to halt the British advance, ordered the remaining three Continental 
regiments from Virginia to be sent north. Henry and the Council reluctantly agreed to this 
demand, but they believed that the absence of the Continental troops meant that Virginia and, 
in particular, the capital, Williamsburg, was vulnerable to attack. In order to increase their 
defence forces, Henry and the Council called up 1300 local militiamen to bolster the defences 
of the ‘present naked and defenceless situation of this Country [Virginia]’. While 
contemporaries questioned Henry’s alarmist response, especially when the British army was 
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based in the north, the governor’s measure was a sensible one. There were rumours that 
Dunmore was preparing to attack Virginia again and the executive branch was starved of 
reliable intelligence concerning the whereabouts of all of the British forces. Henry and the 
Council acted within their constitutional authority, but the House of Delegates, once it 
reconvened on 7 October, censured the governor for wasting unnecessary resources, and 
rescinded Henry’s order. Although in hindsight, Henry was wrong to believe that Virginia was 
vulnerable to a British invasion at this time, he did not have the benefit of hindsight. 
In the invasion scare of 1777, the Delegates repeatedly questioned the governor’s 
judgments. By August 1777, General Howe, after he had failed to reach Philadelphia by 
marching through New Jersey, moved his forces by sea up the Chesapeake Bay. Word spread 
to Williamsburg that the British fleet had been spotted off the Virginian coast on 14 August, 
which understandably spread panic. Patrick Henry, who had been convalescing in Hanover 
County that week, speedily returned to Williamsburg and ordered Thomas Nelson, a Brigadier 
General, to mobilise troops and prepare the state’s defences. When Howe reached Maryland, 
it became evident to Henry and the government that Howe’s plan was to attack Philadelphia, 
not Virginia. Henry and the Council sent a third of the Northern Neck militia to Maryland to 
assist Washington. The records of the Journal of the House of Delegates make it  clear that 
delegates questioned the propriety of the governor’s decision to send the militia out of the state 
in order to aid Washington, the Council’s order to remove all suspicious persons from coastal 
areas and even whether Henry had acted constitutionally in taking decisions without legislative 
consent.44 Unfortunately, the actual debates were not recorded and all that is left to us are the 
questions debated and the decisions made. Eventually, a committee of the House resolved that 
the governor and council ‘acted according to the laws of this Commonwealth’.45 Such was the 
                                                          




heated nature of this controversy, however, that the Delegates believed it necessary to publish 
their decision in the Virginia Gazette.46 Henry was clearly irritated that his decisions, which 
were made in a pressurised situation, were being scrutinised retrospectively and he vented his 
fury to his friend, Richard Henry Lee: ‘Time will not permit the discussion of many matters 
that wait, & have long waited for a decision. Can you think it? Not one law of importance is 
passed.’47 Henry evidently had no real confidence in the legislature and in his fellow public 
servants. He even confessed to Washington that in Virginia, ‘most people seem at a loss to fix 
on the most effectual means of prosecuting the war vigorously’.48 
At the same time, dealing with the central authority, the Continental Congress, was also 
troublesome for the state governor. In the first place, Henry was little more than an intermediary 
between Congress and the legislative assembly. In this period, Congress sent a substantial 
amount of correspondence on financial and other administrative matters to the governor. While 
these missives were sent to the governor, they were actually intended for the legislative 
assembly. Letters concerning taxes, loans and army numbers were passed on to the general 
assembly by the governor. Although the governor was nominally the head of state, he did not 
have any control over the financial policy of the state and he had no influence or authority over 
the treasurer. The office of governor represented nothing more than a ‘pipe of communication 
to the sentiments of others’.49 Congress also periodically sent resolutions to the governor, 
asking what the state had done ‘in consequence of their recommendations’.  
In the winter of 1777-8, when Washington was camped at Valley Forge, Patrick Henry 
became exasperated at the poor administrative efforts of Congress to supply the Continental 
forces. He was inundated with letters from George Washington who, on one occasion, notified 
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Henry that ‘for several days past we have experienced little less than a famine in camp, and 
have had much cause to dread a general mutiny and dispersion’.50 Henry believed that it would 
be ‘unworthy [of] the character of a Zealous American to entrench himself within the strict line 
of Official duty, and there quietly behold the staring and dispersion of the American Army’. 
He begged the Virginian delegates to Congress to make Congress aware of the ‘Sentiments of 
the Executive Body of this State’. For Henry, ‘It is with the deepest Concern that the Business 
of Supplying Provisions for the grand army, is seen to fall into a State of uncertainty & 
Confusion’. He earnestly pointed out that ‘the Executive power here has nothing to do with the 
Commissary’s business’ and ‘that it holds itself guiltless of all the mischiefs which in future 
may arise from the Delinquency in that office’. Henry exonerated the efforts made by himself 
and his Council to supply the Continental Army and blamed the poor management of 
Congress.51 The problem with the system of governorship in this period was dependence: the 
governor was forced to depend on the assembly for effective legislation and it was, in turn, 
forced to depend on Congress and the Continental Army. Conversely, Congress and 
Washington depended upon a state governor who was effectively powerless to assist in their 
endeavours and the general assembly depended upon a weak state governor to prosecute the 
war effort in Virginia. This system of dependence augured ill in a time of war and confusion. 
The above has shown that Patrick Henry struggled to increase troop numbers, laboured 
to meet the competing demands made by the Continental Congress and legislative assembly, 
and suffered under an immense administrative burden. Henry’s governorship did evolve over 
this period, however. Because of the perceived ineffectiveness of the gubernatorial position in 
the political framework, the legislature felt compelled to increase the powers of the executive 
from time to time. In 1777, when the Virginian government received news from the north that 
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the military front had collapsed and that Congress had fled from Philadelphia to Baltimore, it 
believed that its own state was in danger of being invaded.  It therefore temporarily increased 
the powers that Patrick Henry enjoyed in order to repel any future enemy advance. The 
Virginian Senate agreed to proposals drawn up by George Mason that ‘additional powers be 
given to the Governour and Council’ in order to ‘carry into Execution Such Requisitions as 
may be made to this Common-Wealth by the American Congress, for the purpose of 
encountering or repelling the Enemie [sic]’.52 Mason believed that, because of ‘the present 
imminent Danger’, ‘the usual forms of Government shou’d be suspended, during a limited 
time’ so that the State could be preserved. He also added that ‘this Departure from the 
Constitution of Government, being in this Instance founded only on the most evident & urgent 
Necessity ought not hereafter to be drawn into Precedent’.53  Patrick Henry, with the advice 
and consent of the Council, was given free rein to exercise broad powers for a limited time. 
They were authorised to raise whatever number of troops was required and were allowed to 
send them wherever the governor wished during the legislative recess from December 1776 to 
May 1777.54 These new powers were not meant to be permanent, but some of the provisions 
were extended in each new session of the assembly.55 
 Although Henry gained some extra powers during his three terms as governor, he was 
still powerless to prevent a British expedition raiding the Virginia coast in early May 1779. A 
British force consisting of 28 ships under the command of Commodore Sir George Collier and 
1800 soldiers, commanded by Major General Edward Matthew, caused substantial damage to 
Virginian coastal towns. This small expedition was designed to distract the Americans in the 
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south in order that the main British army, commanded by Sir Henry Clinton, could surprise 
Washington, who was camped near New York. In the space of two weeks, the occupying force 
plundered plantations, destroyed thousands of barrels of tobacco, burned supply stores and 
occupied numerous ports and even the coastal towns of Portsmouth and Norfolk. This was 
accomplished with the loss of only two men. Collier believed that the expedition was 
remarkably successful and he hoped that the British would set up a permanent base on the 
Virginian coast.56 He was, however, recalled after two weeks to join up with Clinton’s army in 
New York and the British expedition ended up being nothing more than a raid. 
This raid, however, sent ripples of fear throughout Virginia and many Virginians 
assumed it was only a matter of time before the British advanced on Williamsburg and 
Yorktown. When news arrived of the invasion, the House of Delegates, believing that ‘there is 
reason to apprehend an invasion from the enemy on this Commonwealth’, instructed Henry to 
mobilise a force to defend Virginia.57 At first, Henry could not ascertain the real intentions of 
the enemy and only issued a limited call-up of local militia on 8 May as soon as news reached 
him of the British invasion. In his letter to Governor Johnson of Maryland on 12 May 1779, 
Henry revealed his lack of accurate intelligence: ‘The number of Men landed by the Enemy on 
this occasion cannot be ascertained. The reports say from 1300 to 1600 … It still remains 
uncertain whether they mean [to] take any permanent footing in this State’.58 On 14 May, Henry 
finally ordered a full mobilisation of the Virginia militia. Henry’s lethargic response to the 
invasion resulted in severe reproaches from his contemporaries. In a veiled rebuke of Henry’s 
governorship, the House of Delegates summoned Theodrick Bland’s non-Virginian 
Continental dragoons to assist in defending the state. Clearly, Henry misread the extent of the 
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danger posed by the British, but even if he had ordered a full mobilisation of troops 
immediately, it would have made little difference. Most of Virginia’s soldiers were serving in 
the Continental Army in the Carolinas and it is doubtful whether the remaining troops could 
have thwarted the British advance. In the last months of Henry’s governorship, Virginia’s 
vulnerability was clear to see. The state could not prevent a small British expedition from 
wreaking havoc in Virginia and in the years to come they could not prevent a stronger force 
laying waste to the capital and forcing the Virginian government to flee. 
III 
The British Invasion: Thomas Jefferson and the governorship during a crisis 
Patrick Henry faced many difficulties during his three successive annual terms as governor and 
he struggled to manage the affairs of the state. In truth, the situation with which Henry had to 
contend was not as bleak as the one facing Thomas Jefferson when he ascended to the executive 
chair in 1779. Virginia had already been invaded in that year, inflation was rampant, the 
taxation system was creaking under the strain, and British forces had embarked on a southern 
strategy which imperilled the future of Virginia. Jefferson has faced considerable personal 
criticism from his contemporaries and from later historians for his apparent ‘failure’ as 
governor. Jefferson blamed his difficulties on the few powers he had at his disposal rather than 
on his personal abilities as an executive. This section focuses on how effective governorship in 
Virginia was when it faced an enemy invasion. 
 The American victory at Saratoga in 1777 and the subsequent alliance with France, 
ensured that the British had to change their strategy. Facing a global conflict with France, the 
British decided to concentrate their efforts on recruiting loyalists to build support in America. 
The British believed most loyalists resided in the southern part of America, and they still 
assumed that they could enlist slaves into their army. The southern strategy was predicted by 
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George Washington and he was well aware of the inherent military weakness of the southern 
states. Writing to Gouverneur Morris, on 8 May 1779, Washington maintained that it would be 
pointless to wage more battles in the north: ‘The relief of the S[outhern] S[tates] appears to me 
an object of the greatest magnitude and what may lead to still more important advantages. I 
feel infinite anxiety on their account; their internal weakness, disaffection, the want of energy, 
the general languor that has seized the people at large makes me apprehend the most serious 
consequences; it would seem too, as if the enemy meant to transfer the principal weight of the 
war that way’.59 Washington was right to feel anxious about the state of preparedness of the 
southern defences.60 The British won some important military victories in the south: they 
occupied Savannah, Georgia, in 1778 and Charleston, South Carolina, in May 1779.  Apart 
from a two-week British expedition in May 1779, Virginia had so far been largely spared 
British attacks during the war. This was not to continue. Virginia endured two invasions, in 
1780 and 1781, respectively which severely tested the Virginian governor’s capabilities.  
A year after Collier had urged Clinton to establish a permanent base on the Virginian 
coast, Clinton finally agreed that a permanent British presence in Virginia would be 
advantageous to the British. By occupying Norfolk or Portsmouth, the British would be in a 
position to disrupt the American supply route from the north to the Continental Army in the 
Carolinas. On 21 October 1780, six British ships carrying 2200 men landed at Portsmouth. 
They were commanded by General Alexander Leslie who was ordered to establish and fortify 
                                                          
59 George Washington to Gouverneur Morris, 8 May 1779, George Washington Papers, Library of Congress.  
60 Washington was not only worried about southern defences, but was also concerned about the powers at the 
disposal of Congress. He makes this clear in a letter to his friend, William Fitzhugh ‘I as little scruple to add that, 
unless the powers of Congress are made competent to all the purposes of War we are doing no more than wasting 
our time, and spending our treasure to very little purpose for it is impossible to apply the strength and resources 
of this Country while one State complies with, another rejects, and the majority of them changes or mutilates the 
requisitions of that Body. Hence the willing States are capitally injured if not ruined. Hence proceed distrust, 
jealously, and dissatisfaction; and the impossibility of either projecting or executing (with certainty) any plan 
whatsoever. Hence proceed all those delays, which to people at a distance, and unacquainted with circumstances, 
are altogether unaccountable. And hence it is we incur useless expence, because we do not bring our force, and 
means, into operation at the same time, some being exhausted, before others are obtained.’ George Washington 
to William Fitzhugh, George Washington Papers, Library of Congress. 
173 
 
a permanent British base on the Virginian coast. The British troops successively captured 
Norfolk and Portsmouth and thus ensured that the supply route from the North to the 
Continental Army in the south was cut. 
The Virginian response was utterly inadequate, however. Jefferson did not have access 
to reliable intelligence about British motives or the size of the enemy’s forces. Reports 
circulated that the British had invaded with fifty-four ships and Jefferson himself believed that 
the British force numbered sixty ships.61 Jefferson did not hesitate to mobilise the local militia, 
but they lacked the proper supplies to be an effective force against the marauding British troops. 
They lacked ammunition for their firearms and there were even reports that soldiers had to 
share muskets.62 Jefferson urged Congress to send a ‘great supply of arms’ and he asked 
Washington whether Richard Henry Lee’s cavalry regiment would be able to come to 
Virginia’s aid as it would ‘be of infinite service to us’.63 After Leslie’s forces committed ‘horrid 
depredations’ at Hampton on the Virginia coast, they ‘retired to their ships’, which were docked 
at the mouth of the James River. Jefferson urged Horatio Gates, the commander of the 
Continental Army’s southern forces to instruct their French allies that ‘his enemies are in a net 
if he has leisure to close the mouth of it?’64 Clearly, Jefferson’s governorship did not lack effort, 
but all his requests for action went unanswered. Unexpectedly, Leslie was ordered to join 
Cornwallis’s struggling army in the south and on the 15 November, Leslie left Virginia. 
Virginians were greatly relieved, but this relief was short lived as the British invaded for the 
third time a couple of months later. 
Benedict Arnold’s forces arrived in the Chesapeake Bay on 2 January 1781 and 
subsequently wreaked havoc in the state. Within a month, the British forces had plundered 
                                                          
61 Kranish, Flight From Monticello, 135. 
62 Ibid., 135; Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 225. 
63 Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Huntington, 25 October 1780, PTJ, IV: 68; and Thomas Jefferson to George 
Washington, 25 October 1780, ibid., IV: 69. 
64 Thomas Jefferson to Horatio Gates, 28 October 1780, PTJ, IV: 78. 
174 
 
Richmond, Virginia’s new seat of government, ensured that the entire Virginian government 
was put to flight, destroyed much needed supplies, and cut off the supply line between the 
Continental Congress and the Continental Army in the South. Numerous attempts to mobilise 
a sufficient and organised militia to repel the British advance failed in the ensuing months and, 
by May 1781, the situation seemed utterly hopeless for the Virginians. 
When the British invaded in the early months of 1781, the Virginian militia numbers 
were insufficient to defend the state. Not only were the militia men dispersed across the state, 
but they lacked the supplies needed to repel the enemy invasion. Jefferson judged that there 
was no lack of ‘inclination either in Legislature or Executive’, but admitted that ‘we find it 
very difficult to procure men’.65 He had repeatedly requested arms from Congress to help them 
defend the state, but to no avail.66 Jefferson’s irritation with the inability of Congress to 
acquiesce with his requests is palpable: ‘I have been knocking at the door of Congress for aids 
of all kinds, but especially of arms ever since the middle of summer. The Speaker [Benjamin] 
Harrison is gone to be heard on that subject. [J]ustice indeed requires that we should be aided 
powerfully. [Y]et if they would repay us the arms we have lent them we should give the enemy 
trouble tho’ abandoned to ourselves’.67 Jefferson believed that ‘justice’ demanded that 
Congress assist with Virginia’s defences. Baron von Steuben, who had been sent south to 
Virginia to mobilise men in the defence of Virginia in 1780, became increasingly exasperated 
at the ineffectiveness of the state’s executive. He complained to Washington that, when he 
asked Jefferson for reinforcements to help with the fortifications being built on the Hoods on 
the James River, ‘the Executive Power is so confined that the Governor had it not in his power 
to procure me 40 negroes to work at Hoods’.68 Weak executive power in a republican 
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government would always create problems militarily. Governors could not function extra-
legally by impressing reluctant Virginians to work. As Thomas Jefferson made clear, ‘The 
executive have not by the laws of this State any power to call a freeman to labour even for the 
Public without his consent, nor a slave without that of his Master’.69 Jefferson wrote to 
Lafayette to explain the executive’s inability to exert much control over this unsatisfactory 
situation: ‘I shall candidly acknowledge that it is not in my power to do any Thing more than 
to represent to the House of Delegates that unless they can provide more effectually for the 
Execution of the laws it will be in vain to call on Militia’. 70 
The lack of assistance from Congress was reciprocated by Virginia at times in this 
period, however. When Washington requested more troops be sent from Virginia to the 
Continental army, Thomas Jefferson admitted to him that ‘I have, with great pain perceived 
your situation; and the more so as being situated between two fires, a division of sentiment has 
arisen both in Congress and here, as to which the resources of this Country should be sent’.71 
For Jefferson, choosing between the demands of the Union or the needs of his home state was 
a frustrating and troubling decision. His ‘two fires’ metaphor is exactly the same one that was 
used by Francis Bernard, the Massachusetts royal governor, when he described his difficulties 
in appeasing his colony and imposing royal colonial policy.72 Much in the same way as royal 
governors were helplessly caught between enforcing the requirements of the imperial authority 
and complying with the wishes of the colonial assemblies, so Patrick Henry and Thomas 
Jefferson laboured between meeting the demands of George Washington and Continental 
Congress on the one hand and dealing with the intransigence of the legislative assembly and 
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reluctant patriots on the other. The Virginian state governor had to contend with a central 
authority – Congress – and a local authority – the legislature – which is a similar dynamic to 
the one that royal governors had to endure. Whereas royal governors obviously were in constant 
conflict with both bodies, Jefferson, because of his weak authority, struggled to meet the 
demands of Washington and Congress while trying to work with an over-powerful, but 
ineffective legislative branch and a reluctant people. Of course, the nature of the conflict was 
very different, but there are comparable dynamics at work. Royal governors failed to govern 
effectively because they struggled under a tripartite system with competing interests and state 
governors seem to have fallen into a similar troubling paradigm. ‘Congress having afterwards 
directed that they [the militia] should not be removed [from Virginia] and our Assembly that 
they should’, Jefferson explained to Benjamin Harrison put himself in a disconcerting 
predicament because ‘the Executive are placed in a very disagreeable Situation’.73 
 While Jefferson sought to work with his constitutional constraints, on some occasions 
it proved practically impossible to do so. Thomas Jefferson was always particularly careful to 
present himself as a member of the executive branch rather than as someone who was the 
executive branch. He was careful in all his correspondence to use the plural when describing 
the executive and was not afraid to remind correspondents that the executive also included the 
Council.74 When there was doubt about the constitutionality of an action, he sought the advice 
of the House of Delegates for clarification.75 The problem with this system of government, 
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Treasury for the Payment of any money on accounts certified by Commissioners. From experience it is found 
impracticable to attend to any matters of consequence to the safety of the State, if the Council are, not only to 
advise the issuing of Warrants upon such Certificates, but also to keep Records of the same. We think it proper to 
acquaint the General Assembly with these our Sentiments; and we beg leave earnestly to recommend it to their 
consideration, whether it would not be to the advantage of the State if the Commissioners were empowered finally 
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however, was that the Council could not always be formed into a quorum in order to help the 
governor make decisions. It is obvious from Jefferson’s correspondence that, when he was 
without council, he was relatively inactive. On one occasion, he even advised Colonel William 
Davies that he was unable to comply with his request for a supply of clothing because the 
Council had adjourned for the day and he did not have the power to issue clothing without its 
approval.76  Jefferson quickly realised, however, that, despite his best efforts, an executive was 
compelled to act extra-constitutionally in certain instances. He did govern without the ‘advice 
and consent’ of the Council several times during his governorship. When, in April 1780, the 
Virginian government moved, for security reasons, from Williamsburg to Richmond, for 
example, Jefferson had three weeks in which to perform ‘such business as may be done by him, 
without the concurrence of the publick boards’.77 In this time, Jefferson executed several 
military actions including ordering militia lieutenants to ‘carry an expedition into the Indian 
country’.78 Necessity forced the Virginia state governor on certain occasions to govern alone 
and beyond the formal parameters set down by the Constitution. In the first six months of 1781, 
moreover, Jefferson found himself continually governing without a Council because the 
disruptions caused by repeated British invasions meant that a quorum could not always be 
formed. Because of the critical situation imperilling the future of the Commonwealth, Jefferson 
had to make crucial military decisions even without the consent of the Council: issuing orders, 
raising troops, and publishing proclamations. Governorship in this period, therefore, had to 
adapt itself to the desperate circumstances in which it found itself. For Jefferson, the prevention 
                                                          
to transact this Business, or some other regular mode adopted or the future settling & passing the accounts against 
this State’. Patrick Henry to Edmund Pendleton, 6 December 1776, ibid., I: 72-3. 
76 ‘I am sorry it is not in my power to order a particular issue of cloathing [sic] to you as requested. The council 
have fixed by their rules the manner of issuing, and determined that it should be general, that all may far alike’, 
Thomas Jefferson to Col. Davies, 3 September 1780, OFLG, II: 187. Jeremy Bailey, moreover, has clearly shown 
that when the Council was in attendance, Jefferson’s correspondence consists of far more ‘in-letters’ than ‘out-
letters’, Bailey, Jefferson and Executive Power, 38. 
77 ‘Notice of Removal of Executive Office from Williamsburg to Richmond’, The Virginia Gazette, 25 March 
1780. 
78 Bailey, Jefferson and Executive Power, 57. 
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of the collapse of the Commonwealth was more important than operating within strict 
constitutional limits. He did not, however, wantonly abandon his usually strict constructionist 
beliefs: he made sure that he kept a record of his actions, so that the Council could 
retrospectively approve of them. Virginia’s system of governorship, therefore, sometimes 
required the governor to work outside the law in order to preserve Virginia’s republic of laws.79  
The Virginian governor’s resort to expedient action was not solely confined to his 
relationship with the Council, however. Jefferson discovered that he could not wait for the 
legislative assembly to act, but when necessity required him to act unilaterally, Jefferson often 
found it necessary to work without the explicit permission of the Assembly. In January 1781, 
Benedict Arnold’s forces had destroyed several of the state’s printing presses during their 
incursion into Richmond. Because several laws passed by the House of Delegates for procuring 
men and supplies to defend the state were due to expire, even before they could be printed (by 
the very printing presses which Arnold had destroyed) and circulated to county magistrates for 
enforcement, Jefferson decided to instruct the magistrates to enforce this legislation which they 
had not themselves seen or approved. Rather than taking the time-consuming path of waiting 
for new legislation to be passed, which would have to be printed and circulated, he took the 
decision to ignore the constitutional requirement by continuing to use existing legislation as 
justification for his orders. He advised the magistrates that the House would subsequently 
endorse his actions.80 Jefferson reasoned that ‘saving his country’ justified his actions.81 
                                                          
79 The best discussions of Jefferson’s involvement with the council are Jeremy D. Bailey, Jefferson and Executive 
Power, 35-41 and Francis D. Cogliano, Emperor of Liberty: Thomas Jefferson’s Foreign Policy (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2014), ch.1. 
80 ‘Could any legal scruples arise as to this, there would be no doubt that the ensuing Assembly influenced by the 
necessity which induced them to pass the act, would give their sanction to its execution, though as a later date 
than is prescribed’. Thomas Jefferson to the County Magistrates, 20 January 1781, OFLG, II: 296. 
81 ‘However the substance of the act is to procure supplies of beef, clothing and wagons. The time of doing this is 
a circumstance only; and the principle is sound both in law and policy, that substance not circumstance is to be 
regarded. While we have so many foes in our bowels and environing us on every side, he is but a bad citizen who 
can entertain a doubt whether the law will justify him in saving his country, or who will scruple to risk himself in 
support of the spirit of a law where unavoidable accidents have prevented a liberal compliance with it’. Ibid. 
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While the constitution of 1776 deprived the executive of any meaningful powers, 
Jefferson’s expedient actions suggest that he was able to wield a form of Lockean ‘executive 
prerogative’. Locke maintained in his Second Treatise of Government, that the executive 
sometimes required temporary emergency powers. He defined executive prerogative as ‘this 
power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law, 
and sometimes even against it’. Locke maintained that because the legislative branch cannot 
always be in session ‘and is usually too numerous, and so too slow, for the dispatch requisite 
to execution’ and because the legislature cannot possibly forsee, and consequently provide laws 
for, all emergency situations, ‘therefore there is a latitude left to the executive power, to do 
many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe’.82 Locke advocated granting the 
executive some latitude in order to cope with unforeseen situations and urgent emergencies.83 
Jefferson faced several emergency situations and he could not rely on the legislative branch 
passing the required laws in order to protect the state. The Virginian Constitution obviously 
did not prescribe this prerogative power to the governor, but, such was the situation in the state, 
that Jefferson deemed it necessary to exercise his authority without recourse to the legislative 
branch. Virginia faced the prospect of being overrun by the British and Jefferson acted extra-
constitutionally in order to protect the constitution and the political system in Virginia. 
 Just as Patrick Henry had been granted some increase in powers during his time as 
governor, Jefferson benefited from the same ‘temporary’ powers. Thus, governorship evolved 
gradually over the course of this period. It would be a mistake, however, to maintain that, 
because the assembly increased the powers of the governor, the executive was given free rein 
to control the military. Throughout the increase of power that the governor secured, there was 
                                                          
82 John Locke, ‘Second Treatise on Government’, in The works of John Locke Esq; in three volumes, 2nd edn. 
(London : printed for A. Churchill, and A. Manship, and sold by W. Taylor in Pater-noster-Row, 1722), II: 204. 
83 Lee Ward, ‘Locke on Executive Power and Liberal Constititutionalism’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 
38 (2005), 719-744; Clement Fatovic, ‘Constitutionalism and Contingency: Locke’s Theory of Prerogative’, 
History of Political Thought, 25 (2004), 276–297; and Fatovic ‘Constitutionalism and Presidential Prerogative:  
Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian Perspectives’, American Journal of Political Science, 48 (2004):  429-444. 
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still an underlying legislative check upon the powers at the disposal of the executive branch. 
In May 1778, the governor could send the militia out of Virginia, but only in case of the actual 
invasion of a neighbouring state. In May 1780, the assembly declared that because ‘in this time 
of publick danger ... a powerful and vindictive enemy ... making rapid progress toward our own 
borders ... [it was] highly expedient to vest the Executive with extraordinary powers for a 
limited time’. Jefferson and his council were authorised to mobilise up to twenty thousand 
militia, to appoint new officers, and to march them anywhere they were needed.84 In terms of 
dealing with loyalists, the governor in this period was granted some additional judicial powers. 
By 1781, the governor was empowered to apprehend and confine all persons ‘suspected of 
disaffection’, and these loyalists were given no rights to bail and habeas corpus was 
surprisingly suspended. The legislative assembly also provided the executive branch with 
certain powers of appointment: Jefferson could appoint new justices of the peace in any county 
where any officials had died, moved away or refused to act. For short periods, Jefferson was 
given power to remove any justices against whom misconduct was proven, to change the time 
and place of court sessions, and to be in command of the public jail.85  
 While undoubtedly the governor was a different creature in 1781 from the one 
prescribed by the terms of the constitution of 1776, he was still largely subject to the legislature. 
Although the governor did enjoy more extraordinary powers, he was given limited scope to 
exercise them and he was still dependent on the Assembly to continue them in every legislative 
session. Thomas Jefferson, at the height of his difficulties as governor in 1781, summarised his 
position to Baron von Steuben: ‘The Executive …. Sensible that a necessary Work is not be 
abandoned because their means are not so energetic as they could wish them and on the contrary 
that it is their duty to take those means as they find them and to make the most of them for the 
                                                          
84 The Statutes at Large, IX: 375, 428, 462, 477; X: 309, 413. 
85 Statutes at Large, IX: 373-4, X: 309-10, 413-6. Margaret Burnham Macmillan, The War Governors, 82-3. 
181 
 
public good … propose to pursue this work, and if they cannot accomplish it in a shorter, they 
will in a longer time’.86 Jefferson, in this period, did not lack ambition or will, but he did lack 
the means to accomplish all that he wished to achieve. 
The most written about episode in this period is Jefferson’s ‘Flight from Monticello’ 
during his final days as the governorship. Jefferson has faced considerable personal criticism 
from contemporaries and from later historians for his apparent abandonment of his 
governorship in the face of a hostile enemy running rampant throughout the state. By then, the 
government had removed to Charlottesville and learning of this intelligence, Lord Cornwallis 
deployed a force under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton to capture the 
governor and members of the Virginian government. On 4 June, when Jefferson was residing 
at Monticello, Tarleton sent a detachment of dragoons to capture him, but the governor was 
alerted to the danger and subsequently fled Monticello.87 Unbeknown to Tarleton, Jefferson 
was not in actual fact the governor of Virginia at this time. He had not sought re-election for a 
third term and his official term had ended on 2 June. Unfortunately for the government of 
Virginia there was no successor in place: the lieutenant-governor, Dudley Digges, had resigned 
earlier in the year when the government moved to Charlottesville and a replacement had not 
been elected.  A plan was in place to elect a replacement for Jefferson on the 4 June. None the 
less, in outward appearances at least, Jefferson was not just fleeing Monticello, but abandoning 
the governorship itself and this has been the event most remembered about Jefferson’s time as 
governor of Virginia. 
 While it is certainly plausible to argue that Jefferson reacted too slowly to the reports 
that a British fleet had appeared in Chesapeake Bay on 2 January 1781, his actions over the 
next six months were not lacking effort, especially given his lack of authority in the state. 
                                                          
86 Thomas Jefferson to Baron von Steuben, 12 February 1781, PTJ, IV: 593-594. 
87 See Kranish, Flight from Monticello, 265-75. 
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Facing an enemy which was rampaging through the state, Jefferson was left with a militia 
which was in a crisis of its own making. Militia officers were resigning their commission at an 
alarming rate because they were caught in a serious predicament between enforcing unpopular 
state laws and facing a recalcitrant people refusing to enlist. The draft was proving an unpopular 
and ill-fated measure, and desertions were rife. Jefferson was forced to call the assembly for 
an emergency legislative session and he informed the delegates by a circular letter that the 
government was in urgent need of ‘men and money’.88 Jefferson, perhaps aware of the usual 
intransigence of the legislature, warned the Delegates that a major reform of the militia laws 
was required and he asserted that ‘the crisis at which these instances of disobedience to the 
laws have appeared, may bring on peculiar ill consequences’.89 Jefferson was fighting a losing 
battle, however. The delegates debated the issue for three weeks and then decided that it would 
be necessary to obtain a full report on the militia in order to consider what changes were 
necessary. In other words, the assembly preferred to deliberate at length rather than reach a 
quick decision on any of the changes which Jefferson requested.90 Jefferson’s correspondence 
for the next two months contains desperate pleas for help to Congress and the Virginia 
legislature. He pleaded with the assembly in May to give the executive greater power to enforce 
government policy, but to no avail.91 Jefferson was clear that there was a general ‘Want of 
Authority’ in the executive to defend the state.  Undoubtedly his apparent resignation can be 
regarded as unfortunate and even improper, but Jefferson’s record as governor in his last six 
months suffered not as a result of his personal flaws as an executive, but because of the 
inefficient system of government within which he had to work. 
IV 
                                                          
88 ‘Circular Letter to members of the Assembly’, 23 January 1781, The PTJ, IV: 433. 
89 Thomas Jefferson to the Speaker of the House of Delegates, 9 March 1781, OFLG, II: 395. 
90 Statutes at Large, X: 391-3. 




Faced with external threats and internal problems, the situation in Virginia demanded a 
vigorous and autonomous governor who could take decisive action. Unfortunately for Patrick 
Henry and Thomas Jefferson, the flawed constitution of 1776 had established a governorship 
which had to rely on the consent of the Council which was not always quorate, act at the behest 
of a legislative body which was infrequently in session and whose members were often at odds 
with each other, and was denied real powers of patronage to influence the situation at either 
local or state level.  
As this chapter has shown, however, the governorship did evolve during this period. 
While Patrick Henry often struggled to exercise any effective authority to manage the war 
effort, Thomas Jefferson often found himself governing outwith the consent of the council and 
even outwith the laws of the State. Although it is obvious that both governors were denied 
adequate permanent emergency powers, both governors were at times granted powers that 
ensured that the executive became a stronger branch in the constitution. Indeed, Jefferson’s 
‘extra-legal’ method of governing suggests that he was utilising powers of prerogative which 
John Locke had believed were necessary for a functioning political system. The widespread 
perception that the executive was the greatest danger to liberties of the people was challenged 
when an enemy invaded the Commonwealth and threatened to destroy the entire political 
system.  
While Jefferson and Henry, in this gubernatorial system, could not exercise any 
effective authority or save the state from invasion, Virginians came to realise that the dire 
situation in 1781 required a stronger executive. Virginia’s experiment with plural governorship 
had clearly failed during this period, and some delegates in the House, including Patrick Henry, 
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wondered whether the time was right for a new and stronger executive to be created. For some 





In Search of Cincinnatus: The Virginian ‘Project for a Dictator’ in 1781 
 
When a British force under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton almost 
captured members of the Virginian legislature during its successful raid on Charlottesville in 
1781, there was a deep sense of crisis in the fledgling independent state of Virginia. Thomas 
Jefferson had appeared to resign his governorship before completing his full term and without 
waiting for a successor to be installed.1 With the British invasion apparently endangering the 
state’s government and the state’s figurehead ‘abandoning’ his post, there was undoubtedly an 
awareness that the Commonwealth of Virginia was in a perilous situation. Richard Henry Lee 
exemplified this gloomy mentality when he wrote: ‘this government is, in the moment of its 
greatest danger without government, abandoned to the Arts and the Arms of the Enemy, both 
of which are push’d with the greatest zeal & clearly see that in this State of things that wanting 
a rudder in the Storm, the good ship must inevitably be cast away’.2 In Lee’s eyes, Virginia 
needed a rudder, a captain and a saviour who would be able to navigate the ship of state safely 
through these perilous waters. Such was the widespread perception among Virginians that 
plural governorship had essentially failed over the past five years and such were the apparent 
dangers to the future of the Commonwealth of Virginia, that certain members of the House of 
Delegates proposed that a dictator be appointed to save Virginia from complete collapse.  
                                                          
1 Journal of the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth of Virginia, 1776-1790, 4 vols. (Richmond: 1828), II: 
15. Jefferson had resigned on 2 June 1781, which technically was the end of his term, but the House had delayed 
any new elections until two days later. The lieutenant-governor, Dudley Digges, had resigned earlier in the year 
when the government moved to Charlottesville and a replacement had not been elected. What Virginia faced, 
therefore, from Jefferson’s ‘early’ resignation was a crisis of authority. See John E. Selby, The Revolution in 
Virginia, 281-282. 
2 Richard Henry Lee to Richard Lovell, 12 June 1781, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, ed. James Curtis Ballagh, 2 
vols. (New York: 1911-1914), II: 237. 
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Unfortunately, the source material required for a full appreciation of this ‘dictatorial’ 
debate is deficient.3  We know from a letter written by Henry Young to William Davies that a 
delegate in the legislature, George Nicholas, announced to the House of Delegates on 7 June 
1781 that he ‘gave notice that he shou’d this day move to have a Dictator appointed’, and that 
George Washington was the favoured candidate, closely followed by Nathaniel Greene. 
Washington was urged to relinquish his post as Commander of the Continental Army in order 
to save his home state from apparent ruin.  There is no evidence in the House’s Journal for the 
year of such a motion being made, but in the opinion of one historian, legislators deliberately 
concealed the topic of this debate because they feared the consequences if it were made public.4 
While first-hand sources are particularly scarce, there are second-hand accounts available to 
help substantiate what appears in Young’s correspondence.5 The fullest account was written, 
albeit much later, by Archibald Stuart who was an observer in the House of Delegates that day. 
He wrote to Thomas Jefferson in 1818 to dispel a myth, recently advocated by William Wirt, 
that Patrick Henry did not favour ‘the Project of Establishing a Dictator during the 
revolutionary War’. He recalled that Nicholas, invoking the ‘practices of the Romans on similar 
occasions’, proposed that 
A Dictator be established in this Commonwealth who should have the power of disposing of the 
lives and fortunes of the citizens thereof without being subject to account. – In support of this 
resolution he observed that the Country was overrun by the Enemy and the Operation of the Govt 
was nearly suspended: - That although the powers proposed to be conferred were very great the 
character he proposed to fill the office would remove all apprehensions arising from the abuse of 
them – That he was our fellow citizen, that we had a right to command his services and that he had 
no doubt but that on such Occasion he would obey the call of his country.  
Stuart also emphasised the fact that Patrick Henry did indeed second the motion and recalled 
that the former governor asserted that ‘whether the Officer proposed was called a Dictator or a 
                                                          
3 Julian P. Boyd, the editor of the PTJ, has provided the most succinct account of the evidence available for the 
Virginian flirtation with the idea of instituting a dictator. See Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Julian P. Boyd, 39 
vols. (Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 1950-), VI: 85n. 
4 Michael A. McDonnell, The Politics of War: Race, Class and Conflict in Revolutionary Virginia (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 464 
5 See PTJ, VI: 84, 85n; and Journal of the House of Delegates, 1781-1786, 15. 
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Governor with enlarged powers or by any other name yet surely an Officer armed with such 
powers was necessary to restrain the unbridled fury of a licentious enemy’.6  
Virginia had flirted with the idea of establishing a dictator before. In late 1776, some 
Virginians, including Richard Henry Lee, believed that establishing a dictator could save 
Virginia if the state was invaded. The House of Delegates, therefore, granted Henry some 
temporary powers. Although Patrick Henry, with the advice and consent of the Council, was 
given free rein to exercise broad powers for a limited time, these powers can hardly be 
described as ‘dictatorial’.7 Henry’s increased powers were specifically confined to the military 
arena in that he was able to raise and deploy troops as he saw fit, but it did not give him 
increased control over the political system. It enhanced his powers as commander-in-chief of 
the Virginia militia, but did not make him the state’s dictator. 
Five years later, however, the motion for a dictator seemed to imply that there would 
be a broad increase of prerogative powers granted to the head of the executive branch and these 
powers would not be confined solely to military matters. Away from the legislature at Staunton, 
Richard Henry Lee, in the Tidewater region, pressed upon Congress the suggestion of bringing 
Washington down in order to take over Virginia as a dictator at this time.8 He wrote that 
because ‘the time is short, the danger presses, and commensurate remedies are indispensible’, 
                                                          
6 Archibald Stuart to Thomas Jefferson, 8 September 1818, Jared Sparks Collection of American Manuscripts, 
1582-1843, Houghton Library, Harvard University, MS Sparks 22, MSS. Hist. Vol. 8, 245-6. See also William 
Wirt, Sketches of the Life and Character of Patrick Henry (Philadelphia: Published by James Webster, 1817), 320. 
7 John Selby argues that ‘the powers Mason conferred upon the executive did make Henry a “Dictator”.’ Selby, 
The Revolution in Virginia, 129-30. 
8 ‘In the popularity, the judgement, and the experience of Gen. Washington was alone can find remedy. Let 
Congress send him immediately to Virginia, and as the head of the Federal Union let them possess the General 
with Dictatorial power until the general Assembly can be convened, and have determined upon his powers, and 
let it be recommended to the Assembly when met to continue this power for 6, 8, or 10 months as the case may 
require’.  Richard Henry Lee to the Virginia Delegates in Congress, 12 June 1781, in PTJ, VI: 90. In a letter sent 
to James Lovell on the same day, Lee reiterated his urgency: ‘The temper of the people here, and a thousand other 
considerations point to this remedy – Let Gen. Washington be immediately sent to Virginia, with 2 or 3,000 good 
Troops – Let Congress as the head of the Federal union, in this crisis, direct that until the legislature can convene 
and a Governor be appointed, the General be possessed of Dictatorial powers, and it be strongly recommended to 
the Assembly when conven’d to continue those powers for 6, 8 or 10 months as the case may be’. Richard Henry 
Lee to James Lovell, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, II: 237. 
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Washington should come down to Virginia to save the State from destruction. Lee wrote 
directly to the General: ‘It would be a thing for angels to weep over, if the goodly fabric of 
human freedom which you have so well labored to rear, should in one unlucky moment be 
levelled with the dust’.9 For Lee, ‘both antient and modern times furnish precedents to justify 
this procedure, but if they did not, the present necessity not only justifies but absolutely 
demands the measure’.10  
Five days after the motion to establish a dictatorship was moved in the House, Thomas 
Jefferson’s governorship over the past year was under scrutiny. George Nicolas, the same 
delegate who had put forward the dictatorship motion, moved ‘that at the next session of 
Assembly an inquiry be made into the conduct of the Executive of this State for the last twelve 
months’.11 Jefferson was clearly hurt by the implied criticism and wrote to Nicolas to request 
that the twenty-seven year old Virginian ‘specify to me the unfortunate passages in my conduct 
which you mean to adduce against me’. Nicolas blandly insisted that ‘as a freeman and the 
representative of free Men I considered it as both my right and duty’ to bring the executive to 
account for the losses that Virginia has suffered over the past year.12 Eventually, once the war 
was over, the delegates did investigate Jefferson’s governorship, but found no evidence of 
wrongdoing and offered a vote of thanks for his service.13 The mood had shifted considerably 
when the war had been won and the state was no longer imperilled. The timing of these two 
                                                          
9 Ibid., II: 238, Richard Henry Lee to George Washington, 12 June 1781, ibid., II: 234.  
10 Richard Henry Lee to the Virginian Delegates in Congress, PTJ, V1: 91. George Washington responded to Lee 
and thought that Lee’s plan was ‘a greater proof of your unbounded confidence in me than it is that the means 
proposed would be found adequate to the end in view were it practicable to make the experiment’. Cited in Oliver 
Perry Chitwood, Richard Henry Lee: Statesman of the Revolution (Morgantown, West Va.: West Virginia 
University Library, 1967), 153. 
11 Journal of the House of Delegates, May 1781, 15. 
12 Thomas Jefferson to George Nicholas, 28 July 1781, PTJ, VI: 104-5; George Nicolas Nicholas to Thomas 
Jefferson, 31 July 1781, ibid., VI: 105-6. 
13 ‘Resolved, That the sincere thanks of the General Assembly be given to our former Governor, Thomas Jefferson, 
Esq. for his impartial, upright and attentive administration whilst in office. The Assembly wish in the strongest 
manner, to declare the high opinion which they entertain of Mr. Jefferson’s ability, rectitude and integrity, as 
Chief Magistrate of the Commonwealth; and mean by thus publicly avowing their opinion, to obviate and and 
remove all unmerited censure’. Journal of the House of Delegates, 30 November, 1781 
189 
 
motions was not a coincidence: the debate over establishing a dictator was closely connected 
to the investigation into Jefferson’s apparent failings as a governor.14 While George 
Washington was the stated choice by the supporters of the motion to become dictator, Jefferson 
and his opponents believed that it was their intention to instate Patrick Henry. Even Patrick 
Henry’s earliest biographer admits that it was ‘highly probable, that Mr. Henry was the 
character in view for that office [Dictator]’.15 In order for Henry to be installed as dictator, 
however, it was necessary to discredit not only Jefferson’s governorship, but the weak system 
of executive power that had been established by the Constitution. This would expose the 
inability of Virginia to combat an enemy force successively and, thus, prove the necessity of 
establishing a dictator. As Cogliano has shown, the discrediting of Jefferson would ensure that 
his supporters would find it difficult to vote against the dictatorship motion.16 Although the 
motives behind the proponents for establishing a dictator were dubious, it does not disguise the 
fact that there was a realistic chance that a dictator might have been installed in Virginia in 
1781.  
Nicholas’s motion was defeated in the House of Delegates, but there are conflicting 
reports on how close the legislature came to establishing such a dictatorship. Archibald Stuart, 
in his account of the debate suggested that the proposal ‘was not relished by the people’ whose 
‘feelings were of a different character’ and insisted that ‘had the enemy advanced they would 
have risen in mass to repel them’.17 The belief that there was significant opposition to the 
motion has been corroborated in other accounts. Louis Girardin, in his History of Virginia 
published in 1804, claimed that ‘the pulse of the Assembly was incidentally felt in debates on 
the state of the Commonwealth, and, out of doors, by personal conversations. Out of these a 
                                                          
14 Francis D. Cogliano, Emperor of Liberty, 29. 
15 William Wirt Henry, Sketches of the Life of and Character of Patrick Henry, 231. 
16 Cogliano, Emperor of Liberty, 32. 
17 Archibald Stuart to Thomas Jefferson 8 September 1818, MS Sparks 22, Hist. Vol. 8, 246. 
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ferment gradually arose, which foretold a violent opposition to any species of Dictatorship, 
and, as in a previous instance of a similar attempt, the apprehension of personal danger 
produced a relinquishment of the scheme’.18 Thomas Jefferson, however, in his Notes on the 
State of Virginia, recalled that the dictatorship proposal ‘wanted a few votes only of being 
passed’.19  
What importance should we ascribe to this event? Are we in danger of exaggerating the 
importance of the fact that some Virginians considered establishing a dictator to safeguard their 
state when the motion itself was not even passed by the House of Delegates and Washington 
did not heed Richard Henry Lee’s personal request?20 The historiography of Virginia during 
the War for Independence has afforded little significance to the ‘dictatorial’ debates in 1776 
and 1781. Undoubtedly the lack of substantial source material has contributed to the dearth in 
scholarship: the major monographs about Virginia during the War of Independence have 
tended simply to tell the story of the circumstances surrounding the debates, but have failed to 
delve deeper in order to unearth its larger significance.21 John Selby has blandly insisted that 
                                                          
18 Louis Girardin et al., The history of Virginia: from its first settlement to the present day (Petersburg, Va.: Printed 
for the author by Dickson & Pescud, 1804), appendix, 12. 
19 PTJ, VI: 85-6n; ‘Edmund Randolph's Essay on the Revolutionary History of Virginia 1774-1782’, The Virginia 
Magazine of History and Biography, 44 (1936), 314-15.  
20 George Washington responded to Richard Henry Lee to make him aware that it was impracticable for him to 
return to Virginia at that time and he argued that ‘I am fully perswaded [sic] however (and upon good Military 
principles) that the measures I have adopted will give more effectual and speedier relief to the State of Virginia 
than if I was to March thither with dictatorial power at the head of every Man I could draw from hence without 
leaving the important posts on the North river quite defenceless, and these States open to devastation and ravage’, 
George Washington to Richard Henry Lee, 15 July 1781, The Writings of Washington from the Original 
Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1937), XXII: 383. 
21 John Selby in his monograph about the Revolution in Virginia only spends a paragraph discussing the call for 
a dictator without suggesting the larger significance of the debate, see John E. Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 
283. Similarly, Michael A. McDonnell reiterates the source material available and provides a succinct account of 
the nature of the debate without focusing on the larger significance in his recent monograph, The Politics of War: 
Race, Class and Conflict in Revolutionary Virginia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 464-
466. J. Kent McGaughy, in his recent biography, only briefly mentions that Richard Henry Lee wanted to give 
Washington dictatorial powers, see McGaughy, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia: A portrait of an American 
Revolutionary (Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 160. Oliver Perry Chitwood’s more 
dated biography gives more space to Lee’s belief that Washington should become a dictator, but does not elaborate 
on the effect this would have had: Chitwood, Richard Henry Lee: Statesman of the Revolution (Morgantown, 
West Va.: West Virginia University Library, 1967), 153. 
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‘like many words in the eighteenth-century republican’s lexicon, the term [dictator] had a 
meaning different from what it bears today’.22 Indeed, most historians either use the debate as 
an example of the particular mentality of Virginians during the war or as a preface to an analysis 
of Thomas Nelson’s governorship.23 
The conflicting reports over the closeness of the vote do not matter as much as the 
debate itself. The motion to establish a dictator to save the Commonwealth is crucial to our 
understanding of the evolution of thought concerning executive power in this period. Although 
a dictator was never created, there was a general recognition that a plural executive with 
minimal powers and one which was dependent on a legislative body that was not in constant 
attendance was too weak to deal with the enormity of present circumstances. In the space of 
five years, Virginia’s opinion of the proper exercise of executive power had evolved 
dramatically from a position of advocating a weak governorship with negligible powers to 
instituting a temporary dictatorship with a substantial and wide-ranging remit. The language 
and tone of the debate also suggests a widespread panic and pessimism over Virginia’s future.  
On 12 June 1781, moreover, the legislature eventually elected General Thomas Nelson 
to succeed Jefferson as governor.  Not only did they elect a military person, in itself a sign of 
how they perceived the role of the executive in these dark days, but the legislature furnished 
him with considerably stronger powers than those his two predecessors as governor had 
enjoyed. In a flurry of activity over five days, the House of Delegates passed legislation because 
‘in this time of publick danger, it is necessary to invest the executive with the most ample 
                                                          
22 John Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 130. 
23 Ibid., 283. Emory G. Evans in his study of the first three governors of the period has one line on the dictatorial 
debate: ‘There had been talk of appointing a dictator but wiser heads prevailed and instead they resorted to what 
Jefferson was later to refer to approvingly as a “union of the civil and military powers”,’ in ‘Executive Leadership 
in Virginia, 1776-1781: Henry, Jefferson, and Nelson’, in Sovereign States in an Age of Uncertainty, ed. Ronald 
Hoffman and Peter J. Albert, 218. Indeed, in his biography of Thomas Nelson, Evans only mentions the dictatorial 
debate briefly, see Emory G. Evans, Thomas Nelson of Yorktown: Revolutionary Virginian (Charlottesville: The 
University Press of Virginia, 1975), 102. 
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powers, both for the purpose of strenuous opposition to the enemy, and also to provide for the 
punctual execution of laws, on which the safety and welfare of the commonwealth depends’. 
Nelson, with the consent of the council, was empowered by various statutes, with complete 
control over the state militia and the right to impress food and supplies, to seize loyalists and 
banish them without jury trial, and to constitute courts with the same powers as the General 
Court of the state.24 These ‘extraordinary’ powers gave the governor, in the words of Emory 
Evans, ‘almost dictatorial powers’.25 There can be no doubt that in Virginia there was a 
widespread belief that an executive based on radical country Whig principles was not practical 
in time of war.  
This chapter seeks to answer several questions. How did Virginia understand 
dictatorship and why did some Virginians regard it as a viable alternative to governorship? 
Were the motions for a dictator a fundamental departure from the radical Country Whig 
ideology which had influenced Virginians in 1776? And would the creation of a dictatorship 
mean that Virginians had embraced an ideology which favoured a stronger executive in their 
framework of government? In addressing these questions, this chapter will first explore how 
Americans understood the term dictator in this period and what significance that interpretation 
has on our understanding of this episode. Second, it will analyse how some Classical 
Republican theorists accepted the fact that dictatorship was a necessary and appropriate office 
in time of crisis.  
I 
The Idea of a Dictator: Saviour or Tyrant?  
                                                          
24 The Statutes at Large, X: 413-421, 423, 437. 
25 Emory G, Evans, ‘Executive Leadership’, 219. 
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The essential problem is with nomenclature: how did Americans in this period understand the 
term ‘dictatorship’? The term ‘dictator’ in modern parlance connotes malevolent tyranny and 
excessive oppression and is suggestive of an absolute despot. Dictatorship in the twenty-first 
century, therefore, is antithetical to the desired attributes of an executive in a constitutional 
system.26 The majority of historians, however, have maintained that that the office of dictator 
in the eighteenth century had not acquired this ‘evil modern resonance’.27 Indeed, Clinton 
Rossiter has used the term ‘constitutional dictatorship’ in order to draw a distinction between 
crisis governments with substantially increased powers and illegitimate dictatorial polities.28 
In Samuel Johnson’s A Dictionary of the English Language, the word ‘dictator’ has three 
definitions: ‘1. A Magistrate of Rome made in terms of exigence [sic], and invested with 
absolute authority. 2. One invested with absolute authority. 3. One whose credit or authority 
enables him to direct the conduct or opinion of others.’29  Although these definitions do not 
suggest that a dictatorship was a benign office because they indicate that the dictator is invested 
with absolute authority, they do not have the same malevolent associations which the concept 
has in a modern context. The most important facet, therefore, of this analysis over the Virginian 
flirtation with dictatorship is how Americans understood the term itself. Did the ‘call’ for a 
dictator represent a marked break with the weak governorship which they earlier instituted and 
were they considering an absolutist executive power in the mould of an Hobbesian ‘Soveraign 
[sic] Power’; hence abandoning their earlier ideological beliefs in a time of crisis? In semiotic 
                                                          
26 Peter Baehr and Melvin Richter, eds., Dictatorship in History and Theory: Bonapartism, Caesarism, and 
Totalitarianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
27 Garry Wills, Cincinnatus: George Washington and the Enlightenment (London: Robert Hale Ltd., 1984), 20. 
28 Clinton L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1948).  
29 Indeed, his definition of ‘dictatorial’ follows the same pattern: ‘Authoritative; confident; dogmatical’, Samuel 
Johnson, A dictionary of the English language: in which the words are deduced from their originals, explained in 
their different meanings, and Authorized by the Names of the Writers in whose Works they are found,  2 vols., 5th 
edn. (London, 1773), I. There are no page numbers in Johnson’s work. Compare this definition to the definition 
in Edward Phillip’s A New World of Words: ‘(among the old Romans) a Soveraign [sic] Commander; who had 
absolute Authority for the time being, both in War and Peace, with Power of Life and Death: The Magistrates 
were never chosen, but upon some great Occasion, and his Command was to last but half a year; although the 
senate might continue it’. Edward Phillips, The new world of words: or, universal English dictionary, 6th edn. 
(London: printed for J. Phillips, 1706). 
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terms, what was the signification between the signifier (dictator) and the signified (its 
conceptual use) for Virginians?30 
An insight into how Virginians understood the concept of dictatorship is the way some 
of them interpreted this episode in later years. Thomas Jefferson, in his Notes on the State of 
Virginia, made an acerbic attack on those who proposed establishing a dictatorship. He 
maintained that the dictator would be a ‘despotic one’ and that the office of dictator would be 
‘invested with every power legislative, executive and judiciary, civil and military, of life and 
of death, over our persons and over our properties’. He disagreed with the view that dictatorship 
was permissible in times of crisis in a republican form of government. Indeed, Jefferson argued 
that the example of Rome proved that a dictatorship was antithetical to the principles of 
republicanism: ‘their constitution allowed a temporary tyrant to be erected, under the name of 
a Dictator; and that temporary tyrant, after a few examples, became perpetual’.31 He maintained 
that no ‘necessities’ could justify the institution of a dictatorship, but that in times of crisis, 
government should devolve back ‘into the hands of the people, the powers they had delegated, 
and leave them as individuals to shift for themselves’. Rather than implementing extraordinary 
measures, Jefferson believed that the best remedy for the ‘perilous situation’ in which Virginia 
found itself would be a ‘convention to fix the constitution’.32 Undoubtedly, Jefferson was 
convinced that there was an insufficiently strong connection between the government and the 
people in Virginia because the constitution of 1776 lacked popular approval. The Virginian 
Constitution of 1776 devised an imperfect framework of government because, without popular 
ratification, the Virginian legislature could meddle with the constitution as they pleased.33 In 
                                                          
30 Ferdinand de Saussure, A Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin (London: Fontana/Collins, 1916), 
114-15. 
31 Thomas Jefferson, ‘Notes on the State of Virginia’ in The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. 
Adrienne Koch and William Peden (New York: Random House, Inc.), 227-8, 230. 
32 Ibid., 228-9. Michael Zuckert has used this extract to argue that Jefferson was rejecting the classical in the 
classical republican ideology, see Michael P. Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic: Studies in the Foundation of 
the American Political Tradition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), 212-214. 
33 Selby, The Revolution in Virginia, 130. 
195 
 
his Essay on the Revolutionary History of Virginia, Edmund Randolph expressed agreement 
with Jefferson’s hostility to the introduction of a dictator by labelling any proposed dictatorship 
as an ‘unfettered monster’.34  
For Jefferson and Randolph, dictatorship was synonymous with tyranny. Andreas 
Kalyvas has used Jefferson’s statements in the Notes to reinforce his argument that the concept 
of dictatorship was fused with the concept of tyranny much earlier than has been previously 
supposed. For Kalyvas, Jefferson was not merely attacking dictatorship, but tyranny as well.35 
Dictatorship, therefore, resembled an egregious betrayal of the republican principles at the 
centre of the Virginian constitution. Kalyvas’s article, however, does not take into 
consideration external factors which doubtless preconditioned Jefferson’s denunciation of the 
dictatorship debates. On 28 May 1781, Governor Jefferson himself wrote to Washington and 
suggested, in a guarded fashion, that the general should save Virginia from complete ruin.36 
While Jefferson did not propose that Washington should become a dictator, he was clearly in 
accord with the ‘dictatorial’ proponents in the House when he wished Washington to act as the 
‘saviour’ of the Commonwealth. Jefferson’s criticism of those who proposed the dictatorship 
                                                          
34 ‘Let the error be traced to the panic, which the novelty of positive war in 1776 produced, and in the year 1781 
to the false application of ancient history to a case, wholly unlike. Let it be understood, that the power, which may 
have saved Rome, would have made Virginia revolt’. ‘Edmund Randolph's Essay on the Revolutionary History 
of Virginia’, 315.  
35 Andreas Kalyvas, ‘The Tyranny of Dictatorship: When the Greek Tyrant Met the Roman Dictator’, Political 
Theory, 35 (2007): 429-30. Kalyvas’s main argument is that the two classical historians Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus and Appian of Alexandra fused the concepts of dictatorship and tyranny together in their histories 
and this is proven by Jefferson’s use of the term in the eighteenth century. 
36 ‘Were it possible for the Circumstance to justify in Your Excellency a determination to lend us Your personal 
aid, it is evident from the universal voice that the presence of their beloved Countryman, whose talents have been 
so long successfully employed in establishing the freedom of kindred States, to whose person they have still 
flattered themselves they retained some right, and have ever looked up as their dernier resort in distress, that your 
appearance among them I say would restore full confidence  of salvation, and would render them equal to whatever 
is not impossible .... Should the danger of this State and its consequence to the Union be such as to render it best 
for the whole that you should repair to it’s assistance, the difficulty would then be how to keep men out of the 
field. I have undertaken to hint this matter to your Excellency not only on my sense of its importance to us, but at 
the solicitations of many members of weight in our legislature which is not yet assembled to speak to their own 
desires. A few days will bring to me that period of relief which the Constitution has prepared for those oppressed 
with the labours of my office, and a long declared resolution of relinquishing ot to abler hands has prepared my 
way for retirement to a private station: still however as an individual citizen I should feel the comfortable effects 
of your presence’. Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, 28 May 1781, PTJ, VI: 33. 
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motion must also be put into context: George Nicolas was also the leading legislator who had 
led the investigation into Jefferson’s governorship. While it is certainly an exaggeration to 
suggest that Jefferson’s denunciation of the dictatorship debate was primarily motivated by a 
personal vendetta, it is not difficult to imagine that Jefferson wrote these passages under the 
influence of personal feelings. Unquestionably Jefferson’s tirade against dictatorship should be 
understood in context, but there is little doubt that Jefferson regarded dictatorship as a 
dangerous entity because of its potential for absolutism. There are other examples of the use of 
the term ‘dictator’ in the literature of this period that seem to reinforce not only Jefferson’s use 
of the term, but also Kalyvas’s argument about it. The Virginian, Carter Braxton, in 1776, had 
implied that the British Constitution was being ‘abused’ by ‘arbitrary British dictators’, Zabdiel 
Adams in a sermon had argued that dictator was ‘a title similar to that of absolute monarch’ 
and, in 1775, a writer in Purdie’s Virginia Gazette used the term dictator in a way that implies 
it was synonymous with tyranny.37 Clearly, for some Americans, ‘dictatorship’ was an ominous 
example of monocracy and ‘Life, Liberty, Blood and Treasure would lay blended in a general 
undistinguished Ruin’ if it were introduced in Virginia.38 
For most Americans, however, the term dictator only made sense in a Roman context. 
Patrick Henry, in the Virginian debates on the Federal Constitution in 1788, maintained that 
Thomas Nelson’s ‘dictatorship’ in 1781 followed Roman precedent: 
This government is so new, it wants a name. I wish its other novelties were as harmless as this. He 
[Governor Edmund Randolph] told us we had an American dictator in the year 1781. We never had 
an American President. In making a dictator, we followed the example of the most glorious, 
                                                          
37 ‘However necessary it may be to shake off the authority of arbitrary British dictators, we ought nevertheless, to 
adopt and perfect that system, which England has suffered to be grossly abused, and the experience of ages has 
taught us to venerate’, A native of this colony, ‘An Address to the Convention of the Colony and Ancient 
Dominion of Virginia on the Subject of Government in General, and Recommending a Particular Form in Their 
Attention, Virginia, 1776’, in American Political Writing during the Founding Era, 1760-1805, ed. Charles S. 
Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz, 2 vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 1983), I: 333. Zabdiel Adams, A Sermon 
preached before his Excellency John Hancock, Esq.; governour (|Boston: Printed by T. & j. Fleet and J. Gill, 
1782), 11. ‘For if such notions become fashionable amongst the military, our laws are but a parapet of paper, 
which the sword is ready to cut through on the first hint from a dictator’, ‘To Mr. Purdie’, The Virginia Gazette, 
24 February 1775. 
38 Impavidus, ‘No Headline’, The Boston Evening-Post, 20 May 1771. 
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magnanimous, and skilful nations. In great dangers, this power has been given. Rome had furnished 
us with an illustrious example. America found a person for that trust: she looked to Virginia for 
him. We gave a dictatorial power to hands that used it gloriously; and which were rendered more 
glorious by surrendering it up. Where is there a breed of such dictators? Shall we find a set of 
American Presidents of such a breed? Will the American President come and lay prostrate at the 
feet of Congress his laurels? I fear there are few men who can be trusted on that head.39 
Henry clearly believed that an executive under the dictatorship system was markedly different 
from the strong executive represented in the presidential system in the Federal Constitution. 
For Henry, evidence of this can be found in the Roman Republic. Historians have extensively 
documented the various ways in which Americans were inspired by the Roman example of 
republican government and how the examples passed down from ancient history informed their 
respective republican forms of government.40 The Classics were a mainstay in the education 
system in colonial America and all founding fathers were steeped in the histories, poetry and 
practices of the ancient Greeks and Romans.41 Authors such as Cicero, Sallust, Livy, Tacitus 
and Plutarch portrayed the collapse of the Roman Republic and, thus, provided Americans with 
the examples of the pitfalls of republican government: corruption, greed, luxury and disorder 
were understood to be the contributing factors in the demise of the Roman Republic. These 
                                                          
39 Patrick Henry, 6 June 1788, in The debates in the several state conventions on the adoption of the federal 
Constitution, as recommended by the general convention at Philadelphia, in 1787. Together with the Journal of 
the federal convention, Luther Martin’s letter, Yates’s minutes, Congressional opinions, Virginia and Kentucky 
resolutions of ‘98-‘99, and other illustrations of the Constitution, ed. Jonathan Elliot, 5 vols., 2nd edn. 
(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1861), III: 160. Henry was refuting a claim made by Governor Randolph 
that the establishment of a Virginia dictator in 1781 was a sign that the Union needed a strong executive system:  ‘I 
will close this catalogue of the evils of the dissolution of the Union by recalling to your mind what passed in the 
year 1781. Such was the situation of our affairs then, that the power of dictator was given to the commander-in-
chief, to save us from destruction. This shows the situation of the country to have been such as to make it ready 
to embrace an actual dictator.’ Ibid., III: 79. 
40 See Richard M. Gummere, The American Colonial Mind and the Classical Tradition: Essays in Comparative 
Culture (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1963); Eran Shalev, Rome Reborn on Western Shores: 
Historical Imagination and the Creation of the American Republic (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 
2009); Carl J. Richard, The Founders and the Classics: Greece, Rome and the American Enlightenment 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard university Press, 1994); Peter S. Onuf and Nicolas P. Cole, eds., Thomas Jefferson, 
the Classical World, and Early America (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011); Charles F. Mullet, 
‘Classical Influences on the American Revolution’, The Classical Journal, 35 (1939): 92-104, Carl J. Richard, 
Greeks & Romans Bearing Gifts: How the Ancients Inspired the Founding Fathers (Lanham, MD.: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008); Paul A. Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern, Vol. 3: Inventions of Prudence: 
constituting the American Regime (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994); and Meyer Reinhold, 
Classica Americana: The Greek and Roman Heritage in the United States (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 
1984). 
41 For the prevalence of classical learning in colonial America, see Carl Richard’s chapter, ‘The Classical 
Conditioning of the Founders’, in The Founders and the Classics, 12-38. 
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attributes were all dangerous and inimical to republicanism, which ought to be based on virtue 
and simplicity.42 It was inevitable that such a saturation in the Classics had a significant and 
long-lasting impact on the leading Patriots and on the subsequent introduction of republican 
forms of government. Gordon Wood contends that ‘such Classicism was not only a scholarly 
ornament of educated Americans, it helped to shape their values and their ideals of behavior’.43 
While Jefferson was undoubtedly exaggerating when he remarked that, ‘American farmers are 
the only farmers that can read Homer’, it does seem clear that the knowledge and understanding 
of Roman history were particularly pervasive in America.44 The pamphlets, diaries, 
correspondence and newspapers in Revolutionary America are peppered with classical 
allusions, ideas, and examples that helped build an ideological campaign against Britain. 
The example of the Roman Republic in its rise and fall was not only the most obvious 
precedent for Americans to build upon when they devised their republican forms of 
government; it was also a model to replicate. It was not just the ideas espoused by classical 
authors that inspired Americans during this period, but their practices. History had a 
teleological purpose for the eighteenth-century American: the study of history was not about 
accuracy or discovering the truth, but served to provide justifications and practical applications 
for solving the problems of the present. They manipulated or ‘managed’ historical evidence to 
suit the particular arguments contained in their pamphlets. It is important to emphasise the fact 
that they were not trying to convince historians of the modern era, but an eighteenth-century 
readership that was receptive and open to manipulated historical evidence. History, therefore, 
for the eighteenth-century American Whig was not about the past, but the present.  Examples 
from Roman history served a political function: instances where ‘virtuous’ farmer-politicians 
                                                          
42 Gordon Wood, ‘Prologue: The Legacy of Rome in the American Revolution’, in Thomas Jefferson, the Classical 
World and the American Revolution, 13. 
43 Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1969), 49. 
44 Thomas Jefferson to J. Hector St. John De Crevecoeur, 15 January 1787, cited in Richard M. Gummere, The 
American Colonial Mind and the Classical Tradition, 9. 
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saved Rome from tyrannical men helped illuminate and justify the colonists’ struggle against 
Britain. It goes further than this, however. Rome did not just furnish ideas and practices which 
influenced Americans in this period: it was regarded as the model through which Americans 
compared themselves to Britain.  The Americans, both in the colonial and in post-Independence 
periods, laboured to identify binary structures with Rome to explain their conflict with Britain 
and their early struggles to maintain a republic. Because natural law dictated that human nature 
remains constant, the examples provided by Roman history were readily seen as applicable to 
the situation in the colonies.45 Thus, the struggles in the later Roman Republic were being 
replayed in the American colonies in the later eighteenth century. Examples pervade colonial 
literature of tyrannical and corrupt Romans vying for power against the virtuous leaders 
resisting this oppression. For Americans, the latter were Romans such as Cicero or Cato who 
had resisted the tyrannical and corrupt designs of the Caesars and they needed such men in 
their own age to resist a British Nero.46 Thus, the actions and values of certain ‘honest’ and 
‘virtuous’ Romans acted as exemplars for Americans who believed that they were involved in 
a similar ideological and political battle with Britain. This typological exercise, which pervaded 
the literature of the period, is the context in which the debates concerning dictatorship should 
be understood. 
Through reading Livy, Cicero and Polybius, in particular, Americans in this period 
knew that temporary dictatorships were an integral part of the constitutional system of the 
Roman Republic. Because the executive arm in the Republic, which was represented by two 
consuls who often restricted each other’s power, was often ineffective in times of crisis, there 
was often a need for a system which allowed for decisive action. The two consuls would 
                                                          
45 Andrew Lossky, ‘Introduction: Gibbon and the Enlightenment’, in The Transformation of the Roman World: 
Gibbon’s Problem after Two Centuries, ed. Lynn White Jr. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1966), 4. 
46 The most persuasive argument in favour of the use of classical typology is Eran Shalev, Rome Reborn on 
Western Shores, 127-43. 
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normally appoint a dictator at these times, with the approval of the senate, and bestow upon the 
dictator absolute powers for a temporary period in order to save the constitutional order. The 
powers, or imperium, at the disposal of the dictator were immense: while the dictator was 
primarily a military appointment, his powers extended to every level of civil society. There 
were important restraints on the dictator however. He was dependent on the Senate with regard 
to financial matters and required its approval for all money drawn from the treasury, but there 
was no interference in how he dispensed these funds. A dictator could not rule for more than 
six months and there could not be more than one dictator in one year. This was a condition 
which was rigidly enforced and was never contravened in the Republic. The dictator could not 
alter the nature of the Constitution and under a dictatorship the Senate, the consuls and the 
tribunes still functioned as before. Despite these constraints, however, the dictator was a 
temporary tyrant governing absolutely.47 Thus, the very existence of the Republic was 
dependent on absolute power being exercised temporarily only during an alarming crisis.   
Americans were widely conversant with the examples of numerous dictators, but the 
most widely discussed example of a Roman dictator in America in this period was Julius 
Caesar. He was depicted as the antichrist of the Roman republic in the literature of the 
American Revolution.48 Caesar was denigrated in 1764 by James Otis as the ‘destroyer of 
Roman glory and grandeur’, John Dickinson blamed Caesar for ruining ‘Roman liberty, under 
the titles of tribunical and dictatorial authorities’ and John Adams, in 1771, compared Caesar 
to the ‘corrupt’ and ‘tyrannical’ royal governor, Thomas Hutchinson.49 While there was 
                                                          
47 For a description of the various powers at the disposal of a Roman dictator, see Rossiter, Constitutional 
Dictatorship, 23-26; Clifton Walker Keyes, ‘The Constitutional Position of the Roman Dictatorship’, Studies in 
Philology, 14 (1917), 298- 305; D. Cohen, ‘The Origin of Roman Dictatorship’, Mnemosyne, 4 (1957), 300-318. 
48 For studies on Julius Caesar and his reception in America, see Margaret Malamud, ‘Manifest Destiny and the 
Eclipse of Julius Caesar’, in Julius Caesar in Western Culture, ed. Maria Wyke (Malden, MA.: Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd., 2006), 148-169; and Maria Wyke, Caesar in the USA (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2012). The latter focuses on Caesar’s reception in twentieth-century America, but Wyke does focus closely on the 
American Founding in her introduction. 
49 James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved (Boston, 1764), 15; and John Dickinson, 
Letters from a farmer in Pennsylvania to the inhabitants of the British Colonies (Boston: Printed by Mein and 
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grudging acknowledgement of his military and tactical prowess, he was more often than not 
characterised as the ‘enemy of human kind’.50 Caesar was, therefore, the personification of 
tyranny. By contrast, the opponents of Caesar were venerated in America. Cato, Cassius and 
Brutus were all glorified and were often invoked as examples or models of Virtue fighting 
against the corrupt Caesar in these American oppositional writings waging ideological war 
against the corrupt British Parliament. Marcus Porcius Cato the Younger, who opposed Julius 
Caesar, was the most celebrated Roman hero in the American colonies.51 Cato by Joseph 
Addison was by far the most popular play in the Atlantic colonies and John Trenchard’s and 
Thomas Gordon’s Cato’s Letters were widely disseminated and read in the colonies.52 The Seal 
of the Commonwealth of Virginia, moreover, forever captured Caesar as the personification of 
tyranny: it portrays ‘Virtue’ (representing the Commonwealth) triumphantly standing over the 
figure of ‘tyranny’, bearing a striking resemblance to Julius Caesar, and proclaims ‘sic semper 
tyrannis’ (thus always to tyrants) on the bottom of the seal.53  Thus, the dictator, Julius Caesar, 
was a tyrant who was the scourge of the Roman Republic and the cause of its demise. Were 
Americans disparaging Julius Caesar himself or Caesar as dictator?  
Americans did not universally loath Julius Caesar because he was a dictator per se, but 
they did interpret Caesar’s rise to power through his exploitation of the dictatorship system. In 
other words, Americans were not criticising the office of dictatorship when they were 
                                                          
Fleming, 1768), 62. John Adams argued: ‘Caesar, by destroying the Roman Republic, made himself a perpetual 
Dictator; Hutchinson, by countenancing and supporting a System of Corruption and Tyranny, has made himself 
Governor – and the mad Idolatry of the People, always the surest Instruments of their own servitude, laid prostrate 
at the Feet of both’. John Adams, Diary, 13 June 1771, in The Diary and Autobiography of John Adams, ed. L.H. 
Butterfield (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1961), II: 35. 
50 ‘From Gordon’s Discourse upon Caesar the Dictator’, The Boston Gazette, and the Country Journal. 14 
February 1785.  
51 Shalev, Rome Reborn in Western Shores, 219. See Anon., ‘A new Epilogue to Cato’, The Continental Journal, 
And Weekly Advertiser, 30 April 1778. 
52 Julie Ellison, Cato’s Tears and the Making of Anglo-American Emotion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1999), 68; Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 19767), 35-7. 
53 Richard R. Beeman, The Varieties of Political Experience in Eighteenth-Century America (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 31-32. 
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condemning Caesar, but they were mindful that Caesar exploited the dictatorship system for 
his own malevolent ends. An article written in the Massachusetts Spy in 1771 perfectly captures 
this logic: 
This power might have originally been intended for wise purposes, but we see what is the 
consequence. The office of dictator in Rome, though a great stretch of power, was intended by that 
honest people to be a means of safety for their country. This when in the hands of Camilius, and 
men of integrity, often proved so. But it was dangerous, and Rome found it so to her cost. It was 
this engine that overthrew the liberties of the nation, and under the name of dictator Caesar 
triumphed over the liberties of his country.54 
Just as they condemned Cromwell for destroying the English Commonwealth, so Americans 
castigated Caesar for destroying the Roman Republican tradition, which included the practice 
of temporary dictatorship. Indeed, there are many examples in which Cromwell and Caesar 
were portrayed in a similar light.55 Caesar utilised the dictatorship for his own tyrannical ends: 
he ‘covered his ambitious designs with the semblance of popular virtues’ and ‘laid waste that 
flourishing empire in blood, and introduced a monarchical government, more arbitrary, 
tyrannical and cruel than the first’.56 It was the ‘engine’ through which he overthrew the 
‘liberties’ of Rome: ‘as perpetual dictator, Caesar was perpetual tyrant’.57 Americans 
interpreted Caesar’s usurpation of the dictatorship system as the fundamental cause for the 
                                                          
54 A Centinel, ‘For the Massachusetts Spy’, The Massachusetts Spy, 2 May 1771.  
55 An oration by William Tudor in 1779 portrayed Cromwell and Caesar as tyrants: ‘Cromwell ... became sole 
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despostism operates to the public misery – Dictator, King, Protector, - it is not the appellation we reprobate, though 
even that we should guard against – but the thing. Who but must own that Cromwell under the name of Protector, 
was as absolute a despot as he could have been with any other title? The first CAESAR affords us another instance 
among the thousands which history holds up to our view, to teach us what bold and principled  spirits have effected 
by the aid of the armies .... He ... led his veteran legions, “nothing loth,” against his country; passed the rubicon; 
fought his way to Rome; plunged a dagger in her vitals; impiously trampled on her dearest rights; and seized on 
empire crimsoned, execrable patricide! Crimsoned with the richest blood of Rome’s best citizens! ...Learn Hence, 
my countrymen, that a state may sink so low in slavery that even itself cannot retrieve her’. William Tudor, An 
Oration delivered March 5th, 1779 at the request of the town of Boston: to commemorate the tragedy of the fifth 
of March, 1770 (Boston: Printed by Edes  Gill, 1779), 9-11. 
56 Anon., ‘For The Massachusetts Spy’, 25 April 1771, Anon., ‘On the Five per Cent duty’, The Freeman’s 
Journal, 6 November 1782. 
57 C.X., ‘Hume’s Essays’, Dunlap’s Maryland Gazette, 26 March 1776.  
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demise of the Republic and the real reason for the rise of the despotic Roman emperors. 
Americans abhorred Caesar because his actions gave birth to Caesarism.58 
In contrast to the vilification of Julius Caesar, there was admiration for other Roman 
dictators. There can be little room for doubt that for an American eighteenth-century readership 
there were proven examples where the system of dictatorship actually worked and, for most 
Americans, it seemed much more preferable to the rule of the first Roman kings: ‘The 
dictatorial power was afterwards given occasionally, and found of great use; but still it was 
limited to so many months; and there are instances where even the dictator could not do what 
he pleased, but was overruled by the people’.59 Alexander Hamilton, in his defence of strong 
executive powers in The Federalist No. 80, utilised the example of dictators in Rome to support 
his advocacy of a strong presidential system: 
Every man the least conversant in Roman story, knows how often that republic was obliged to take 
refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of Dictator, as well against 
the intrigues of ambitious individuals who aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes 
of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, as against the 
invasions of external enemies who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome.60 
Dictatorship, therefore, was a necessary ‘evil’ in order to continue the functioning existence of 
a republic. Rather than being a tyrannical office in itself, it often served as a buffer against 
those who ‘aspired to tyranny’.  
 In praising certain Roman dictators, such as Fabius, Camillus and Cincinnatus, 
Americans in this period demonstrated that they also appreciated the importance of the 
dictatorship system in maintaining the Roman Republic. They were to ‘admire, in Camillus, 
                                                          
58 Although the word ‘Caesarism’ was not in common use until the middle of the nineteenth century, it was obvious 
that Americans in this period understood the concept even though they did not use the word. See Zwi Yavetz, 
‘Caesar, Caesarism, and the historians’, Journal of Contemporary History, 6 (1971), 189 and Nicolas Cole, 
‘Republicanism, Caesarism and Political Change’, in A Companion to Julius Caesar, ed. Miriam Griffin (Malden, 
MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2009), 419. 
59 Anon, ‘The Remainder of the piece begun in our last’, The Massachusetts Spy, 6 February 1772. 
60 Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist: a collection of essays, written in favour of the new Constitution, as agreed 
upon by the Federal Constitution, September 17, 1787, 2 vols. (New York, 1788), II: 240. 
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this fine example, this greatness of soul, he, who, having been unjustly banished, forgetful of 
the wrongs he had received, and actuated by the love of his country, more than the desire of 
revenge, comes to save those who had sought his ruin’.61 The system of dictatorship, therefore, 
required a virtuous man to undertake ominous responsibilities: ‘The great dictator Fabius 
saved, and even restored, the Roman state, by a prudent forbearance, when the more sanguine 
measures of a general, actuated by an immoderate love of glory, might have ruined the 
republic’.62 The Roman dictator Quintus Cincinnatus was a revered figure in Revolutionary 
America. The use of the name ‘Cincinnatus’ as a pseudonym was prevalent in newspapers and 
pamphlets in this period.63 For most Americans, Cincinnatus was the ideal historical figure: 
‘Cincinnatus was taken from the plough to save and defend the Roman State; an office which 
he executed honestly and successfully, without the grimace and gains of a Statesman .... As he 
came into it with universal consent, he resigned it with universal applause’.64 The farmer-
dictator exhibited outstanding attributes such as ‘magnanimity of mind, disinterested conduct, 
and refined patriotism’ that ‘dazzled’ many Americans.65 It was not just the fact that he did not 
take advantage of his office or the fact that he had many admirable qualities, but it was also the 
fact that ‘Honest Cincinnatus was but a Farmer: And Happy had it been for the Romans, if, 
when they were enslaved, they could have taken the Administration out of the Hands of the 
Emperors, and their refined Politicians, and committed it to such Farmers’.66  
                                                          
61 The Virginia Gazette, 9 March 1776. 
62 Anon., ‘From the American Magazine’, The New-York Gazette, 16 January 1758. 
63 Examples in newspapers include Cincinnatus, ‘Friday; Committee; Correspondence; Memorial; Honorable; 
House; Representatives’, Boston Evening-Post, 1 March 1773; Cincinnatus, ‘For the Massachusetts Spy’, 
Massachusetts Spy, 16 June 1774; ‘For the Pennsylvania Packet’, Pennsylvania Packet, 22 October 1776; and 
‘From the Freedman’s Journal’, Thomas’s The Massachusetts Spy, 29 August 1782. For the use of classical 
pseudonyms in American pamphlets and newspapers and their political functions, see Eran Shalev, ‘Ancient 
Masks, American Fathers: Classical Pseudonyms during the American Revolution and Early Republic’, Journal 
of the Early Republic, 23 (2003), 151-172 and Eran Shalev, Rome Reborn on Western Shores, 151-187. 
64 Anon., ‘What is Government But a Trust Committed by all, or the Most to One or a Few Who are to Attend’, 
The Pennsylvania Evening Post, 28 March 1775 
65 Anon., ‘For the Massachusetts Spy, the Centinel, No. XXXV’, The Massachusetts Spy, 20 February 1772. 
66 Anon., ‘’Messiuers Printers’, The Boston Gazette, or Country Journal, 12 May 1755. 
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 The classical typology to which many Americans subscribed prior to 1776 continued 
during the war. This is evident in the way George Washington was habitually depicted as the 
American Cincinnatus. When Washington resigned his commission as Commander-in-Chief 
of the Continental Army in 1783, the similarity between him and Cincinnatus was not lost on 
the American public: the plethora of platitudes to Washington in addresses, paintings and 
statues were all fashioned in the image of Cincinnatus.67 Although this Cincinnati iconography 
largely took place after 1783, there are examples during the war which show that many 
Americans quickly installed Washington as the mythical protector of the new republic. Poems, 
songs and addresses published during the War suggest that many Americans identified the same 
attributes in Washington that most Romans detected in their esteemed dictators. In an address 
in the Virginia Gazette in 1777, Washington was almost deified: ‘Great in the cabinet as in 
war, he shines with unrivalled splendour in every department of life; and, whilst his abilities as 
a Statesman and a General excite our wonder, his disinterested patriotism and domestic virtues 
command universal veneration’. Washington’s admirable qualities were placed on a pedestal 
for all Virginians to venerate: 
Such, my Countrymen, is the General who directs the military operation of America; such the 
glorious leader of her armies; such the HERO whose bright example should fire every generous 
heart to enlist in the service of his country. Let it not be said you are callous to the impressions of 
such noble considerations, but, by following his glorious example, shew yourselves worthy of 
possessing that inestimable jewel LIBERTY, and reflect that you have nothing to dread whilst you 
are engaged in so glorious a cause, and blessed with a WASHINGTON for a leader’68 
Washington had all the traits of an American Cincinnatus and he was clearly exhorted to ‘Be 
Th[e] great guardian of thy country’s cause’.69 Although the symbolism which portrayed 
                                                          
67 According to Garry Wills, Washington deliberately modelled his leadership style on such classical heroes as 
Cincinnatus in the years following the War. See Garry Wills, Cincinnatus, passim. See also Maurie D. Mcinnis, 
‘George Washington: Cincinnatus or Marcus Aurelius?’ in Thomas Jefferson, The Classical World, and Early 
America, 128-170, and Ron Chernow, Washington: A life (New York: The Penguin Press, 2010), 448-458. 
68 H.G.R., ‘Honour, I obey Obey Thee!’, Virginia Gazette, 24 January 1777.  
69 Charles Henry Wharton, Á poetical epistle to His Excellency George Washington, Esq. Commander in chief of 
the armies of the United States of America, from an inhabitant of the State of Maryland. To which is annexed, a 
short sketch of General Washington’s life and character (London, 1780), 7.  
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Washington as the American Cincinnatus was not fully crystallised until 1783, there were 
attempts earlier to draw comparisons between the two military leaders: 
Such, to name no more, was the Character of a Cincinnatus in ancient Times; rising “awful from 
the plough” to save his country; and, his Country saved, returning to the Plough again, with 
increased Dignity and Lustre. Such too, if we divine aright, will future Ages pronounce to have 
been the character of a; but you all anticipate me in a Name, which delicacy 
forbids me, on this occasion to mention. Honoured with his Presence as a Brother, you will seek to 
derive Virtue from his Example; and never let it be said, that any principles you profess, can render 
you Deaf to the calls of your Country; but, on the contrary, have animated you with intrepidity in 
the Hour of Danger, and Humanity in the moments of triumph.70  
Undoubtedly this veneration was partly a result of the exemplary leadership qualities of 
Washington, but it also stemmed from a widespread belief that Americans needed a hero to fill 
the role of 'saviour' of the fledging republic. In other words, Washington was deliberately cast 
in the mould of Cincinnatus so that Americans could have their archetypal ‘hero’ of the 
republic. 
In the same way as Washington was expected to fulfil the role of the Republican 
Protector, so there was an expectation in certain circles that a dictator would be established to 
protect the republic. Proof of this can be found in the false rumours circulating in 1777 in the 
newspapers that George Washington was made a dictator by Congress, which John Adams 
reported as a ‘Collection of Lyes [sic]’.71 In 1776, there was a plea to the Assembly of 
                                                          
70 William Smith, A Sermon preached in Christ-Church, Philadelphia (for the benefit of the poor) (Philadelphia: 
Printed by John Dunlap, 1779), 22. Compare Wharton’s poetical epistle:  
‘Thus, when of old, from his paternal farm  
Rome bad her rigid Cincinnatus arm,  
Th’ illustrious peasant rushes to the field; 
Soon are the haughty Volfii taught to yield: 
His country sav’d, the solemn triump o’er,  
He tills his native acres as before.’ 
Wharton, A poetical Epistle to his Excellency George Washington, 7. 
71 An example of this spurious reporting that John Adams condemned is: ‘It is confidently reported, that the 
Congress have devolved all their Power upon Mr. Washington, and appointed him DICTATOR, in example of the 
Romans. The Reason, if the Fact be true, is very apparent: They find themselves in a slippery Situation, and are 
glad to throw their Burthen upon the first Simpleton of Consequence that would take it. Washington has now no 
mean Character to support: He must be the first or last of Men, who would accept Power upon such terms. But as 
the Congress are desperate, as is this Gentleman, as the first Instance of this Protectorship, he has ordered all 
Persons to take an active Part in his Concerns, and for the Support of his Authority, upon Pain of Confiscation of 
all their Properties.’ ‘New York, February 3’, The New-York Gazette; and The Weekly Mercury, 3 February 1777. 
John Adams wrote to his wife Abigail that ‘Another report, which has been industriously circulated is, that the 
General has been made by Congress, Dictator. But this as false as the other Stories. Congress it is true, upon 
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Pennsylvania for a dictator to be installed.72 The desire for a dictator to be established during 
the war is a clear example of the extent to which some Americans believed that they were not 
just following Roman examples, but fulfilling their destiny as latter-day American Romans. 
There was an expectation that their ‘virtuous’ leader would make sure that their Republic was 
safe. Virginia was in danger and thus needed a Cincinnatus to protect her from ruin. 
II 
The Dictator in the Whig tradition 
The question remains, however, whether the attempt to install a dictator in Virginia, and the 
increased military powers that Henry and Nelson enjoyed on a temporary basis, represented an 
abandonment of the radical Country Whig ideology which had inspired their 1776 constitution. 
This constitution was designed upon the premise that an independent and strong executive was 
a potential threat to the political system and, in particular, harmful to the future of the 
Commonwealth in general. A dictatorship which devolved a substantial array of powers upon 
a single man seems, on the surface, to be diametrically opposed to this ideological principle. 
Indeed, a dictator appears to be more in the style of a ‘Soveraign [sic] Power’ which Thomas 
Hobbes described in his Leviathan.73 
                                                          
removing to Baltimore, gave the General Power, to raise fifteen Battallions [sic], in Addition to those which were 
ordered to be raised before, and to appoint the Officers, and also to raise three thousand Horse, and to appoint 
their Officers, and also to take Necessities for his Army, at an appraised Value. But no more. Congress never 
thought of making him Dictator, or giving him a Sovereignty.’ John Adams to Abigail Adams, 6 April 1777, 
Adams Family Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.  
72 ‘Would it not conduce to the immediate safety of the state of Pennsylvania if a Dictator were appointed for 
three or six months, with full powers to exert the strength of the state in any way he should think proper against 
our enemies? Has not the want of a suitable person, entrusted with such powers in time of war, ended in the ruin 
of several of the most flourishing republics of antiquity? Are no the present ravages of the enemy in the states of 
New-York and New-Jersey owing to the want of suitable persons entrusted with absolute power to compel every 
individual of those states to concur in repelling the common enemy? Does not the languor with which all the new 
legislatures in America move, in the present alarming exigency of our affairs, fully demonstrate that placing so 
little in the hands of the executive branch of government is a most essential and fundamental fault in all our new 
constitutions?’ A Citizen, ‘To the Assembly of the of Pennsylvania’, The Pennsylvania Evening Post, 7 December 
1776.  
73 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or, The matter, form, and power of a common-wealth ecclesiastical and civil by 
Thomas Hobbes (London, 1651), 175-186. 
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 Certain theorists, who were either antecedents or prophets of the Country Whig 
tradition themselves, acknowledged that the practice of dictatorship was not necessarily 
contrary to the principles later adopted in American republicanism. Just as Americans in the 
Revolutionary era looked upon the golden age of the Roman Republic as a source of inspiration 
and guidance, so did early Country Whig thinkers utilise examples from the Roman Republic 
in order to substantiate their theoretical political systems. Niccolo Machiavelli, the ideological 
forbearer of Classical Republicanism, argued vehemently that ‘the dictatorial authority did 
good, and not harm, to the Roman Republic’. For Machiavelli, because ‘no dictator did 
anything but good to the republic’, dictatorship contributed to the ‘greatness of so great an 
empire’.74 James Harrington, a disciple of Machiavellian thought, included a provision for a 
dictatorship in his constitution for The Commonwealth of Oceana if an emergency arose: ‘And 
the whole administration of the commonwealth for the term of the said three months shall be 
in the Dictator, provided that the Dictator shall have no power to do anything that tends not to 
his proper end and institution, but all to the preservation of the commonwealth as it is 
established, and for the sudden restitution of the same to the natural channel and common 
course of government’.75  Algernon Sidney, while not permitting dictatorship in his ideal 
political system, begrudgingly accepted in his Discourses on Government that dictatorship 
might be necessary in certain circumstances. Even Jean-Jacques Rousseau in 1762 argued that 
                                                          
74 Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), 73, 74, 75. See Patrick J. Coby, Machiavelli’s Romans: Liberty and Greatness 
in the Discourses on Livy (Oxford: Lexington Books, 1999), 5-59, 114. For Machiavelli’s influence on the Country 
Whig tradition, see J.G.A Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Neal Wood, ‘The Value of Asocial 
Sociability: Contributions of Machiavelli, Sidney and Montesquieu’, in Machiavelli and the Nature of Political 
Thought, ed. Martin Fleisher (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1973), 282-307; and Felix Raab, The English Face of 
Machiavelli: A Changing Interpretation, 1500-1700 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964), 185-217. 
75 James Harrington, The Common-wealth of Oceana (London, 1656), 132. Harrington also stipulated that the 
dictator of Oceana had a term of three months, and had ‘power to levy men and money, to make war and peace, 
as also to enact laws which shall be good for the space of one year’, in ibid. See also Charles Blitzer, An Immortal 
Commonwealth: The Political Thought of James Harrington (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960); J.G.A 
Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth 
Century, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 124-147; and C.B. Macpherson, The Political 
Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 160-193. 
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most dictators were effective in their duties in the Roman Republic before the dictatorships of 
Sulla and Julius Caesar.76  
 The appreciation of the importance of dictatorship for these theorists was conditional 
upon certain significant factors however. In the first place, dictatorship in the Roman Republic 
was not thrust upon the constitutional system, but emanated from it; it involved powers that 
were freely granted, not seized by force or corruption. Machiavelli’s approval of the 
dictatorship system in Rome was predicated upon the fundamental fact that all dictators were 
essentially legal: ‘One sees that while the dictator was appointed to public orders, and not by 
his own authority, he always did good to the city. For magistrates that are made and authorities 
that are given through extraordinary ways, not those that come through ordinary ways, hurt 
republics’.77 This system of dictatorship, therefore, never contravened the legal processes that 
were in place; dictators were exercising kingly prerogatives within the confines of the law. 
Harrington justified the existence of a Dictator in Oceana on the same grounds as Machiavelli: 
dictatorship was part of the constitution of the Commonwealth of Oceana. Both theorists 
recognised the fact that temporary, prescribed emergency powers were sometimes essential for 
the preservation of the constitutional order, but both also emphasised that dictatorship should 
be provided for by the constitution.78 Because a constitution could not possibly foresee every 
eventuality, it was essential that it prescribed a system whereby temporary emergency powers 
could be invoked to alleviate a critical situation.79  
                                                          
76 Algernon Sidney, Discourses Concerning Government (London, 1698), 119; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A Treatise 
on the social compact; or the Principles of politic law (London, 1764), 220. See also Peter Richards, Algernon 
Sidney (1623-1683): A Martyr to Liberty (London: Libertarian Heritage No. 29, 2012); Alan Craig Houston, 
Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 201-228; and Caroline Robbins, ‘Algernon Sidney’s Discourses 
Concerning Government: Textbook of Revolution’, William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, 4 (1947), 267-96. 
77 Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, 74. 
78 Charles Blitzer, An Immortal Commonwealth, 256. 
79 Indeed, Harrington argued ‘But whereas it is incident unto Common-Wealths upon Emergencies requiring 
extraordinary speed, or secrecie [sic], either through their natural delayes [sic], or unnatural haste to incur equal 
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 Because Harrington made sure dictatorship was integrated into the constitutional fabric 
of a state, ultimate sovereignty in the Commonwealth still resided with the legislature.80 
Algernon Sidney also argued that dictatorial power must always be kept subordinate to the 
supremacy of the people: ‘I do therefore grant, that a power like to the dictatorian, limited in 
time, circumscribed by law, and kept perpetually under the supreme authority of the people, 
may, by virtuous and well disciplined nations, upon some occasions, be prudently granted to a 
virtuous man’.81 For Sidney, dictatorship was only permissible if popular sovereignty remained 
intact. Dictatorship for these theorists, therefore, did not represent a Hobbesian ‘Soveraign [sic] 
Power’ because it lacked ultimate sovereignty. Sidney highlights the fact that because 
sovereignty resides in the people, dictators could do very little harm: ‘Cincinnatus, Camillus, 
Paprius, Mamercus, Fabius Maximus, were not made dictators, that they might learn the duties 
of the office; but because they were judged to be of such wisdom, valour, integrity and 
experience, that they might be safely trusted with the highest powers; and whilst the law 
reigned, not one was advanced to that honour, who did not fully answer what was expected 
from him’.82 For Sidney, these examples of successful dictators proved ‘that the government 
was ever the same remaining in the people, who without prejudice might give the 
administration to one or more men as best pleased themselves, and the success shews that they 
did prudently’.83  
                                                          
danger, while holding unto the slow pace of their Orders, they come not in time to defend themselves from sudain 
[sic] blow; or breaking them for the greater speed, they but haste unto their own Destruction’.. Harrington, The 
Common-wealth of Oceana, 131-2. Compare this with Machiavelli’s explanation for the necessity of having a 
dictatorship: ‘So a republic will never be perfect unless it has provided for everything with its laws and has 
established a remedy for every accident and given the mode to cover it. So, concluding, I say that those republics 
that in urgent dangers do not take refuge either in the dictator or in similar authorities will always come to ruin in 
grave accidents’, Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, 75. 
80 Harrington, The Common-wealth of Oceana, 132. 
81 Algernon Sidney, Discourses Concerning Government, 119. 
82 Ibid., 217. 
83 Ibid., 119. 
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Dictatorship was not an ‘unfettered monster’ which was uncontrollable, but, because it 
was prescribed in the constitution, it was bound by certain restrictions that hindered its ability 
to become tyrannical. Not only was the tenure of dictators restricted to a specified term of 
office, but their jurisdiction was also limited to resolving the problem at hand. While they 
enjoyed a broad array of powers to deal with the crisis, they could not alter the constitutional 
order when they were in office. For Machiavelli, this was crucial: ‘So, when the brief time of 
his dictatorship, the limited authorities he had, and the noncorrupt Roman people are added up, 
it was impossible for him to escape his limits and hurt the city; and one sees by experience that 
he always helped’. A constitutional dictatorship was permitted in time of war or rebellion and 
its only purpose was to preserve the independence of the state.84 Dictatorship, therefore, for 
these theorists, was not a dangerous office in itself because it was a temporary office, which 
was established by the constitution and which lacked ultimate sovereignty, and its holder could 
not overstep his stated powers. 
It is clear, therefore, that dictatorship was not as contrary to Country Whig ideology as 
one might first suppose. When a minority of Virginians sought to establish a dictatorship, they 
did so not only because they believed that they needed to replicate the example of the Roman 
Republic, but also because they were following the theories propagated by certain major 
theorists of Classical Republicanism. There can be no doubt that if the Virginian government 
did establish a de facto dictator, they were not establishing a permanent tyrant. For George 
Nicolas, Patrick Henry and Richard Henry Lee among others, dictatorship did not represent an 
acceptance of excessive executive power, but was a necessary emergency provision which 
could prevent the downfall of the entire Commonwealth. As long as dictators were restricted 
in their tenure and jurisdiction and as long as they did not enjoy ultimate sovereignty, these 
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Virginians believed that they would not pose a serious risk to the Commonwealth. It was a 




Conclusion: The Adaptation of the Roman republican model 
Thomas Nelson was governor of Virginia for only five months (he resigned because of ill 
health) and in that time he did not hesitate to make use of the increased powers at his disposal. 
He was facing an enemy on his doorstep, governing a state with very little revenue and one 
which was suffering spiralling inflation, and he had to operate with a state militia which was 
haemorrhaging men at an alarming rate. He took vigorous action by impressing all goods and 
equipment, personally leading the state militia to maintain control, and ordering loyalists to be 
arrested. Nelson’s ability to keep the Virginian militia supplied undoubtedly contributed to the 
eventual defeat of the British at Yorktown. With his hands-on approach to governorship, 
Nelson often acted unconstitutionally because he governed without the consent of the council. 
In the months after his governorship had ended, he was severely rebuked in the press and by 
leading Virginians for governing ‘arbitrarily’ and without ‘limitation’, while ‘sapping the 
Foundations of the Commonwealth, and the Rights and Libertys [sic] of the People’.85 He 
defended his actions by arguing that ‘the critical situation of the army and the peculiar 
circumstances of the country, made vigorous exertions necessary; and I must acknowledge that 
I feel the truest satisfaction when I reflect that those exertions were crowned with success’.86 
The House of Delegates on 27 December 1781 retrospectively legalised all Governor Nelson’s 
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actions.87 While it would be an exaggeration to suggest that Nelson’s strengthened 
governorship saved Virginia from ruin, there can be little doubt that Nelson’s ‘dictatorial’ 
behaviour partly contributed to the defeat of the British. 
 While the proponents of the dictatorial debate did not manage to create the dictatorship 
which they wanted, they probably felt somewhat vindicated by the success of the actions taken 
by Governor Nelson. They realised that in order to maintain effective control of the state, 
decisive executive action was required. Indeed, one could possibly argue that Thomas Nelson’s 
governorship was a Classical Republican dictator in another guise: rather than establishing a 
dictator from outside the prescribed constitution, the governor was given extraordinary powers 
within the constitution in order to save Virginia from its worst imaginable fate.  
 The crucial component of this discussion is the fact that Virginia essentially rejected 
the Roman form of dictatorship.  In the same way as they adapted the Country Whig ideology 
concerning executive power in their constitution, so they adapted the implementation of the 
dictator. The refusal to follow Roman precedent and Jefferson’s repudiation of the dictatorship 
system both mark an interesting evolution of thought for Virginians. They looked upon the 
Roman example and realised that, without the occasional resort to dictatorship, the Roman 
republic could not have survived. The very existence of republicanism in Rome required the 
existence of temporary absolutism. For Jefferson, this demonstrated that the Roman Republic 
was fundamentally flawed: a republic in any age should not always have recourse to the 
abilities of one man in order to resolve a critical situation, especially when that man might end 
up being a Julius Caesar or Oliver Cromwell. When Thomas Jefferson wrote those paragraphs 
in his Notes on the State of Virginia, he would have been reminded of the passage in The 
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Republic by Plato when Socrates warned against installing a popular champion to rule over the 
people: 
The people have always some champion whom they set over them and nurse into greatness ... This 
and no other is the root from which a tyrant springs; when he first appears above ground he is a 
protector .... How then does a protector begin to change into a tyrant? .... Must he not either perish 
at the hands of his enemies, or from being a man become a wolf – that is, a tyrant?88   
 
 The debate over establishing a dictatorship is crucial to our understanding of the 
evolving opinion that Virginians had of the executive branch in this period. In 1776, the 
executive branch had been undoubtedly the one institution in the political system that 
was most feared. A strong executive branch endangered the constitution as it had the 
greatest propensity for absolutism and corruption. In other words, the executive branch 
was perceived as the greatest danger to the political system. By 1781, the executive was 
now perceived, by some, as the only saviour of the political system. The changing 






                                                          





Virginia and the Development of the Executive Branch, 1781-1788 
 
This chapter focuses on the development of executive authority in the United States up to 1788 
when the Federal Constitution was finally ratified. It will provide a succinct overview of the 
nature and development of the position and authority of the executive branch in Virginia, in 
the other states and on the national level. It will focus its attention on the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787 and explain why it created a much stronger executive branch than had 
previously been devised. It will analyse Virginian reaction to this presidential system and 
assess the extent to which Virginians were hostile to the new federal executive branch. In the 
second half of this chapter, and building upon the previous discussion, this dissertation will 
conclude by comparing the system of royal governorship to the system of state governorship 
in Virginia. 
I 
The Executive Branch in the American States up to 1787 
Thomas Nelson’s five-month term as governor of Virginia is very significant for this study of 
the evolution of gubernatorial power. In 1776, the Virginia Convention established an 
executive branch which was completely stripped of any meaningful powers and, at the same 
time, it devised a strong legislative branch that had full possession of the kind of prerogatives, 
which had been granted to royal governors before the Revolution. By 1781, when the 
exigencies of war were ravaging the state, some members of the legislative branch recognised 
the importance of having a stronger executive branch with access to some temporary 
emergency powers. Some Virginians were pessimistic about the future of the Commonwealth 
and they even considered installing a dictator to ‘save’ it. Instead, they elected Thomas Nelson 
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to become governor. He was vested with some extraordinary powers to drive the British out of 
Virginia and also to help achieve ultimate victory over the enemy. 
 The perceived importance of executive power to the political framework had evolved 
fundamentally in the space of five years. Without the necessary prerogatives to manage a crisis, 
the state governor, as devised in the Virginian Constitution, was nothing more than an 
administrator who was beholden to the legislative branch. The situation in 1781 required a 
governor that was able not only to respond to an emergency situation appropriately, but an 
executive who did not have to wait for the approval of an intransigent or divided legislative 
branch. In other words, by 1781, Virginians began to realise that the executive branch required 
a form of prerogative power. More important, the perception of governorship had changed: in 
1776, a strong executive branch was regarded as the greatest threat to the political system, but, 
by 1781, a strong executive was required in order to save the same political system. These 
changing perceptions of the dangers posed by executive power, which had significantly altered 
in these short, but tumultuous five years, ensured that executive authority in Virginia had 
evolved.  
Virginia was not the only state in America to modify the powers at the disposal of its 
executive branch during the War for Independence. Politicians in other states quickly realised 
that the dangers posed by dominant executives within their republican political systems were 
outweighed by a situation that appeared to spell the end of republican government itself. New 
York and Massachusetts had devised constitutions, in 1777 and 1780 respectively, that restored 
a degree of authority to the executive branch. Both states provided for the popular election of 
governors and then granted those elected a limited veto power. Although the popular election 
of the governor signalled the people’s check on the legislative branch, the veto was not absolute 
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and could be overturned by a two-thirds majority in the legislature.1 Both constitutions 
signalled an evolution in public attitudes towards executive power, however. It was believed 
that the burden and demands of a protracted war could only be alleviated by a decisive and 
administratively capable governor. 
 Similar attitudes motivated other states to modify their executive branches in order to 
prosecute the war more efficiently. Just as the Virginia legislature devolved certain special 
powers to Thomas Nelson in 1781, so did the South Carolinian legislature increase the powers 
at the disposal of its executive branch when the British forces appeared to be invading 
Charleston in 1780. The legislature granted its governor, John Rutledge, the ‘power to do 
everything necessary for the public good except the taking away the life of a citizen without 
legal trial’.2 Changes to executive powers were not solely restricted to state constitutions, 
however. The pressures placed on the ‘national’ government in Philadelphia during the war led 
some in the capital to propose that Congress should appoint executive officers to manage the 
war effort more robustly.3 In 1780, Alexander Hamilton complained that ‘Congress is properly 
a deliberative corps and it forgets itself when it attempts to play the executive’. He suggested 
that the newly-formed Confederation should have distinct executive departments with 
                                                          
1 For the Massachusetts’ Constitution of 1780, see The Popular Sources of Political Authority: Documents on the 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, ed. Oscar and Mary Handlin (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of the 
Harvard University Press, 1966), 25-26; Massachusetts, Colony to Commonwealth: Documents on the Formation 
of its Constitution, 1775-1780, ed. Robert J. Taylor (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), 51-
58. For the New York Constitution of 1777, see Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire: New York and the 
Transformation of Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1664-1830 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2005), 145-202. 
2 In fact, South Carolina’s provisional constitution, which was drafted before independence, granted its governor 
an absolute veto power, but eliminated this veto power in an amended constitution after independence was 
declared in 1776. Ray Raphael, Mr. President: How and Why the Founders Created a Chief Executive (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2012), 41. 
3 In December 1776, after Congress fled to Baltimore because of fear of attack from British forces, Robert Morris 
proposed that Congress ‘pay good executive men to do their business as it ought to be & not lavish missions away 
by their own mismanagement. I say mismanagement because no men living can attend the daily deliberations of 
Congress & to do executive part of business at the same time’. Robert Morris to the Committee of Secret 
Correspondence, 16 December 1776, in Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, ed. Edmund C. Burnett, 
8 vols. (Washington D.C.: The Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1921-1936), II: 178. Robert Morris would 
later serve as the Superintendent of Finance of the United States from 1781 to 1784. 
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individuals in charge of each agency.4 Hamilton did not suggest, however, that Congress should 
create a chief executive to oversee these different executive agencies. By 1781, Congress was 
lacking money and credit, and representatives decided to create three ‘civil executive offices’: 
a Financier, a Secretary of War and a Secretary of Marine. Congress realised that it required 
competent executive officers in order to prosecute the war effort more effectively. 
 When the fighting on the American mainland in 1781 stopped, and with it the 
disappearance of an immediate military threat, opponents of strong executive branches were 
once again in ascendancy in the state legislatures. In 1781, Virginia’s governor, Thomas 
Nelson, relinquished the governorship in the face of substantial acrimony from Delegates who 
protested the constitutionality of some of his actions while he was governor.5 His successor, 
Benjamin Harrison, served as governor from 1781 to 1784, but he did not receive the same 
extraordinary powers that had been granted to Nelson. The Delegates in the legislature, 
believing that the end of the war meant that the security of the state had been achieved, began 
to erode the executive branch of any meaningful purpose and authority in Virginia. The 
Delegates transferred naval affairs to a three-man agency that was directly controlled by the 
House. The legislature dismantled most of the bureaucracy that was set up to assist Henry, 
Jefferson and Nelson during the war. The House discontinued the commercial agent, the 
commissary of military stores and the post of war commissioner. The executive branch by 1783 
consisted of a governor, his council and three clerks. It was restored to the 1776 vision of an 
executive: an administrator who assisted the legislature. Benjamin Harrison, believing that he 
was ‘the most impotent executive in the world’, complained about the heavy burden of his daily 
                                                          
4 Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, 3 September 1780, in The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Harold C. 
Syrett, ed., 27 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961-87), II: 400-418.In the same vein, Thomas 
Jefferson maintained that ‘nothing is so embarrassing nor so mischievous in a great assembly as the details of 
execution’, PTJ, XI: 679. 
5 Delegates in the Virginian legislature accused Nelson of acting unconstitutionally because he had authorised 




chores as governor: ‘The eternal interruptions I meet with by being under the necessity of 
hearing every Man that has Business … with me … are such as often to take up Time for 
several Hours in the Day’.6   
 On the national level, under the Articles of Confederation, which took effect in 1781, 
the Confederation had neither an executive nor a judicial branch. There was no administrative 
head of government, except the president of the Congress who was chosen annually. Fear of a 
British-style centralised government dominated political discourse and state legislatures were 
not prepared to stomach strong central government. While Congress had the de jure authority 
over coinage, the postal service and Native American affairs, it required the consent of at least 
nine states to implement policy. It had no power to levy taxes or effectively regulate interstate 
commerce. Congress depended on the approval of state legislatures to achieve anything 
meaningful. With such a decentralised system of government, the Confederation experienced 
multiple problems: disagreements over paper money and protectionism for American goods 
ranked high among them.7 Because of the nature of the inconsistency in policies adopted 
between the individual states, the Confederation was undermined by financial turbulence. This 
instability appeared to threaten the future of the Confederation when, in 1787, Captain Daniel 
Shays advanced an ‘army’ of 1200 hard-pressed farmers upon the federal arsenal at Springfield, 
Massachusetts. Shays’s Rebellion convinced many political leaders that the nation required a 
stronger union and a stronger national government in order to survive.8 A Convention was 
called in 1787 in order to revise the Articles of Confederation and, consequently, strengthen 
                                                          
6 Benjamin Harrison to John Tyler, 1 July 1782, OFLG, III: 409, and Benjamin Harrison to Nathanael Greene, 21 
January 1781, ibid., III: 132. 
7 See Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States During the Confederation, 1781-1789 (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 282-301, 313-326. 
8 For a discussion of the impact of Shays’s Rebellion on the Massachusetts’ and American political scene, see 
Richard D. Brown, ‘Shays’s Rebellion and the Ratification of the Federal Constitution in Massachusetts’, in 
Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity, ed. Richard Beeman et al. 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 113-127; and David P. Szatmary, Shays’ Rebellion: The 
Making of the Agrarian Insurrection (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1980), 120-134. 
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the national constitution. Many Americans were determined that the country should be a 
closely-knit union of states rather than a loosely-bound confederation of states. 
II 
The Federal Convention and the Creation of the Presidential Office 
On 25 May 1787, 29 delegates began work in Philadelphia to change the system of national 
government in the United States of America.9 Their discussions and proposals marked an 
important milestone in the development of American constitutionalism. As Pauline Maier’s 
From Resistance to Revolution demonstrates, in 1768, no American in the colonies was 
prepared for independence and most Americans had a deep affection for Britain. Not even the 
Stamp Act and the Townshend duties could shake colonial trust in the king and parliament.10 
Elsewhere, Maier contends that prominent revolutionaries, such as Sam Adams and Richard 
Henry Lee, in the 1760s, shared a commitment to traditional notions of republicanism. Indeed, 
she classifies them as Old Revolutionaries in order to draw a distinction between the men she 
portrays and the more familiar ‘Founding Fathers’ who were responsible for the great 
constitutional achievement in 1787, the Federal Constitution.11  By 1776, however, Americans 
were committing metaphorical regicide and establishing republican government. Indeed, 
Maier’s American Scripture demonstrates that the Declaration of Independence was not simply 
a work of a single author, Thomas Jefferson, but was part of a process, whereby the ‘other 
                                                          
9 For a discussion of the debates in the Convention, see Richard Beeman, Plain Honest Men: The Making of the 
American Constitution (New York: Random House, 2009); Lance Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James 
Madison and the Founding of the Federal Republic (Ithaca, NY: 1995); Forrest McDonald, We the People: The 
Economic Origins of the Constitution (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958); Jack Rakove, Original 
Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996); and Jackson 
Turner Main, The Antifederalists: Critics of the Constitution, 1781-1788 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1961). For a discussion of the creation of the executive branch in the Convention, see Ray Raphael, 
Mr. President: How and Why the Founders Created a Chief Executive (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012); 
Donald L. Robinson, ‘Gouverneur Morris and the Design of the American Presidency’, Presidential Studies 
Quarterly, 17 (1987), 319-28; and William H. Riker, ‘The Heresthetics of Constitution Making: The Presidency 
in 1787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice’, American Political Science Review, 78 (1984), 
1-16. 
10 Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition 
to Britain, 1765-1776 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), xii. 
11 Pauline Maier, The Old Revolutionaries: Political Lives in the Age of Samuel Adams (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1980), xvii. 
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declarations’ of the first half of the eighteenth century shaped American republican thought.12 
From the introduction of republican government, through the creation of state constitutions and 
the eventual failure of the Articles of Confederation, Americans had tested different forms of 
government. In this Federal Convention, delegates from all the states would debate different 
plans of government, drawing from their own experiences, failures and successes. The main 
debate they faced was whether to reform moderately the existing Confederation or drastically 
devise a new form of national government. In terms of the national executive branch, the 
question was whether the delegates would establish a plural executive branch that proved to be 
woefully inadequate during the war or would they prefer an executive branch that had a degree 
of authority and some meaningful powers in the constitutional system? 
Although 55 delegates from all the states attended in total, several states took precedence. 
James Madison, a delegate from Virginia, drafted proposals that became known as the Virginia 
Plan and, Virginia’s governor, Edmund Randolph, presented these fifteen resolutions on 29 
May 1787. The Virginia plan called for separate legislative, executive and judicial branches 
and a national government whose laws would be binding upon individual citizens as well as 
states. The legislative branch would be divided into two branches: a lower house to be chosen 
by popular vote and an upper house of senators elected by the state legislators. Madison’s 
seventh resolution described the proposed national executive branch: 
Resd. that a National Executive be instituted; to be chosen by the National Legislature for the term 
of _ years, to receive punctually at stated times, a fixed compensation for the services rendered, in 
which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the Magistracy, existing at the time 
of increase or diminution, and to be ineligible a second time; and that besides a general authority to 
execute the National laws, it ought to enjoy the Executive rights vested in Congress by the 
Confederation.13  
 
James Wilson, a delegate from Pennsylvania, moved immediately ‘that the ‘Executive consist 
of a single person’, but the Convention could not agree on this point. Even Edmund Randolph, 
                                                          
12 Pauline Maier, American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1997). 
13 ‘The Virginia Plan, 1787’, in The America Republic: Primary Sources, ed. Bruce Frohnen (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, Inc., 2002), 231-2. 
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according to James Madison’s notes of the debate, ‘strenuously opposed a unity in the 
Executive magistracy’ because ‘he regarded it as the fetus of monarchy’. Randolph ‘could not 
see why the great requisites for the Executive department, vigor, dispatch & responsibility 
could not be found in three men, as well as in one man’. The fear of monarchical power still 
loomed large in the delegates’ discussions. Madison concluded his notes on the debate by 
stating, ‘Mr. Wilson’s motion for a single magistrate was postponed by common consent’.14 
After three days of debate, the delegates had sketched out the outlines of a new executive 
branch: a single executive, appointed by Congress, which would serve a single seven-year term, 
have the authority to veto a congressional bill, but this could be overturned by a two-thirds 
majority in both Houses of the legislature. Delegates were still to spell out exactly the powers 
which this ‘chief magistrate’ would be granted.15 
On 15 June, after weeks of debate on the Virginia Plan, delegates critical of it submitted 
an alternative vision, which became known as the New Jersey Plan. New Jersey’s William 
Paterson announced to the Convention that he and his colleagues – the majority of delegates 
from New Jersey, Delaware, Connecticut and New York – wanted to start over. These delegates 
proposed reforming the existing Articles of Confederation by keeping the existing 
representation of the states in a unicameral congress, but endowing the Congress with power 
to levy taxes and regulate commerce. The United States was to remain a confederation and no 
state would cede all authority to a supreme national government. The plan also proposed a 
plural executive, consisting of an unspecified number of people who would be elected by a 
congress.16 It was clear that the choice facing the delegates was the very same choice during 
the era of the first state constitutions: a single, strong and independent executive or a plural 
executive branch that was subservient to the legislative branch. 
                                                          
14 ‘Madison’s Notes on the Federal Convention of 1787, Friday June 1st 1787 ’, in The Records of the Federal 
Convention of 1787,  ed. Max Farrand, 4 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 3rd edn., 1966), I:64-66. 
15 Ray Raphael, Mr. President, 64. 
16 ‘New Jersey Plan’ in The America Republic: Primary Sources, 232-3. 
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The New Jersey Plan provoked Alexander Hamilton into defending not only centralised 
authority, but also monarchical government. In a speech delivered to delegates on 18 June, 
Hamilton claimed that the British constitution was the ‘best form’ of government. He called 
for a strong executive: ‘the monarch must have proportional strength. He ought to be hereditary 
… [and] he must always intend … the true interest and glory of the people’.17 While the vast 
majority of the delegates shied away from the idea of establishing a hereditary monarchy, there 
was a majority in the convention that was convinced that an independent executive branch with 
substantial powers was the best form. Pennsylvania’s Gouvernour Morris encapsulated the 
logic for a strong, independent executive branch: ‘Our Country is an extensive one. We must 
either then renounce the blessings of the Union, or provide an Executive with sufficient vigor 
to pervade every part of it’.18 He continued that the executive branch must be ‘the guardian of 
the people, even of the lower classes, against legislative tyranny’. In other words, the American 
President must have substantial power to limit the potential for oligarchy. 
Delegates argued at length over the course of several months as to what was the most 
effective executive branch for the country. They argued over the election of the executive: 
would it be by popular vote or by legislative vote? It was finally agreed that the President would 
be chosen by ‘electors’ in each state equal to the number of senators and representatives in 
Congress. Delegates debated whether the President should have an absolute negative on all 
congressional bills or whether the legislature could override the Presidential veto. It was finally 
decided that the President could have a veto on legislation, but it was also decided that Congress 
could overturn this veto if it had a two-thirds majority in the House in which the legislation 
originated.19 
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By 17 September 1787, Congress had finally agreed upon its constitution. Government 
was to be divided into three branches – the executive, the judicial and the legislative. The 
legislative branch would be comprised of an upper house, the Senate, and a lower House, the 
House of Representatives. The former would consist of two senators from each state and the 
latter was to consist of members in proportion to the population sizes of the states. The 
executive branch shall be ‘vested in a President of the United States of America’, holding office 
for a four year term, and to be elected by the Electoral College. The President ‘shall be 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy and have power to grant pardons, to make Treaties, 
and to appoint Ambassadors, ‘Judges of the supreme Court’, and ‘all other Officers of the 
United States’, with the approval of the Senate. The President also had the power to veto all 
congressional laws, but his veto could be overturned by a two-thirds majority in the legislative 
chamber in which the bills originated.20 It was a major achievement to reach a compromise 
over the executive branch, especially after such conflicting views were aired during the 
convention. While it was one thing to work out a constitution that delegates could agree upon, 
it was quite another to ensure that this Federal Constitution would be ratified by at least nine 
of the 13 states. The ratification process would put to the test the opening paragraph of the 
constitution: ‘We the people’. 
III 
‘The Genius of the People’: Ratification in Virginia 
When the Virginian Convention began to debate the Federal Constitution on 2 June 1788, a 
full nine months after the Federal Convention submitted its plan for public ratification, eight 
states had already ratified the Constitution. Several of the smaller states, apparently satisfied 
by the provisions for equality of representation in the senate and thus content that their rights 
were safeguarded, quickly ratified the constitution by the end of 1787. If the Virginia 
                                                          
20 ‘The Constitution of the United States of America, 1787’, in The America Republic: Primary Sources, 237-8. 
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Convention decided to approve the Federal Convention’s proposals, Virginia might prove to 
be the decisive vote which would ratify the constitution. This was not to prove to be the case, 
however. New Hampshire was the ninth state to ratify the Constitution on 21 June 1788, which 
meant that the Constitution had been effectively ratified by the American people. It was clear, 
however, that this new Constitution would not succeed without the approval of the most 
populous state, Virginia. 
 Pauline Maier’s seminal monograph, Ratification, has reframed the debate over the 
ratification of the proposed federal constitution in 1787-1788. Rather than analysing the 
ratification process in the American states as a narrow federalist versus antifederalist debate, 
Maier has shown that ‘critics of the constitution’ ranged far and wide in the American states. 
Because virtually all Americans recognised imperfections in the proposed constitution, Maier 
has shown that the debate over the constitution cannot be neatly categorised into for and against 
camps. Instead, there was a spectrum of opinion in the American states. Relying heavily on the 
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, Maier contends that, without the 
determined opposition of the constitution’s critics, the first ten amendments to the constitution 
would not have been included. She maintains that ‘We the People’ of 1787 and 1788 
‘inaugurated a dialogue between power and liberty that has continued, reminding us regularly 
of the principles of 1776 upon which the United States was founded and that have given us 
direction and national identity’.21 
Despite the fact that it was Virginian delegates who proposed the more centralised plan 
of government to the Convention, the Virginian legislature was particularly divided over the 
new national constitution. This was not a simple ‘for’ and ‘against’ division, however. James 
Madison identified ‘three parties in Virginia’ that would contest the proposed constitution: the 
first, a party led by Washington that favoured ‘adopting the constitution without attempting 
                                                          
21 Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 468. 
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amendments’; the second, a party that ‘urged amendments’ which included George Mason; and 
the third, a party that wanted not to ratify the constitution at all.  Leading the charge for the last 
group was Patrick Henry. 
 On 5 June, Henry denounced the proposed executive branch, declaring that the 
Constitution ‘has an awful squinting’ towards ‘monarchy. And does not this raise indignation 
in the breast of every true American?’ He reasoned that ‘Your president may easily become a 
King’ and ‘if we make a King, he may prescribe the rules by which he shall rule his people, 
and interpose such checks as shall prevent him from infringing them’.22 The presidential pardon 
also came under attack because many Antifederalists maintained that the power was 
unchecked. George Mason reasoned that the President should be denied this right to pardon 
because ‘he may frequently pardon crimes which were advised by himself’. In Mason’s dark 
vision of the future presidency, the power to pardon led to monarchical government and the 
end of republicanism: ‘It may happen at some future day, that he will establish a monarchy, 
and destroy the republic’. 
 The powers at the disposal of the President and Senate were challenged simultaneously 
in the debates. Critics of the constitution maintained that the Senate would work with the 
President in order to bypass the people’s representatives in the House. Mason explained this 
Anti-Federalist thinking: 
The Constitution has married the President and the Senate – has made them man and wife.  I believe 
the consequence that generally results from marriage, will happen here. They will be continually 
supporting and aiding each other. They will always consider their interests as united. We know the 
advantage the few have over the many. They can with facility act in concert and on an uniform 
system. They may join scheme and plot against the people without any chance of detection. The 
Senate and the President will form a combination that cannot be prevented by the Representatives. 
The Executive and the legislative powers thus connected, will destroy all balance.23 
                                                          
22 Henry continued in his speech: ‘Can he not at the head of this army beat down every opposition? Away with 
your President, we shall have a King. The army will salute him Monarch; your militia will leave you and assist in 
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ed. Merrill Jensen et al., 17 vols. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976-), IX: 963-4. 
23 Ibid., X: 1376. 
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 Mason believed that such was the concentrated power that was devolved to the Senate and the 
executive branch, that people would become bystanders in the great political play on the 
national stage. Anti-Federalists were clearly worried that the executive branch could interfere 
with the legislative branch in the constitution and, therefore, undermine the separation of 
powers. Mason continued: ‘The dangerous power and structure of the government … would 
end either in monarchy, or a tyrannical aristocracy’.24 
 How threatening was the proposed executive branch to the constitution’s critics in 
Virginia? Was the proposed Presidential system really regarded as repugnant by a large group 
of Virginians? Ray Raphael has insisted that those who ‘decided against the Constitution tried 
to defeat it by using any and all arguments they could muster, so they naturally raised alarms 
about the powers of the presidency’.25 Complaining about the powers and prestige of a new 
political office was an easy target for Virginians who were mainly preoccupied by the issue of 
state’s rights. In a similar fashion, Pauline Maier downplays Virginian concerns over the 
presidential system. Two chapters of her monograph analyses, in minute detail, Virginian 
complaints about the proposed constitution, but Maier devotes only two paragraphs to a 
discussion of Virginian fears over the proposed presidential system. For Maier, Virginians were 
far more concerned about the issues of representation, states’ rights, Congress’s military 
powers and taxation.26 
 Evidence of the federal constitution’s critics’ lack of genuine conviction over the 
proposed presidential system is revealed in the Convention’s proposed amendments to the 
Constitution.27 The Virginia Convention formally ratified the Constitution on 25 June and, two 
days later, it recommended a list of amendments to the first Federal Congress for consideration. 
The Convention recommended a bill of rights, which was a revised version of the 1776 Virginia 
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25 Ibid., 139. 
26 Pauline Maier, Ratification, 260, 265-6, 286, 289-291. 
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declaration of rights. This is a crucial amendment and it was James Madison of Virginia, 
despite being a Federalist, who played a major role in getting the Bill of Rights (the Ten 
Amendments) accepted by Congress. As Gordon Wood has shown, it was Madison’s personal 
conviction and political skill which engineered the passage of the Bill of Rights through a 
Federalist-dominated (and largely ambivalent) Congress and, thus, assuaging the doubts of 
those antifederalists in Virginia.28 Patrick Henry demanded an additional twenty amendments 
to the constitution: they included amendments addressing ambiguities in the text of the 
Constitution; annual publication of reports on public finance changes to taxation policy, and 
state approval of commercial treaties. The amendments did tackle some powers of the 
president. In particular, the Convention wanted to limit federal control over state militias – 
fearing abuse of military power – and to change the president’s terms of office – no person 
could be president for more than eight years in sixteen. Clearly, these two amendments indicate 
that delegates in the Convention were more worried about a president being able to abuse his 
authority while in office than the specific powers and prestige granted to the office. Pauline 
Maier may well be correct in her assertion that critics of the constitution ‘had pulled back on’ 
structural changes to the executive branch because ‘understanding perhaps that the time had 
passed for so substantial a revision of the Constitution’s institutional design’. It cannot be 
denied, however, that, for Virginians, their concerns did not merit amendments to the 
constitution. Their discussions of the perceived excessiveness of the proposed presidential 
powers could easily have been a front to destabilise the apparent erosion of states’ rights.29 The 
Federal Constitution had been ratified by all thirteen American states and became the law of 
the land on 4 March 1789. It was a phenomenal achievement for a nation that was particularly 
divided over the proposed system of government. George Washington was the first person to 
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be sworn in as head of the new federal executive branch on 30 April 1789. The American 
Republic had evolved from a collection of states without any real executive authority to a union 
of states with a federal executive branch. 
IV 
Conclusion: The Evolution of Executive Authority in Virginia 
In 1776, the Virginian constitutional drafting committee was apprehensive about the potential 
of an unlimited executive branch. Not only did its members believe that they had endured 
oppressive legislation implemented by royal governors, but they concluded that the root cause 
of this tyrannical legislation was over-mighty monarchical government. Inspired by Country 
Whig theories in Britain, Virginians claimed that corruption had undermined the whole 
political system and Parliament’s oppressive legislation had originated in its executive abuses. 
Inspired by radical Country Whig thinkers in Britain, Virginians maintained that all individuals 
had to aspire to public virtue. They believed that a system of government must protect people’s 
happiness and they were certain that a strong executive branch was inimical to such a goal. 
They warned that a republican system of government must never be corrupted in the same 
fashion as the ‘old’ monarchical government. Hence, they devised a constitution which placed 
almost all power in the legislative branch and, by the same token, they neutralised the threat 
posed by the executive branch by stripping away all of the prerogatives and powers that it had 
formerly possessed under royal government. It was widely feared that a powerful executive 
branch able to wield prerogatives, enforce unpopular legislation and influence the people’s 
representatives, would undermine and ultimately destroy the Commonwealth. They ensured 
that they would have an executive branch which was elected by the legislature, accountable to 
the legislature and managed by the legislature. Although Virginians rejected the form and 
substance of royal government, they relied heavily upon British constitutional thinking when 
they created the gubernatorial position in the Virginia Constitution. They adapted Country 
230 
 
Whig fears concerning executive power in order to neutralise the effect a strong executive 
branch could pose in the constitution. The question remains: how different was the ‘old’ 
government system that had evolved over a period of 150 years to the one created in 1776? To 
what extent does the 1776 system of governorship represent a radical change from its royal 
predecessor? 
In the first place, the symbolical significance of both systems of governorship was 
manifestly different. Although the Virginia Convention retained the name ‘governor’ in the 
political system, they did not retain the same kind of office. The royal governor was the king’s 
representative, who could exercise various kingly prerogatives and was involved in all the 
judicial, legislative and military affairs of the colony. The royal governor acted as if he were 
head of state and he represented the link between mother country and colony. Ceremonially, 
Botetourt and Fauquier were revered in the colony and were fondly remembered after they had 
died. In stark contrast, the new governor of the Commonwealth was an administrator who acted 
at the head of an executive council. He lacked any actual powers of appointment and any real 
powers over the legislative and judicial branches.  In terms of what the governor represented, 
both systems appear diametrically opposed. 
In terms of the method of appointment to the governorship, the two systems had 
contrasting methods. A royal governor was appointed, whereas the state governor was elected. 
A royal governor secured his position because of the influence of powerful patrons with the 
king. He served at the king’s pleasure and could often be transferred to another colony or 
removed altogether on the personal whim of the king or according to the changing power 
struggle back at Westminster. A royal governor’s appointment lacked security and permanence 
which severely hampered his ability to govern. A state governor, on the other hand, was elected 
by the General Assembly, which meant he was effectively controlled by the legislative branch. 
While a royal governor’s appointment guaranteed that he could never be the all-powerful 
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executive which some contemporaries perceived him to be, or accused him of being, the state 
governor’s election meant that he could wield only a modicum of influence over the state 
legislature. Because the General Assembly elected the governor, it meant that the governor 
inevitably came from the legislative branch with extensive legislative experience. In other 
words, the governor had personal contact with delegates in the House and Henry and Jefferson 
would often use this existing relationship in order to make policy suggestions to the House. 
Thus, whereas the appointed royal governor lost his ability to govern because of the nature of 
his appointment, the elected state governor derived some influence with the legislature because 
of the fact that the General Assembly appointed him. 
Although they may appear diametrically opposed, the two systems of governorship 
were actually quite similar in certain respects. Whereas most historians have maintained that 
all royal governors had substantial powers, this is not entirely accurate. While royal governors 
in Virginia did have a degree of control over the Virginian militia and the judiciary, they had 
very little real authority over the House of Burgesses and had little or no means of influencing 
the general public. In the same manner, the state governor had no influence over the legislative 
branch and had very few patronage powers which would allow him to create a support base. 
The system of state governorship had to contend with the same difficulties and problems that 
undermined and exposed the weak system of royal governorship in Virginia.  
Both systems ensured that the governor did not govern alone. The royal governor was 
assisted by an executive council consisting of between ten and twelve members. While the 
royal governor did not control who was appointed to the council, he did make recommendations 
to the Board of Trade which usually agreed with the governor’s nomination. The council in 
colonial Virginia had become a dysfunctional political body, however. All three governors of 
Virginia constantly had problems putting a quorum together because the members of the 
council were scattered across the colony. Indeed, Virginian royal governors were often 
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informed by the Board of Trade to ignore the advice given by the Council if it contradicted 
imperial policy. The state governor was not permitted to ignore his Council of State. The 
Virginia Convention ensured that the Council would no longer be regarded as simply an 
advisory body. Instead, they stipulated that the governor could execute the laws of the state 
only with the consent of the council. In other words, the Virginia Convention ensured that the 
governor was little more than the head of a plural executive. While the governor could not 
govern without the advice of the Council, both Henry and Jefferson often had to act unilaterally 
because the Council were not present to assist him. Therefore, both royal and state governors 
frequently functioned without the advice and support of their Council. 
Both systems of governorship had to contend with a tripartite system of administration. 
Royal governors worked within a system of imperial administration which proved untenable 
for most governors. They were instructed how to act and liable to have any decision of theirs 
vetoed or overturned back in Britain. These imperial bodies were haphazardly organised, 
heavily bureaucratic and lacked a centralised decision-making process which, if in place, would 
have greatly benefited the governor’s ability to execute his office in the colony. The Board of 
Trade and Plantations often assumed some of the powers of patronage that were nominally at 
the disposal of the royal governors and the Privy Council appropriated land granting powers, 
which impaired any royal governor’s ability to manage the legislative assembly. At the same 
time, the remaining powers of royal governors were parcelled out to an increasingly powerful 
House of Burgesses. This legislative body had control of the colony’s public finances and was 
often able to use its command of the revenues raised in the colony in order to negate the 
governor’s ability to wield his prerogative. The governor in Virginia was also unable to 
influence the composition of the legislative branch as the House of Burgesses was elected by a 
large majority of the people living in Virginia and he lacked the patronage to influence large 
numbers of voters or many members of the assembly. 
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In a similar fashion, Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson had to contend with two 
political institutions which severely hampered their ability to govern effectively. In the first 
place, they had to work with a legislative branch which had been granted all the prerogatives 
and patronage that were possessed by the executive branch before the Revolution. They were 
directly elected by the General Assembly of Virginia and had to act at the behest of this body, 
which could not always be consulted because it was infrequently in session. Second, both 
governors had to contend with the Continental Congress which exerted great pressure on the 
executive branch in the state by its frequent and unrelenting requests for both men and supplies. 
Both state governors frequently sought the help of the Continental Congress in order to defend 
Virginia, but with little success. Thus, the governor was dependent on the legislative branch 
for his election and the means to carry out his governorship.  
In other words, both systems of governorship were severely hampered because they had 
to contend with an internal institution and an external administration. The Virginian royal 
governor was unable to exert much influence or authority in the colony because an internal 
institution, the House of Burgesses, controlled not only the means and amount by which 
revenue was to be raised in his colony, but it also assumed control over how this revenue was 
to be spent. The Virginian royal governor was unable to exert much authority or influence in 
the colony because an external administration, the Board of Trade, had assumed most of his 
patronage powers, had the power to remove him from office whenever it wanted, and had 
ensured that the governor must follow its instructions. The Virginian State governor could not 
exert much authority or influence in the state because an internal institution, the General 
Assembly, directly elected him, possessed all the prerogatives, which were formerly devolved 
to the royal governor, and assumed control of the most important powers of patronage. The 
Virginian state governor could not exert much influence in the state because an external body, 
the Continental Congress, placed considerable demands on the governor for men and supplies. 
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Both systems of governorship, therefore, struggled to work with their local legislative assembly 
and struggled to appease the demands placed on them by an ‘external’ administration. 
For a royal governor to become a truly dominant executive, he would have had to be 
able to control the House of Burgesses. Of course, Fauquier, Botetourt and Dunmore frequently 
prorogued and dissolved the House in order to reassert imperial control over the Virginian 
legislature. This, however, did not prevent the House of Burgesses from meeting elsewhere 
and its members eventually acted independently of the governor’s prerogative. Because they 
could not control the House of Burgesses, all three governors resorted to utilising a consensual 
style of governance. They would often accede to the legislation passed by the House in order 
to ingratiate themselves with the colonial elite who essentially controlled the colony. The state 
governor had even fewer means of controlling the General Assembly of republican Virginia. 
Instead, he was himself largely controlled by the legislative branch. Patrick Henry and Thomas 
Jefferson, however, had to rely on their personal contacts within the House of Delegates in 
order to achieve anything meaningful. Thus, both systems of governorship were largely 
powerless with regard to the powerful legislative branch. 
Both systems of governorship struggled to impose their influence over the people at 
large. All three royal governors did not have the required patronage at their disposal which 
would allow them to build up large bodies of support in the colonies. They had to rely on their 
personality and appearance in order to cultivate loyalty among Virginians. While this worked 
to an extent in the capital, Williamsburg, all three governors failed to control the colonists’ 
march westward and their incursions into Native American land. All royal governors tried to 
gain loyalty from Virginians by granting land patents, which were essentially another form of 
patronage for the governor. The problem was that by granting land patents for areas in the 
borderland region, the governor was essentially losing his ability to control these colonists. 
Both republican governors failed to exert any influence over the people because the Virginia 
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Convention expressly denied them any effective powers of patronage. Both Jefferson and 
Henry failed to wield influence on the local level and troop enlistment to the Virginia militia 
suffered as a direct result. Both systems of governorship lacked the patronage required and the 
powers needed to exert much influence over the legislative branch and over Virginians in 
general. 
The system of governorship, that was devised by the Virginia Convention, therefore, 
essentially established in law what had already become apparent in practice. Royal 
governorship was a very weak governing system: governors lost their ability to influence the 
legislative branch, struggled to control Virginians in their march westward, and had to contend 
with a system of imperial administration that was highly diversified and bureaucratically 
inefficient. All royal governors lacked security in their tenure, were forced to govern by 
instruction and were denied the important patronage rights which would ensure they could 
govern effectively. Although the Virginia Convention firmly believed that royal governors, 
such as Dunmore, had wielded too much influence over the political system, they were 
mistaken. When they devised their own version of the gubernatorial office, they were actually 
outlining what royal governors had actually become in the colony. Without the ability to gain 
public loyalty, dependent on the whim of the king or their superior patrons, royal governors 
could exert very little influence over the colony. State governors, in the same manner, lacked 
the powers and prestige to influence the people at large or to control the General Assembly. 
The new state governorship, therefore, was a system which strongly resembled the practical 
nature of royal governorship. There was not a marked transformation in the system of 
governorship during the revolution; instead, both systems were ineffective and suffered as a 
consequence. The American Revolution did not radically transform the gubernatorial position, 
but only enshrined in law what had become obvious in reality.  
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While royal governors steadily lost their prerogative powers over the course of the 
colonial era, state governors steadily increased theirs in the space of five years. As has been 
shown in Chapter Four, both Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson were not only granted some 
temporary emergency powers, but were often forced to act beyond their constitutional 
constraints. While the House of Delegates restored the executive branch to its 1776 creation, 
there can be little doubt that the war, when the governorship in Virginia had evolved a little, is 
emblematic of the wider evolution of gubernatorial and executive power that was occurring in 
other American states. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 had evolved from its 1776 
framework: the latter constitution had got rid of the governorship, but the 1790 framework 
restored the governor to the position of the head of the executive branch. The Federal 
Constitution of 1787 devised an executive that was closely modelled upon the executive branch 
that was contained in the Massachusetts’ constitution. The American perception and 
application of the powers at the disposal of the executive branch was clearly changing. 
From the time when Francis Fauquier arrived in the colony in 1758 to Thomas Nelson’s 
resignation in 1781, the perceived importance of a governor to the political system had evolved 
considerably. Fauquier appeared to possess kingly powers, but in reality was only an 
administrator of government who lacked the authority and practical influence to govern as the 
king’s representative. In 1776, Virginians perceived the executive branch as the most 
dangerous threat to the future of the Virginian constitution. The constitutional committee 
ensured that the governor was denied all means of influence and power. Thomas Nelson 
inherited an office that was supposed to be ineffective and weak, but he exercised some 
considerable powers in order to protect Virginia and assisted in the final defeat of the British. 
Although Virginia restored the weak governorship system once Harrison was elected, the 
experience during the war ensured that most Americans believed that a weak executive branch 
was inadequate in time of crisis. Thus, from the weak executive branches created in the 1776 
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constitutions to the stronger executive branch devised by the Federal Convention in 1787, the 
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